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Preparations for Battle,
March 1942 to 4 June 1942


By March 1942, Japanese Navy strategists had achieved their initial war goals much more easily than expected. They had therefore abandoned the prewar plan to then transition to a strategic defensive posture, but there was still dispute on how to maintain the offensive. Moving further south in the Pacific would isolate Australia, and possibly remove that nation as a threat to the freshly-expanded Japanese Empire.



However, the American island base at Midway was also an attractive target, and the Doolittle Raid on Japan prompted a decision to attack there as the next major offensive goal. Midway was a vital "sentry for Hawaii", and a serious assault on it would almost certainly produce a major naval battle, a battle that the Japanese confidently expected to win. That victory would eliminate the U.S. Pacific fleet as an important threat, perhaps leading to the negotiated peace that was Japan's "exit strategy".

The Japanese planned a three-pronged attack to capture Midway in early June, plus a simultaneous operation in the North Pacific's Aleutian Islands that might provide a useful strategic diversion. In the van of the assault would be Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's aircraft carrier force, which would approach from the northwest, supress Midway's defenses and provide long-range striking power for dealing with American warships. A few hundred miles behind Nagumo would come a battleship force under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto that would contain most of the operation's heavy gun power. Coming in from the West and Southwest, forces under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo would actually capture Midway. Kondo's battleships and cruisers represented additional capabilities for fighting a surface action.



Unfortunately for the Japanese, two things went wrong even before the Midway operation began. Two of Nagumo's six carriers were sent on a mission that resulted in the Battle of Coral Sea. One was badly damaged, and the other suffered heavy casualties to her air group. Neither would be available for Midway.

Even more importantly, thanks to an historic feat of radio communications interception and codebreaking, the United States knew its enemy's plans in detail: his target, his order of battle and his schedule. When the battle opened, the U.S. Pacific fleet would have three carriers waiting, plus a strong air force and reinforced ground defenses at the Midway Base

Japanese Air Attack on Midway,
4 June 1942


At 0430 in the morning of 4 June 1942, while 240 miles northwest of Midway, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's four carriers began launching 108 planes to attack the U.S. base there. Unknown to the Japanese, three U.S. carriers were steaming 215 miles to the east. The two opposing fleets sent out search planes, the Americans to locate an enemy they knew was there and the Japanese as a matter of operational prudence. Seaplanes from Midway were also patrolling along the expected enemy course. One of these spotted, and reported, the Japanese carrier striking force at about 0530.



That seaplane also reported the incoming Japanese planes, and radar confirmed the approaching attack shortly thereafter. Midway launched its own planes. Navy, Marine and Army bombers headed off to attack the Japanese fleet. Midway's Marine Corps Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) intercepted the enemy formation at about 0615. However, the Marines were immediately engaged by an overwhelming force of the very superior Japanese "Zero" fighters and were able to shoot down only a few of the enemy bombers, while suffering great losses themselves.

The Japanese planes hit Midway's two inhabited islands at 0630. Twenty minutes of bombing and straffing knocked out some facilities on Eastern Island, but did not disable the airfield there. Sand Island's oil tanks, seaplane hangar and other buildings were set afire or otherwise damaged. As the Japanese flew back toward their carriers the attack commander, Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, radioed ahead that another air strike was required to adequately soften up Midway's defenses for invasion.



U.S. Attacks on the Japanese Carrier Striking Force,
4 June 1942


While their aviators flew back from Midway, the Japanese carriers received several counterstrikes from Midway's own planes. Faced with overwhelming fighter opposition, these uncoordinated efforts suffered severe losses and hit nothing but sea water. Shortly after 0700, torpedo attacks were made by six Navy TBF-1s and four Army Air Force B-26s. Between 0755 and 0820, two groups of Marine Corps bombers and a formation of Army B-17s came in. The only positive results were photographs of three Japanese carriers taken by the high-flying B-17s, the sole surviving photos of the day's attacks on the Japanese carriers.

