Establishment of a defensive base at Ste. Mere-Eglise was one of the major undertakings of the division immediately after its drop. The other was the establishment of bridgeheads over the Merderet. But, as the latter operation began to founder, the capture and holding of Ste. Mere- Eglise assumed increasing importance. Tactically the most significant operation of the 82d Airborne Division on D Day was, therefore, the action in and around this town. The town itself was the objective of the 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, which was to organize the immediate defense by setting up road blocks to the south and east. The 2d Battalion was to establish a line to the north, running from west to east through Neuville-au-Plain and Bandienville, tying in with the 502d Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, on the right. The 1st Battalion was to seize the Merderet crossings at la Fiere and Chef- du-Pont, organize the defense of the glider landing zone, and furnish security for the regimental command post.
Like the other serials, the planes of the 505th Parachute Infantry ran into fog and flak, and for a time it appeared that the drops would be scattered. But the pathfinder markers were spotted correctly, and some of the planes which had moved out to prevent collision circled back before flashing the green light. As a result, all three battalions had good drops. The 1st Battalion (Maj. Frederick A. Kellem), after assembling the bulk of its force, started for the la Fiere bridge. No troops could be sent to Chef-du-Pont immediately.
The 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Edward C. Krause) moved after collecting about a quarter of its men. Colonel Krause organized these men into two companies and headed for Ste. Mere-Eglise. Learning from a Frenchman that the Germans had recently established themselves outside the town along the roads, Colonel Krause planned to surround the town and establish road blocks before daylight. He ordered his men to go directly into town without searching buildings, and they were told to use only knives, bayonets, and grenades while it was dark, so that enemy small- arms fire could be spotted by sight and sound.
By 0430 the 3d Battalion had occupied the town and raised the same American flag which the battalion had raised over Naples upon its entry into that city. Before daylight the main Cherbourg communication cable had been cut and all the road blocks were in. There was some resistance at three of the locations, but it was overcome with grenades. By 0930 the entire town had been cleaned out. It yielded only about thirty prisoners and ten enemy dead. The rest of the Germans, surprised, fled southward. Colonel Krause had at this time about 360 men under his control.
In the meantime, Lt. Col. Benjamin H. Vandervoort had gathered enough of his 2d Battalion to start on its mission of establishing a line through Neuville-au-Plain and Bandienville on the north. The battalion had been under way for an hour when, at 0614, Col. William E. Ekman, the regimental commander, ordered it to stop. He had not heard from the 3d Battalion, although Colonel Krause had sent runners with news of the situation at Ste. Mere-Eglise. At 0810, still without information about the 3d Battalion's location, Colonel Ekman ordered the 2d Battalion to return and capture Ste. Mere-Eglise. The order was countermanded on word of Ste. Mere-Eglise's fall and then, at about 0930, reissued when Regiment received a report of an enemy counterattack against the town from the south.
Fighting for a Foothold, 82nd Airborne at Sainte Mere-Eglise 1944
The Germans had attacked with considerable force-two companies of infantry supported by self-propelled guns and tanks. The attack had begun with mortar and machinegun fire and had hit the flanks of the southern road blocks. The 3d Battalion was spread thinly. When the 2d Battalion came down at 1000 Colonel Krause ordered the scattered elements of Companies G and H on the north to join their companies on the south. The 2d Battalion took positions north and east of the town. Together the two battalion commanders decided on the defense, and by mutual agreement Colonel Krause took charge. Both officers had been injured. Colonel Krause had suffered a slight leg injury from shell fragments, and Colonel Vandervoort had a broken leg but continued to command his battalion from a cart.
Before proceeding to Ste. Mere-Eglise, Colonel Vandervoort had detached one rifle platoon (3d of Company D) on receiving word that Neuville-au- Plain was lightly held by the enemy. He sent the platoon there to organize part of the northern defensive line which was the battalion's assigned mission. This impromptu decision proved wise, for the German thrust from the south at Ste. Mere-Eglise turned out to be only part of a larger squeeze which extended also to the north of the town. The effectiveness of the squeeze was nullified by the delaying action which the 3d Platoon (Lt. Turner B. Turnbull), Company D, fought at Neuville-au-Plain.
