The landings at Maleme Airfield
The attack on Maleme airfield was assigned to Group West under the command of General Eugen Meindle and started early in the morning with fighters and bombers of Richtofen's VIII Fliegerkorps hitting the airfield in two waves. Their attacks were concentrated on the exposed Bofors anti-aircraft guns, troops on the ground, and especially on Hill 107. This hill, overlooking the airfield (and now the location for the German war cemetery), was an important focus for the German airborne troops, many of whom would die there. At around 08:15 the airborne assault began, the first troops on the ground were the elite 1st Battalion of the Assault Regiment, who arrived by towed glider.
Glider borne troops were planned to land at the mouth of the Tavronitis river to attack the western edge of the airfield, a force under Major Koch (who would later receive a fatal stomach wound) would land and assault the south-western and north-eastern slopes of Hill 107, and Major Braun would land and lead his glider troops to capture the iron bridge over the river.
Although the gliders carrying this group landed where they were intended to, they were raked by small arms fire from the New Zealanders on the ground. Braun, the commander, was killed while still in his glider. The area around Maleme, in fact most of Crete, is covered in olive groves with low walls made of the sharp local rocks. This would have been a dreadful place to land a glider, or come down by parachute. The terrain made movement and force concentration difficult. It was also hot and dry, which would take its toll of both side. Anyone visiting the area today cannot help but wonder how anyone could have contemplated glider landings in that hilly, stony, olive tree covered countryside. No wonder so many died.
Behind the glider borne troops would come the paratroopers in their tri-motor JU52 transport aircraft. A number of problems are faced by paratroop forces; if they drop from too great a height they risk missing the aiming point for the drop; if they drop too low they risk their parachute failing to open; they are vulnerable to ground fire from defending forces if they are dropped over a defensive position; their main weapons are dropped separately in weapons containers as a man and all his equipment is too heavy for the parachute and he would fall too quickly.
At Maleme and Kastelli Kissamos the German paratroops were dropping against defensive positions, many were killed before they reached the ground, and many more were killed before they could retrieve their weapons from the weapons containers. Those who dropped over Kastelli led by Lieutenant Murbe were killed in large numbers by the 1st Greek Regiment, and the local villagers. Very few survived that drop. At 08:15 74 paratroops dropped on Kastelli, by 11:00 there were only 17 alive, and all were captured. The Cretan villagers proved that they would not stand by and see their island invaded without taking their own dreadful revenge. Although they had very few weapons, they fought with anything to hand. However, as a result the Germans would later raze villages to the ground, and murder hundreds of civilians as reprisals for their show of defiance.
The German intelligence staff under a Major Reinhardt had given General Student and his team an incorrect appreciation of the resistance the invasion would meet on Crete. On the evening before the battle they stated that the British garrison on Crete was no more than 5,000 strong, 400 of them at Iraklion and none at Rethymnon. All the New Zealanders and Australians, according to the intelligence brief, had been removed to Egypt and their were no Greek forces on the island. They were in for a surprise.
Generaloberst Kurt Student
The German assault had met a much sterner defense around Maleme than they had been led to expect. The German parachute training manual had been captured, without their knowledge, during their attack on Ypenbourg aerodrome in Holland, May 1940. This allowed British commanders to plan for defense against paratroop attacks. However, by mid morning groups to the west of the Tavronitis had started to link up with some of those on the slopes of Hill 107. At this point they should have been supported by the 3rd Battalion under Major Scherber, but the dropping plan for this group had had to be changed at the last moment. Their take-off from Greece had been delayed because of the dust clouds over the runways created by all the previous aircraft, and to avoid the possibility of their dropping over the sea at Maleme they were dropped in scattered groups over the hills to the south which were expected to be unoccupied.
One German pilot said of the dust; "The clouds of dust whipped up by the first take-offs blinded the other pilots, with the result that by the time the transports reached their destination, our fighters and bombers providing the air cover had to dash back to refuel."
In fact they were now dropped onto the New Zealand 21st and 23rd Battalions, who killed many of them as they hung from their parachutes. Scherber himself being killed before he reached the ground. The attack at this point was not going well. The intended pincer attack on the airfield would now have to become an assault from one direction only, the west bank of the Tavronitis.
By the late evening of the first day Student became aware that none of the airfields on Crete were in German hands, Groups Centre and East had both failed to take their objectives, and the whole attack was not going to plan. Of his commanders on the ground Sussman, Scherber, Koch, Braun and Plessen were dead, Meindl and Derpa were severely wounded. It was imperative that he should capture one of the landing fields and commit his mountain troops. Colonel Ramke was assigned the task of capturing Maleme, but for him to succeed Meindle must hold out until the relieving forces arrived. While Student could see failure looming before him General Freyberg could afford to be cautiously optimistic. He still held all three airfields and the ports at Suda and Heraklion. However his perception of his defensive position was based on his assumption that having released some of his reserves to Brigadiers Puttick and Hargest, that these commanders were using them to good effect. In fact both had been over cautious, and the effects of this were to be particularly serious around Maleme and the high point, Hill 107.