Meanwhile, a tardy Japanese scout plane had spotted the U.S. fleet and, just as Midway's counterattacks were ending, reported the presence of a carrier. Japanese commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo had begun rearming his second group of planes for another strike on Midway. He now had to reorganize that, recover the planes returning from Midway and respot his flight decks to launch an attack on the U.S. ships. Nagumo's force barely missed having enough time.



In the hour after about 0930, U.S. Navy planes from the carriers Hornet (CV-8), Enterprise (CV-6) and Yorktown (CV-5) made a series of attacks, initially by three squadrons of TBD torpedo planes that, despite nearly total losses, made no hits. The sacrifice of the TBDs did slow Japanese preparations for their own strike and disorganized the defending fighters. Then, at about 1025, everything changed. Three squadrons of SBD scout bombers, two from Enterprise and one from Yorktown, almost simultaneously dove on three of the four Japanese carriers, whose decks were crowded with fully armed and fueled planes that were just starting to take off. In a few minutes, Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were ablaze and out of action.



Of the once-overwhelming Japanese carrier force, only Hiryu remained operational. A few hours later, her planes crippled USS Yorktown. By the end of the day, though, U.S. carrier planes found and bombed Hiryu. Deprived of useful air cover, and after several hours of shocked indecision, Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto called off the Midway operation and retreated. Six months after it began, the great Japanese Pacific War offensive was over.

Japanese Attacks on USS Yorktown,
4 June 1942


After the 4 June mid-morning U.S. Navy attacks on the Japanese carrier force, only the Hiryu remained operational. Shortly before 1100 she launched eighteen dive bombers, escorted by six fighters, to strike a retaliatory blow. At about noon, as these planes approached USS Yorktown (CV-5), the most exposed of the three American aircraft carriers, they were intercepted by the U.S. combat air patrol, which shot down most of the bombers. Seven, however, survived to attack, hitting Yorktown with three bombs and stopping her.



While Yorktown's crew worked to repair damage and get their ship underway, a second force left Hiryu, this one consisting of ten torpedo planes and six fighters. Though the U.S. carrier was moving again by 1430, and even launched more fighters, the Japanese aircraft penetrated heavy air and gunfire opposition to hit Yorktown with two torpedoes, opening a huge hole on her midships port side. The stricken ship again went dead in the water and took on a severe list. Concerned that she was about to roll over, her Captain ordered his crew to abandon ship.

Actions and Activities after 4 June 1942


Following the 4 June attack on Midway's facilities and the day's great battles between opposing aircraft carrier forces, the Japanese briefly considered continuing their campaign. However, as the full extent of their disaster became clear, they began a general retreat. After a brief withdrawal to avoid the risk of a night action, the two remaining U.S. carriers pursued the enemy forces, unsuccessfully attacking a destroyer on the 5th.



On 6 June, U.S. planes found and attacked two Japanese cruisers, sinking the Mikuma. Meanwhile, USS Yorktown had remained afloat. A salvage party returned to try to save her, but this effort was thwarted on the afternoon of the 6th, when a Japanese submarine found and torpedoed the carrier and the accompanying destroyer Hammann. The battered, gallant Yorktown sank the following morning.

As Battle of Midway combat activities gradually wound down, PBY patrol seaplanes and ships busied themselves rescuing downed aviators, the last of whom was recovered on 21 June. A U.S. submarine found two Mikuma survivors, and 35 of Hiryu's crewmen were picked up on 19 June. Earlier, men from Yorktown and Hammann had been taken to Pearl Harbor, where reinforcements were being forwarded to Midway and the nearby carriers. USS Saratoga (CV-3) arrived from the west coast on 6 June with a full load of aircraft. She quickly returned to sea, en route to join Enterprise and Hornet. Later in the month, fresh Marines were landed at Midway, which remained an important U.S. base for the rest of World War II, and beyond.