Lieutenant Turnbull had forty-two men with normal infantry weapons plus extra bazookas, BAR's, and two 57-mm. antitank guns. He deployed the platoon on high ground north of Neuville-au-Plain, and at 1030 the men engaged an enemy column which outnumbered them five to one. By weight of fire power, Lieutenant Turnbull's men were able to fight the enemy to a draw for eight hours. Gradually, however, enemy mortar fire, which the platoon was unable to neutralize, took its wearing toll, and the Germans began to use their superior numbers to turn the flanks of Lieutenant Turnbull's platoon. It became clear that the unequal fight could not continue. Colonel Vandervoort sent a platoon of Company E to cover Turnbull's withdrawal, and he pulled out late in the afternoon with sixteen of his forty-two men.
The platoon's tenacious fight at Neuville-au-Plain, however, had held back the northern prong of the enemy thrust long enough for the two battalions in Ste. Mere-Eglise to meet the stronger German threat from the south. Companies G and H, though hardly more than platoon strength, still held the southern edge of town. Two companies were in reserve in- side the town. The enemy was building up strength on high ground 1,500 yards south of Ste. Mere-Eglise, where according to reports he had emplaced an artillery battery. He was moving infantry into the draw in front of his base.
Glider Attack on D-Day. Some American glidermen in both Horsas and CG-4As having already landed, more gliders continue to cut loose to commence their attack
After the first German attack had been repulsed, Colonel Krause sent Company I, with eighty men, to strike at the enemy's western flank. The counterattack was almost disastrous, as Company I, confused by the zigzag course through hedgerows, turned east too soon and emerged on the road just ahead of the enemy position. As a result of this miscalculation, however, the company hit an enemy convoy and destroyed it with Gammon grenades.3 The surprise and effectiveness of the blow led the enemy forces immediately south of Ste. Mere-Eglise to overestimate American strength, and they began to withdraw. Company I, after following the flank of the withdrawal for some time, returned to the perimeter defense of Ste. Mere-Eglise.
As night approached, the general situation around Ste. Mere-Eglise began to appear more satisfactory. A few snipers had to be ferreted out of buildings, and roving groups of enemy delayed the free movement of messengers and supply personnel. But these did not constitute a serious threat. Except for a critical shortage of water, supply was adequate. Considerable quantities of food, ammunition, 57-mm. antitank guns, and engineer and signal supplies were gathered in from crashed gliders, whose occupants had been killed. After the morning attacks the enemy had exerted no pressure against the town during the rest of the day. It was not until after dark that he began to probe half-heartedly at the road- block outposts. These attempts, largely from the north, and presumably made by the same enemy which had overrun Neuville-au-Plain, were defeated without difficulty.
The events of Ste. Mere-Eglise assumed a greater significance in view of the critical situation which developed along the Merderet. There, more than anywhere else, the well-laid plans miscarried with a far-reaching impact on the operation as a whole. Securing the la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont bridges from the east was the assigned mission of the 1st Battalion, both Parachute Infantry. Company A was to seize the one at la Fiere. This company, along with the rest of the battalion, had an excellent drop and effected a remarkably rapid assembly, moving to its objective immediately.
On the other side of the river the 507th Parachute Infantry and the 508th Parachute Infantry, with the mission of securing the west bank of the river, probably depended more than any other units on a good drop pattern for success. Both regiments, however, were scattered and faced some of the most difficult problems of assembly of any of the airborne units.
The two regiments came in between 0230 and 0300, as scheduled. Pathfinders preceding them had in many cases found it impossible to mark the drop zones north of Amfreville and Picauville because of the presence of the enemy. Momentarily puzzled by the failure to see marker lights and by the realization that it was necessary to rely on alternative signals like the Eureka, pilots in some cases overshot the drop zones. Large numbers of paratroopers thus landed in the watery marshes along the Merderet. Aerial photos had indicated that the Merderet was a fairly narrow stream bordered with grassy swampland. But the photos were deceptive in that they did not reveal the wide flood areas created by the closing of the la Barquette lock. Grass had grown out of the water so thickly that from above this shallow lake looked like a prairie. Paratroops, heavily laden with equipment, found themselves in water several feet deep. The whole problem of assembly and recovery of equipment was therefore complicated. Both regiments were also widely dispersed. Part of the 508th Parachute Infantry dropped east of the Merderet and operated with the 101st Airborne Division. The 507th Parachute Infantry dropped generally east of its assigned zone, but personnel were found in widely separated places in the entire peninsula. Small groups held out against the enemy for several days, isolated from the rest of the division.
