| Bureaucratic infighting and mixed signals reinforced Noriega's misperceptions. This fighting, particularly inside the White House and between the State Department, CIA and DOD, was often leaked to the press and received wide attention. The internal feuds were responsible for many of the confusing signals. Reagan was unable to prevent the competing branches of his administration from supporting different strategies toward Noriega, who assumed the split would prevent the administration from using extreme measures against him, especially the use of force. The split in Congress and congressional disagreements with the White House also reinforced Noriega's misperceptions. U.S. policies and threats in the Noriega crisis lacked credibility, which was one of the major factors in the escalation that led to the U.S. invasion. The United States preferred a Panamanian solution to the Noriega problem - a PDF coup or a popular uprising. American officials, including Bush, encouraged PDF officers and the people to remove Noriega, implying that the United States would help the Panamanians once they initiated such an action. But when the Giroldi coup took place, the United States did very little to help. Similarly, when Noriega brutally suppressed public demonstrations, the United States did very little to support the people. On several occasions the United States dispatched forces to Panama and conducted military exercises. The main purpose of these actions was to send Noriega a message. However, in the absence of true intention to use force against Noriega, these actions only reenforced Noriega's belief that the United States was bluffing. The growing gap between the tough rhetoric and the meager action exposed the Bush administration to charges of weakness and impotence, which eventually contributed to Bush's decision to use force. -- Eytan Gilboa, |
Kings of Cocaine, Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen, Simon & Schuster, 1989.
Desperados, Elaine Shannon, Penguin, 1989.
In 1972,, officials at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs considered Noriega a major hindrance to their efforts to shut down Panama as a staging area for shipments of heroin from Europe and cocaine from South America.
So, we go back a long way with the pineapple.
The traffickers had known Noriega personally at least since early 1982, when, as chief of military intelligence, he had helped the Ochoas. . . .By the end of that year Escobar had set up a deal with Noriega. . . .Sometime around the end of 1983. . .Ochoa, Escobar, and probably others--paid $5 million to high-ranking Panamanian military officers to ensure they would not be bothered. . . .
John Kerry got into the act chairing Foreign Relations subcommittee hearings on the matter, accusing the U.S. of making stopping drug trafficking secondary. "It has been sacrificed repeatedly to other goals."
To which I would add two words, "Cold War", something not on the Democrats' radar screen, ever.
In fact, upon Noriega's indictment, our fifth column brother Charles Rangel piped up about Noriega's "civil rights".
U.S. policies and threats in the Noriega crisis lacked credibility, which was one of the major factors in the escalation that led to the U.S. invasion. The United States preferred a Panamanian solution to the Noriega problem - a PDF coup or a popular uprising. American officials, including Bush, encouraged PDF officers and the people to remove Noriega, implying that the United States would help the Panamanians once they initiated such an action. But when the Giroldi coup took place, the United States did very little to help. Similarly, when Noriega brutally suppressed public demonstrations, the United States did very little to support the people.
This tired business of "encouraging the people to remove" some troublesome ruler never, ever works.
It didn't work in Panama and it didn't work in Iraq--and to let the people act, then stand idly by while they are slaughtered is unconscionable.
As for the "bureaucratic infighting and mixed signals"--again, two words, "April Glaspy".
Yet we have not "solved" the "drug problem"--the events in Colombia are terribly dangerous in the context of the many Marxist middlemen from Venezuela's Chavez to Brazil's Lula, Cuba's Castro and Mexico's Fox--all leftist anti-Americans.
And the prize which elicited Operation Just Cause--our canal (thanks to Nobel Putz Prize winner Jimmy I-Love-Dictators Carter) is in the hands of Li Kashing, Jiang and Hu's man of the sea.
On several occasions the United States dispatched forces to Panama and conducted military exercises. The main purpose of these actions was to send Noriega a message. However, in the absence of true intention to use force against Noriega, these actions only reenforced Noriega's belief that the United States was bluffing. The growing gap between the tough rhetoric and the meager action exposed the Bush administration to charges of weakness and impotence, which eventually contributed to Bush's decision to use force.
"Sending messages" works if the targeted party has his ears on and something between them.
With the Chia Pet of North Korea, a "message" may not suffice.
In which case our president has a repository for the thousands of nuclear warheads he promised Pooty-Poot to 86.
In sum, Noriega blew it.
He was grossly corrupt but as long as he provided stable pro-American rule in a strategic choke point his dealings would be overlooked.
For we were at war globally with the Soviet Union.
Noriega was targeted by the gods for he went quite mad with his own inviobility--as did Saddam Hussein.
For such hubris as this, two words, "road kill".