80th Anniversary: The Battle of Midway

In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet, which at that time the public perceived as residing at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.

On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. He did not bring any staff with him. When the door opened, he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.

He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the general perception was wrong. The dry-docks, repair shops, and fuel tank farm were intact. The carriers with their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. The war against the Japanese would begin in Hawaii and not on the West Coast. He immediately sent submarines into Japanese waters and conducted carrier operations disrupting Japanese Initiatives. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.

Nimitz decided some particularly good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. He related that as head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.

However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr., and Captain Edwin T. Layton. There intelligence unit had not unscrambled the new Japanese call signs or broken into the revised naval code to warn of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, these men later provided the key intelligence convincing Nimitz to hazard all his carriers at Midway.

For the Japanese, the battle for Midway was part of their strategy for establishing the next line of their Pacific Ocean defensive parameter. They intended to conquer Port Moresby in New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Aleutians. Thereby, Australia would be severed as a base for an American counter-offensive and the northern flank of the Home Islands would be protected. Specifically, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto considered this initiative would provide the opportunity to draw out Nimitz for the decisive naval battle contemplated by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.

This sea fight began with Chester Nimitz determined to meet the enemy in a major battle, but he faced long odds. Solid intelligence had discerned a complex plan disbursing Japanese forces, but Nimitz still had to consider the information could be a ruse, because the basic principle of U.S. intelligence was that an enemy will act according to the best use of their capabilities. For Nimitz that meant giving weight to concentration as the best option. He was also troubled by the uncertainty of locating enemy dispositions expected because of storms west and northwest of Midway. In fact, weather was to play an important part in hiding Japanese carriers from detection. Both sides experienced Horatio Nelson’s admonition that “something must be left to chance; nothing is certain in a sea fight”.

His final instructions to admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher were, “In carrying out the task assigned in Op Plan 29-42, you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy”.

To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they might be outnumbered more than three to one. Author Gordon W. Prange compiled the order of battle for the navies. The Japanese had 4 heavy carriers, 2 light carriers, 11 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers for a total of 86 ships. The United States had 3 carriers no light carriers or battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seventeen destroyers or a total of 27 ships.

To balance the odds somewhat Nimitz had decided to make Midway Island his fourth aircraft carrier and sent every aircraft under his control forward. He crowded the island with 115 aircraft, including the untried B-17 & B-26 bombers and the obsolete Vindicator dive bombers & Brewster Buffalo fighters. The Army contributed had their bombers but retained fighters to defend the Hawaiian Islands.

This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the carrier task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and inspired assessments of naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how paying the more bitter price for mistakes in strategic planning, tactical execution, and operational doctrines contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat. Instead, the narrative relates the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men, who in close combat attacked the four heavy carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force on June 4, 1942.

The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but the next morning the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady radioed discovery of the Japanese carriers. Fifteen minutes later the PBY patrol by Lieutenant William Chase radioed in the clear, “Many planes headed Midway. Bearing 320 degrees distance 150 miles. These warnings enabled the remaining 66 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air. The updates provided by Ady enabled Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the Japanese carriers except for 21 Marine Brewster Buffalos and 7 Wildcat fighters dedicated to repelling the attackers.

In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway beginning at 6:16AM, 14 of the 21 Brewster fighter pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s (Brewster Buffalo) should consider them lost before leaving the ground”. Captain Francis McCarthy, flying one of the Wildcats, was also killed after shooting down one of eight Zeros attacking him and wingman Lt. Roy Corry Jr. Overall, only 10 fighters survived the fight and only two were in shape to fly again.

The attacks by land-based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Navy Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling of Torpedo 8 made their attack. These were some of the new torpedo bombers that should have replaced the hopelessly outdated Devastators Lt. Cdr. John Waldron had onboard Hornet, but the Avengers were 24 hours late reaching Hawaii. The planes obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived to return to Midway. Ens. Bert Earnest and Radioman Harry Ferrier thereby became with Ens. George Gay the other two “lone survivors” of Torpedo 8.

Next the Army Air Corps made its appearance. Captain James Collins lead four Army B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes externally in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. They were instructed to launch at less than 1,000 yards to hit 30 knot aircraft carriers with 33 knot torpedoes. Also, they understood most torpedoes failed when released at over 50 feet above the water and at aircraft speeds exceeding 126 mph; a speed at which this aircraft often stalled and crashed when attempting to land. Two of four planes with their 7-man crews perished, and no hits were obtained.