At first there was a noticeable gravitation to the la Fiere bridge area, and ultimately elements of four regiments, including the 325th Glider Infantry, had a hand in the establishment of the bridgehead. This convergence on la Fiere was due in part to the tendency of the groups landing in the Merderet marshes to collect at or move toward the railroad. The railroad embankment rose prominently from the marshland and was a convenient orientation feature. The men knew it was the only railroad in the Merderet valley and naturally used it as a guide. Probably the first group to do so was the one led by Capt. F. V. Schwartzwalder. His group of men from the 507th Parachute Infantry had landed along the swamp east of the Merderet and assembled on the railroad embankment. They moved down to the la Fiere bridge and met their first opposition there at daylight. In an orchard near the group of houses east of the bridge, they were fired on by mortar and small arms. Several attempts to rush the houses netted only casualties.
Forrest"Gody" Guth clowns for the camera with a captured German helmet, 6 June 1944 Ravenoville
The engagement thus begun involved, in the course of the day, groups from all three parachute regiments. Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, which had assembled almost to a man in the drop zone near Ste. Mere- Eglise, was already engaged on the right of Captain Schwartzwalder's unit. Next on the scene were men of the 507th and 508th under Col. Roy Lindquist, Commanding Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry. Colonel Lindquist, after landing in the swamps northeast of Amfreville, moved to the railroad' embankment, assembling a hundred men as he went along. On reaching the railroad, he was joined by thirty men of the 507th under Lt. John H. Wisner, regimental S-2. Lieutenant Wisner wished to reach the regimental assembly area in the vicinity of Amfreville. Colonel Lindquist's objective was Pont l'Abbe. Both planned to follow the railroad as the clearest route south, and to cross the river at la Fiere if the bridge was taken.
They arrived at dawn at the intersection of the railroad and the highway from Ste. Mere-Eglise west, to find Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, moving toward the bridge. The company was deployed to the north of the road and Colonel Lindquist decided to move up abreast. Lieutenant Wisner's men, leading off, were stopped by machine-gun fire 300 yards east of the bridge. At about the same point Company A, also pinned down by enemy fire, tried unsuccessfully to outflank the German positions from the right.
About that time Lieutenant Wisner, reconnoitering to the north, ran across another group making its way to la Fiere. This new group numbered about 300 men, principally from the 507th Parachute Infantry, who had assembled, like so many others, north of la Fiere and had followed the railroad south. Part had been collected by General Gavin, and part by Lt. Col. Arthur Maloney and Lt. Col. Edwin J. Ostberg. General Gavin's initial intention, after assembly, was to move this force south against the west end of the la Fiere bridge and causeway. However, fruitless efforts to retrieve a jeep and an antitank gun from the marshes delayed the move until daylight. With the light, enemy fire seemed to build up along the west bank. The original plan was therefore abandoned and the force proceeded east and thence south along the railroad embankment.
Colonel Howard Johnson, Commander 501st P.I.R
When this force arrived at la Fiere, the first American attempt to approach the bridge had been checked, but still it did not appear that the enemy was strong. Moreover, men of the 507th and 508th continued to drift into the position until by midmorning some 500 to 600 had gathered there. General Gavin therefore decided to commit part of the force elsewhere. Colonel Maloney was sent south with seventy-five men to reconnoiter another crossing. A little later General Gavin and Colonel Ostberg took another group of seventy-five men to try to cross the Merderet at the Chef-du-Pont bridge, which had been reported undefended.
Colonel Lindquist took command of the assorted units remaining at la Fiere. The principal organized groups, comprising about 400 men of all regiments, were Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry; Company G, 507th Parachute Infantry; and Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry. Company G, under Captain Schwartzwalder, in position on the extreme left, south of the road, had probed out the weakest portion of the enemy line but had not followed up the advantage. When Colonel Lindquist ordered attack at noon by all forces, Company A, which had displaced to the north of the road, failed to get the order, but Lindquist's own force, attacking through the area where Company A had been held all morning, destroyed or captured the last of the enemy. As the fire fell away, Captain Schwartzwalder's men crossed the causeway and made contact near the west end with a patrol from the 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles J. Timmes).