Colonel Andrew's repeated requests for assistance from Hargest were not afforded the urgency they required. At 17:00 he made a direct request to Hargest to let him know when he could expect a counter attack from 23rd Battalion. On being told by Hargest that this would not be forthcoming as the 23rd was "itself engaged against paratroops in it's own area" he decided he had to launch his own counter attack. Andrew attempted a counter attack on the Germans around Hill 107. With his force fragmented he had only a limited number of infantry he could send in with the tanks. They suffered severely from the German machine guns. Both of his tanks were lost in the attack, as well as most of his reserves. He then informed Hargest that he had no alternative but to withdraw, unless he received reinforcements quickly. Andrew's withdrawal abandoned his forces that were still fighting to the west of the airfield, those of Campbell and Johnson. Both groups were still full of fight and ready to hang on. When Campbell discovered that the Battalion had in fact withdrawn (he no longer had radio contact with them) he was shocked. He had confidently expected that there would be a counter attack, and that they would be a part of it. He now split the remnants of his Company into three, and told them to escape as best they could to the south. Johnson, on the coastal side of the airfield decided at first light on the 21st that the Battalion had withdrawn, and that he should now pull his men out. While two companies from two separate battalions were assigned to Andrew by Hargest they were so late in arriving that all initiative was lost. This apparent lack of understanding of the situation at Maleme, and the slow response of Hargest to the need to reinforce Andrew, effectively lost the airfield to the Germans the following day.
At the end of the 20th May the Germans around Maleme were in an exhausted state. They could not have withstood a determined counter attack by the New Zealand forces. Unfortunately Hargest and Puttick played a cautious hand, when movement and initiative were called for. Both these commanders operated from their Headquarters, without visiting the forward areas that were under pressure. If Hargest had gone to the forward Battalions instead of sending Captain Dawson, he may well have stopped the withdrawal of Andrew's 22nd Battalion. Maleme was central to Freyberg's defense plan, as well as to the German plan of invasion. Freyberg's plan called for strong counter attacks to prevent the seizure of the airfields. In the afternoon and evening of the 20th caution destroyed the plan, and Freyberg had failed to ensure that his subordinates aggressively deployed the reserves he had released to them.
The capture of Maleme Airfield
The aircraft with the ammunition supply for the beleaguered paratroops landed at Maleme around 07:00 on the 21st. Although the flight had proved that it was possible to fly into Maleme, the decision was taken to consolidate the German position around the airfield before sending in any more troops. Ramke and the rest of his men made their landings in the late afternoon and early evening, and as with all the other drops and landings, many died before they had any chance to be effective. Ramke now had some 1800 men under his command, and anticipated more reinforcements from the sea. He hoped soon to go onto the offensive.
The price of Maleme: the wrecked German transports litter the airfield
Meanwhile, in Athens and Germany, politics and the needs of Barbarossa came together to see the active command of the invasion of Crete taken from General Student and given over to General Ringel. The slippage in the timetable for the successful taking of objectives on Crete, and the continued need for the involvement of the Luftwaffe were causing concern that they may impact the timetable for the invasion of Russia. It had always been a requirement that the invasion of Crete must not impact Barbarossa.
Freyberg needed to regain control of the airfield at Maleme if he was to be able to stop the German invasion. To do this he agreed to a very risky strategy. He would attack with only two battalions, at night, and one of these battalions, the 20th New Zealand (the other was the Maori 28th Battalion), had to come from the western side of Chania. The transport needed for this move would not be available until the New Zealanders were relieved by an Australian battalion coming from Georgioupoli, the New Zealanders would then take over the transport from the Australians. As this handover was not expected to happen until around midnight, it would be quite late before they could arrive for the planned attack. An additional problem was the start line for the assault. The forces currently in place around Maleme had German units on their right flank along the coastal area from Maleme to Platanias. This meant that the new forces would need to traverse an area held or covered by the Germans before they could come up with those units they were supporting.
Signal from Freyberg to Wavell, 22 May.
"The position at Heraklion is that the enemy appears to have penetrated the town but, as far as can be ascertained, the aerodrome holds. At Retimo we are still in a position to deny the enemy the use of the landing ground but the garrison is being attacked from the east. A successful counter-attack was carried out this morning. At Suda we are occupying a perimeter defence and are in fill possession of all our base organisation.
The position at Maleme is less secure. The enemy has made tremendous efforts to knock us out and I am bringing in help from Georgiopolis. Owing to severe bombing and heavy casualties one battalion withdrew from the defences in the immediate vicinity of Maleme aerodrome during the night of 20-21 May. Early in the day we still commanded the landing area with machine-gun, trench mortar, and artillery fire. However, at 9:15 a.m. the enemy dropped approximately 500 parachutists just west of the aerodrome, also another lot in the vicinity of the enemy's main concentration at the prison and on the road five miles south west of Canea. At 4:15 p.m. 500 parachutists dropped behind the aerodrome defences and our field guns were put out of action by air action. At 5 p.m. thirty planes landed on the aerodrome and others on the beaches. I am hoping to reinforce Maleme tonight bu the situation is now obscure and, I feel, perhaps precarious. Everybody here is determined to fight hard. Do all you can to damage the surface of the aerodrome."