Marine dive bombers closely followed the B-26’s. At 7:55AM Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field at Guadalcanal was named) attacked with 16 Dauntless bombers of which 8 were lost with their two-man crews. Henderson’s crews made a glide bombing attack on the Hiryū, because they were untrained in dive bombing tactics. Again, no hits were obtained.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney lead 13 long range Army B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers, escorts, or the transport group. One aircraft was damaged by a Zero and one man was injured. The Japanese were reluctant to attack the heavily armed bombers, but the ships had no trouble evading the bombs dropped nearly four miles above them.

At 8:30AM Marine Major Benjamin Norris led eleven Vindicator dive bombers to the Japanese fleet. The aircraft were considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. These planes displayed such fragility their fabric fuselage was reinforced with 4” hospital masking tape. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy fire, but two more were lost at sea with their two-man crews because of low fuel. By June 6 only three were flyable. The Battle of Midway was this aircraft’s only combat use. The plane was pulled from service in 1943.

Next into the battle from 9:18AM to10:15AM came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet, respectively. In all Lt. Commanders Lance E. Massey, Gene Lindsey, and John Waldron lead 42 Devastator torpedo bombers against the Japanese carriers. The squadrons had become separated from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Waldron left the other Hornet aircraft deliberately replying to Lt. Commander Stanhope C. Ring’s order to follow him, “I know where the damn Jap fleet is. The hell with you”. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at less than 1,000 yards. In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their two-man crews were lost and no hits were obtained. Ens. George H. Gay, Jr., who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers, was the lone survivor of this Torpedo 8 attack and was rescued by a PBY the next day.

The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ensigns Mark Kelly and George R. Hill were never found.

The Japanese carrier task force had withstood eight separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy, Marine, and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 79 aircraft. Of those 58 were destroyed, 126 of 174 men perished, and no hits were obtained. While the Japanese found satisfaction in thwarting the attacks, they faced complete frustration in efforts to re-arm and spot aircraft from the hanger decks to strike the American carriers.

Now at 10:20AM Bombing 3, Scouting 6 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived overhead while most Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the American torpedo bombers. The 18 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6 and Scouting 6, Lieutenant Wade McClusky as group commander, and Lieutenants Earl Gallaher and Richard Best as section leaders attacked the Akagi and Kaga. Most of Best’s section incorrectly followed McClusky and Gallaher in attacks that inflicted five hits and five near misses on the Kaga. Best and his two wingmen attacked the Akagi. The two wingmen obtained near misses, but Best’s 1,000 lb bomb exploded amongst aircraft on the hanger deck to start an uncontrollable fire.

The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely but Scouting 6 and Bombing6 lost 16 aircraft and 11 of 38 two man crews.

The Japanese turn came at 11:52AM when Yorktown radar plot reported, “Bogeys 32 miles and closing”. Despite fearful losses, the Japanese scored hits with three bombs at noon and at 2:42PM their torpedo plane attacks scored two hits and forced the Yorktown to abandon ship. The defending Combat Air Patrol lost one Wildcat compared to 22 of 30 Japanese aircraft lost to fighters and anti-aircraft fire.

There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 2:45PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 6 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers but ordered Lieutenant William E. Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling. However, there were just too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and three aircraft with crews were lost.

There were attacks before and after June 4 during the Battle of Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers and the many superbly trained aircrews and technicians proved fatal to Japanese plans.

This splendid victory by Navy, Marine and Army Air Corps flyers over the First Carrier Striking Force permanently seized the initiative from the Japanese. One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet and obtained no hits, about 550 flyers closely engaged the Japanese and suffered nearly 300 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this accomplishment incredible and miraculous. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv5-Midway.html

Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm

I find no evidence the planes flew with bombardiers on June 4 or had Norden bombsights.

http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx

http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849

“8 May 1942 by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington which scored three bomb hits: one on the carrier’s port bow, one to starboard at the forward end of the flight deck and one just abaft the island. Fires broke out but were eventually contained and extinguished. The resulting damage required Shokaku to return to Japan for major repairs. On the journey back, the carrier shipped so much water through her damaged bow she nearly capsized in heavy seas, maintaining a high rate of speed in order to avoid a cordon of American submarines out hunting for her.

She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and entered dry dock on 16 June 1942. Repairs were completed within ten days and, a little over two weeks later on 14 July, she was formally reassigned to Striking Force, 3rd Fleet, Carrier Division 1”.

At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8 dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington scored three bomb hits on the Shokaku. The resulting damage required her to return to Japan for major repairs. She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and did not enter dry dock until a month later on 16 June 1942.

In comparison the damage the Yorktown sustained after Coral Sea led to the Navy Yard inspectors estimating that she would need at least two weeks of repairs. However, Admiral Nimitz ordered that she be made ready to sail alongside TF 16. Yard workers at Pearl Harbor, laboring around the clock, made enough repairs to enable the ship to put to sea again in 48 hours.