The 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry, had achieved an early assembly of fifty men under Colonel Timmes 1,000 yards east of Amfreville, near the battalion's planned drop zone. Soon after the initial assembly a patrol under Lt. Lewis Levy of Company D was sent to investigate the la Fiere causeway and to clear it if possible. The patrol found a few men of the 507th already established in the village of Canquigny, though enemy infantry held the ground south and east. The forces joined but were unable to work their way to the causeway until the attack from the east bank carried across. The success of that attack cleared the west bank and brought eighty men into the bridgehead. Lieutenant Levy then established contact with the forces still on the east side and received assurance that the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, was coming across to take over the bridge.
82nd Airborne Links up with the 4th Armored
The position seemed secure. Yet within the next hour the bridge was lost. The Germans countered quickly. Enemy artillery began to hit the vicinity of Canquigny, while small-arms fire built up to the south; tanks were heard approaching from the west. Before these signs of coming battle had become critical, Captain Schwartzwalder had decided that his primary mission was to go on toward Amfrevile to join the 2d Battalion and, under prodding of the first enemy artillery bursts, had pulled out fast with his eighty men and some additional personnel of the 508th. As no other troops from the east bank crossed over, this move left the bridgehead in the hands of four officers (including Lieutenant Levy) and eight enlisted men. With grenades and rifles and one machine gun, this handful of men fought off the enemy and even succeeded in disabling two enemy tanks with Gammon grenades, but they finally had to withdraw northward to join the 2d Battalion of the 507th.
In the meantime, Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, had been sent, belatedly, across the causeway. When it arrived on the west bank it met the enemy attack head on. Unable to organize or hold its ground, it was forced south along the river, and survivors swam back under fire to the east bank.
The bridge so handily won was thus lost through failure to consolidate rapidly the west bank position. The reason for the failure was in part that the groups participating in the action had only a vague idea of what neighboring units were doing. The hedgerow country virtually penned each unit in its separate field of action.
Paratroopers move through St. Mere-Eglise on way to make contact with the enemy at Normandy
Not only had the bridge been lost, but the enemy counterattack had isolated the force under Colonel Timmes (now including Captain Schwartwalder's men) from the units at la Fiere. Colonel Timmes' group had taken up a defensive position in an orchard near Amfreville and was caught and virtually immobilized by the enemy forces attacking toward the bridgehead. An attack south to la Fiere was planned for that night but not attempted. The force numbered about 120 men; many were exhausted or casualties; and, in addition, friendly artillery fire began to fall in the causeway area. Colonel Timmes' force remained isolated in this position for two more days.
At la Fiere, after the retreat of Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, the position on the east bank was reorganized. Men of the 507th and 508th Regiments under Colonel Lindquist were relieved on the left and the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 505th, joined Company A in the line. Colonel Lindquist's men were placed in reserve west of the railroad. But the position was still far from satisfactory. The forward defenses of the 1st Battalion, 505th, were exposed to heavy mortar and artillery fire, and the enemy, after his success in clearing the west bank, began to show unusual aggressiveness. Two German tanks attempted to exploit their success by crossing the causeway. Company A's road block covered by bazooka men stopped the attack, destroying both tanks. But it seemed probable that the Germans would try again. General Gavin came up to la Fiere from Chef-du-Pont late in the afternoon and found the situation serious. Ammunition was low; medical aid was scarce. General Gavin sent orders to Colonel Maloney at Chef-du-Pont to bring all his force, less about a platoon, to la Fiere at once.
Before Colonel Maloney arrived, the enemy attacked the east bank again in considerable strength, and the position of the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, was, in the opinion of its commander, becoming rapidly untenable. At about 2000 Colonel Maloney brought 200 men to la Fiere and moved up to the 505th Parachute Infantry line. By dark the American defense was again fairly well stabilized and the enemy had ceased his attack across the causeway.
Colonel Sink
Locally the situation was secure. But there was still no news at 82d Airborne Division headquarters, located west of Ste. Mere-Eglise, of the progress of the seaborne invasion. General Ridgway therefore took steps to provide for the possibility that the whole division might have to consolidate its defense in the vicinity of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Colonel Lindquist was ordered to move his force, now numbering some 250 men, to a position from which he could prevent the enemy from cutting off la Fiere units from Ste. Mere-Eglise. This movement, however, was not accomplished until the next day.