The Allied counter attack
The move of the 20th NZ did not go to plan. The Australian battalion had suffered air attacks and delay on their way to Chania, so the New Zealanders did not reach their start point for the attack until nearly 03:00. The Maoris had been at their start point for some 3 hours, and the slow movement of the Australians to hand over their transport to the New Zealanders would result in the attack going ahead with only two companies (C & D) of the 20th Battalion. While the hand over had been taking place in Chania between the two battalions, the flotilla of sea borne reinforcements for Van der Heydte at Maleme was intercepted and destroyed by the British fleet. Freyberg knew of this naval action, and now felt that his planned counter attack must succeed, in spite of the late arrival of the New Zealanders.
Freyberg's optimism following the destruction of the flotilla stemmed from his earlier incorrect interpretation of information from ULTRA regarding the aim of the flotillas, and his view of how the Germans would use their airborne and seaborne forces. He seems to have believed that the main attack would be a seaborne invasion, rather than an airborne invasion which would capture parts of the coast to allow reinforcement by sea. This difference in emphasis gave him the optimism mentioned above. After the war he said "We for our part were mostly preoccupied by seaborne landings, not by the threat of air landings". An interpretation which coloured later actions.
At 03:30 the attack went ahead. The 20th, under Brigadier Burrows, advanced on the seaward side of the road, and were tasked to clear the airfield, while the Maori Battalion (28th), under Colonel Dittmer, was to retake Hill 107. The attack was supported by three light tanks. The 20th met stiff resistance but did make slow progress. The Maoris on their left made better progress as many of the Germans they had expected to meet had earlier withdrawn to the north, and were now hindering the 20th in their advance. When the two forces of Burrow and Dittmer met it was starting to get light. They decided that C Company (of 20th) would go for the north of Pirgos village, while D Company would attack the eastern edge of the airfield. The Maoris would make their direct assault on Hill 107. The tanks would go pretty much through the centre towards Pirgos, unfortunately they were quickly disabled making the C Company advance into the village very difficult. Although the forces were advancing the failure of Hargest and Puttick to commit all available forces in the area to the attack was now causing the gains to be squandered. Dittmer tried to get Leckie and Andrews with their 23rd and 22nd Battalions to support him and Burrows. They declined, preferring to hold the ground they had. The counter attack had come to a halt. During the time that all this was going on Brigadier Hargest was signaling Division that he thought the Germans might be withdrawing! Despite bitter fighting, the advance of the 20th turned into a withdrawal. It would be a similar scenario for the 21st. Although they initially made good progress towards Hill 107, by the afternoon they were forced to withdraw to Vineyard Ridge.
At the same time as the Germans were fighting off the counter attack at Maleme, they were attacking strongly at Galatas, South West of Chania, and threatening to cut the Chania-Maleme coast road. The attacks came from forces under Colonel Heidrich as cover for some of his forces who were trying to make contact with those under Ramcke. These attacks met stiff opposition from poorly armed Greek forces. However, during 23rd May Heidrich's forces were able to join up with those on the coast road.
Win at a heavy cost; 7,000 of the 22,000 German soldiers engaged in battle at Crete were either killed or wounded
All through the day Ramcke's reinforcements were being flown into Maleme, despite the attack on the airfield. However, a large number of the transports were destroyed on the ground. With the strengthening of the German forces, General Ringel was flown into Maleme on the evening of the 22nd. Control of the Battle for Crete had now definitely moved from General Student, who had lost the confidence of the German High Command.
By early evening on the 22 May Freyberg had decided that he wanted a second counter attack to be made by 5 Brigade, who would be strengthened by two battalions from 4th Brigade. Circumstances would prevent this. Hargest, who had not yet visited his troops at the front was pessimistic about the chances of this second attack succeeding. Also, Puttick was less in favour of moving two battalions from 4th Brigade as he was concerned about German activity in Prison Valley and around Galatas. Freyberg allowed himself to be persuaded and 5th Brigade were pulled back from Maleme towards 4th Brigade. Ringel could now consolidate his hold on Maleme, and the Maleme/Chania coast road, and join up with the forces in the Galatas are. Freyberg had always said that control of the airfields was crucial to the control of Crete. By allowing the counter attack to go ahead without committing his troops in sufficient strength, and then canceling the second attack, he had allowed that control to go to the Germans. With the withdrawal of the 5th Brigade on the 23rd May, Maleme was now well and truly in German hands.
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Additional Sources:
http://www.crete-1941.org.uk
www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/4602/kreta.htm www.aerenlund.dk
www.explorecrete.com
www.standto.com
www.defence.gov.au
www.gebirgsjaeger.4mg.com
home.freeuk.com/johndillon
jodiecon.org
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk
www.rickard.karoo.net
www.keele.ac.uk
www.brooksart.com