The Japanese never replaced the carriers they lost at Midway. Meanwhile we in the US built over thirty fast carriers - carriers so fast the old battle wagons couldn’t keep up with them - and a host of carrier escorts. I.e. jeep carriers.

We will never forget the courage of those pilots and seamen. I think we had providential assistance. The battle turned on our planes locating the Japanese carriers before they found ours. Had the reverse happened it would have been a disaster for us.

As one admiral was quoted, after Midway we fought the Pacific War just as we had planned it at the Navy War College. That doesn’t mean there was not much blood, sweat, and tears involved. My Dad was a USN Pacific vet. God Bless Him and all sailors, marines, and soldiers.

Some results from a search. The USA had 5 aircraft carriers just prior to the war.

151 aircraft carriers were built in the U.S. during World War II.
122 of them were Escort Carriers
US Navy had 6768 active ships by 1945
Between Dec 7th, 1941 and Sep 2nd, 1945 the US lost
2 Battleships
5 Carriers
6 Escort Carriers
7 Heavy Cruisers
3 Light Cruisers
88 Destroyers
14 Destroyer Escorts
54 Submarines
3 Minelayers
Hundreds of other ships and craft

How many people died in the Second World War?
Over 60 million people were killed, which was about 3% of the 1940 world population (est. 2.3 billion).
World War II fatality statistics vary, with estimates of total deaths ranging from 50 million to more than 80 million.

The higher figure of over 80 million includes deaths from war-related disease and famine. Civilians killed totaled 50 to 55 million, including 19 to 28 million from war-related disease and famine. Military deaths from all causes totaled 21 to 25 million, including deaths in captivity of about 5 million prisoners of war.

For emphasis - this video describes the battle from the Japanese perspective, including the decisions the commanders had to make when and the information that was available to them at the time:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd8_vO5zrjo

"The Japanese never replaced the carriers they lost at Midway. Meanwhile we in the US built over thirty fast carriers - carriers so fast the old battle wagons couldn’t keep up with them - and a host of carrier escorts. I.e. jeep carriers."

When WW2 ended the US had 109 carriers in the Pacific. Most were escort type carriers.

The SBD (Dauntless) is best remembered as the bomber that delivered the fatal blows to the Japanese carriers at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The type earned its nickname "Slow But Deadly" (from its SBD initials) during this period. ( Wiki))

Many heroes' names are associated with this battle. The names Spruance and McClusky are among the most illustrious.

Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morrison: "...Spruance's performance was superb. Calm, collected, decisive, yet receptive to advice; keeping in his mind the picture of widely disparate forces, yet boldly seizing every opening. Raymond A. Spruance emerged from the battle [Midway] one of the greatest admirals in American naval history. (Wiki)

In the words of Admiral Chester Nimitz: "McClusky's decision to continue the search for the enemy and his judgment as to where the enemy might be found, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway". (Wiki)

Thanks for the link. One thing I kept running across in several of my sources was the frustration with the sighting reported by the reconnaissance aircraft from the Japanese heavy cruiser Tone. With a bit more aggression and professionalism on his part it seems they could have reacted sooner.

Nice article.

Interesting to note that Admiral Halsey would have been in command of Midway had he not come down with a severe case of psoriasis, which caused him to be sidelined. This opened the door for Admiral Spruance and the rest is history.

Later in the war, Admiral Halsey would constantly try to make up for that resulting in questionable decisions in the Leyte Gulf and for keeping his fleet moving forward in a typhoon where it would have been more prudent to take the fleet to shelter.

Halsey is the admiral most remembered. But Spruance and Mitscher and Nimitz were real heroes too. Interesting that the Navy never named a class of ships after Halsey, as opposed to Spruance and Nimitz.

And Leyte Gulf was a big SNAFU on Halsey's part.

My Dad, a Navy veteran of the Pacific War, told me that the designation was an inside joke. The reality was that after the Battle of Guadalcanal was won, the navy found that they could produce CVEs in less than a third the time as standard CVs and that the momentum had shifted so heavily in America's favor that few were actually lost in combat.

Of the five standard CVs which started the war:

Lexington was sunk at the Battle of Coral Sea,
Yorktown was heavily damaged at Midway and was sunk by a chance encounter with a Japanese submarine while being towed back to Pearl Harbor for repairs,
Hornet was sunk in one of the Guadalcanal battles,
Saratoga was damaged and repaired multiple times until finally damaged so badly in a kamikaze attack at Iwo Jima that she was towed back and converted into a training vessel for the duration of the war,
Enterprise thus became the only one of the original aircraft carriers to survive the war as an aircraft carrier.

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