While the chief concern of the 82d Airborne Division during D Day was with the la Fiere bridgehead, where the bulk of the assembled forces were committed and where the enemy put up his strongest resistance, another attempt to secure a crossing of the Merderet River had been made at the same time to the south of Chef-du-Pont and had fared slightly better. The initial attack at Chef-du-Pont had been undertaken by the seventy-five men under Colonel Ostberg. The enemy withdrew from the town and the eastern approaches to the bridge but dug in along the causeway and on the west bank. Though apparently not numerous, the Germans fought tenaciously. Colonel Ostberg's men were stopped at the bridge. The seventy-five reinforcements who arrived later under Colonel Maloney could do nothing to break the deadlock. At about 1700 the Chef-du-Pont force was stripped to a platoon in order to send reinforcements to the hard-pressed paratroopers at la Fiere.
The remaining platoon of thirty-four men under Capt. Roy E. Creek almost at once were whittled down to twenty effectives by direct fire from an enemy field piece on the opposite bank. At the same time from seventy- five to one hundred Germans were observed forming on the east bank in some buildings to the left rear of Captain Creek's position. Captain Creek asked for reinforcements. Before they could arrive, immediate help was provided fortuitously by the landing within American lines of a glider carrying a 57-mm. antitank gun and ammunition. The gun was emplaced and fired to neutralize the enemy artillery piece. Nearly one hundred men came down from la Fiere shortly thereafter and the enemy threat was removed. With the reinforcements a defensive position was organized to bring greater fire power to bear on the enemy. In a short time the east bank was cleared, and a platoon crossed the bridge and dug in on the other side without opposition. The bridge was secured, though the position remained enfiladed by enemy fire from the Carquebut area.
The capture of Ste. Mere-Eglise, and the fights for the Merderet River crossings at la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont, together constituted the principal efforts of the 82d Airborne Division on D Day. But there were also a number of isolated groups of the division which organized themselves west of the Merderet and fought independently-in some cases for four or five days. These isolated groups contributed in some degree to the accomplishment of the division's missions, though they carried on what amounted to fights for survival rather than battles for planned objectives.
Col. George V. Millet, Jr., commanding the 507th Parachute Infantry, collected in the course of D Day some seventy-five men northwest of Amfreville. But, though he was not more than 1,000 yards from the 2d Battalion, 507th (Colonel Timmes), he made no contact with this battalion or other friendly elements until D plus 4.
Farther south, elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry were having similar experiences. One group, initially led by Lt. Gerald P. Guillot and later by Capt. Jonathan Adams, had one skirmish after another with the enemy, and survived to join the regiment on D plus 5.
The largest force from the 508th Parachute Infantry to assemble west of the Merderet was commanded by Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley (Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion). Colonel Shanley landed near Picauville. He assembled a small group, not large enough to proceed, as he wished, on the mission against the Douve bridge at Pont l'Abbe. Before noon he established radio contact with Lt. Norman McVicar, who had a force of about sixty men a mile to the northeast, and started out to join this force. He met a patrol from another force off to his left under Maj. Shields Warren, Jr. Junction between these three groups, however, was delayed by enemy pressure on the south, which forced Colonel Shanley's men to engage. It was mid-afternoon before they could free themselves even so far as to choose better ground and organize a defensive position. Before nightfall, however, the enemy had been cleared sufficiently to allow the Shanley, Warren, and McVicar forces to join. But in the meantime Colonel Shanley had learned that the German force which had been trying all afternoon to close in on him had the strength of a battalion, and that more of the enemy was dug in around Pont l'Abbe. He therefore abandoned the idea of attacking toward the Douve bridge and decided to proceed to the regiment's assembly area, the high ground known as Hill 30, dominating the Chef-du-Pont causeway. At 2300 the entire force, organized into two companies, moved there and improvised an all-around defensive position.
Additional Sources:
www.military-art.com
search.eb.com
www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil
www.nps.gov
www.pointvista.com
www.jungbauer-imedia.nl
www.artareas.com
www.ploiesti.net
www.dragonmodelsltd.com
perso.wanadoo.fr
www.aircareintl.org