Additional Sources:

www.stjohnshistoriccemetery.com
www.globalsecurity.org
www.users.bigpond.com
www.strategypage.com
www.history.navy.mil
www.wwiitech.net
www.centurytel.net
www.walldrawn.com
www.brooksart.com
www.military-art.com
www.history.navy.mil
library.nps.navy.mil
www.psns.navy.mil
www.turkishnavy.com

2 posted on 06/02/2005 9:53:53 PM PDT by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: All
Remembering Torpedo Squadron 8


June 4, 1942: Torpedo Squadron 8, off the USS HORNET, attacked the Japanese carriers off Midway. Flying old, slow aircraft armed with defective torpedoes and lacking fighter cover, they were all shot down without inflicting any damage on the enemy. But by attracting the attention of the Japanese combat air patrol, their sacrifice made possible the success of the American dive bombers that arrived overhead minutes later, to devastate the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, bringing victory at Midway

Lt. Commander John C. Waldron KIA
Lt. Raymond A. Moore KIA
Lt. James C. Owens KIA
Lt.(jg) George M. Campbell KIA
Lt.(jg) John P. Gray KIA
Lt.(jg) Jeff D. Woodson KIA
Ens. William W. Abercrombie KIA
Ens. William W. Creamer KIA
Ens. Harold J. Ellison KIA
Ens. William R. Evans KIA
Ens. George H. Gay WIA
Ens. Henry R. Kenyon KIA
Ens. Ulvert M. Moore KIA
Ens. Grant W. Teats KIA
Robert B. Miles, Aviation Pilot 1c KIA
Horace F. Dobbs, Chief Radioman KIA
Amelio Maffei, Radioman 1 KIA
Tom H. Pettry, Radioman 1 KIA
Otway D. Creasy, Jr. Radioman 2 KIA
Ross H. Bibb, Jr., Radioman 2 KIA
Darwin L. Clark, Radioman 2 KIA
Ronald J. Fisher, Radioman 2 KIA
Hollis Martin, Radioman 2 KIA
Bernerd P. Phelps Radioman 2 KIA
Aswell L. Picou, Seaman 2 KIA
Francis S. Polston, Seaman 2 KIA
Max A. Calkins, Radioman 3 KIA
George A. Field, Radioman 3 KIA
Robert K. Huntington, Radioman 3 KIA
William F. Sawhill, Radioman 3 KIA


3 posted on 06/02/2005 9:55:32 PM PDT by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: snippy_about_it
All swabs treasure the memory of Torpedo Eight. Our people were completely willing. As Thomas Adkins told the future Duke of Wellington, as Adkins lay shot and dying, "Don't worry, Sir. It's all in a day's work."

Without the TBDs dying, the SBDs (old Slow But Deadly) would not have had their shot at Nagumo's task force. Don't believe otherwise, the SBD was an excellent machine, long ranged and very accurate with a heavy bomb load.

Yorktown, lost at Midway, had been badly damaged May 8, 1942 at Coral Sea. Two torpedoes hit, and several bombs. By heroic effort the crew and numerous swabs from other ships in the task force got her going, but she was very slow and unseaworthy. They got her back to Pearl Harbor on May 27. That is about six or eight knots per hour.

The yardbirds (Naval Yard people) swarmed aboard and reported that the extensive damage would normally take ten months to fix, but maybe they could do it in three months. Nimitz said "I can give you three days."

To make a long story short, Yorktown departed Pearl on the 30th of June, just over 72 hours after arriving. Who can be sure, but maybe she made the difference at Midway.

Would have liked to have been there during the seventy two hour repair. I can picture what needed doing, a little. The must have been three men waiting for every man working, eager to work, but they would be in the way, and slow things down, so they stayed out of it. When a man showed tiredness, even a little, a backup man would step in.

Wasn't there, but it had to be that way. Seventy two hours, amazing.

8 posted on 06/03/2005 2:19:38 AM PDT by Iris7 ("War means fighting, and fighting means killing." - Bedford Forrest)
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