The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Special Operations in WWII (Mediterranean 1942-1945)

Sicily and Italy

The performance of Darby's forces in North Africa and the continuing need for troops to spearhead amphibious landings led Eisenhower's headquarters to form additional Ranger units. Patton and Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, praised the Rangers in glowing terms, and Allied planners requested authorization from the War Department to form two more battalions for the invasion of Sicily.

Marshall approved the expansion but again stipulated that Ranger-trained soldiers be returned to their parent units once the need for the battalions had passed. His attitude underlined the continuing status of these battalions as temporary organizations. Nevertheless, Darby and his officers enthusiastically sought out volunteers for the new formations, making stump speeches at replacement depots throughout North Africa. At Nemours, where Dammer had created a replica of the commando training depots, the recruits endured physical conditioning, weapons training, and amphibious landings under live fire.

In Sicily the Rangers served first as assault troops in the landing and then in various task forces in the drive across the island. At Gela in the early morning darkness of 10 July the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, under Darby and Maj. Roy Murray, attacked across a mined beach to capture the town and coastal batteries. They then withstood two days of counterattacks, battling tanks with thermite grenades and a single 37-mm. gun in the streets of Gela. For all the courage of individual Rangers, naval gunfire support proved decisive in holding the town. As Allied forces expanded the beachhead, one Ranger company captured the formidable fortress town of Butera in a daring night attack, while to the west Dammer's 3d Ranger Battalion moved by foot and truck to capture the harbor of Porto Empedocle, taking over 700 prisoners. In the ensuing drive to Palermo, the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions joined task forces guarding the flanks of the advance, and the 3d Ranger Battalion later aided the advance along the northern Sicilian coast to Messina by infiltrating through the mountains to outflank successive German delaying positions. By the fall of Messina on 17 August, marking the end of the Sicilian campaign, the Rangers were already preparing for the invasion of Italy.

Rangers assault Licata Beach

At Salerno the Rangers once again secured critical objectives during the amphibious assault, but, cut off by the rapid German response to the main landings, they were forced to hold their positions for about three weeks, a defensive mission unsuitable for such light units. Landing on a narrow, rocky beach to the left of the main beachhead early on the morning of 9 September, the Rangers quickly occupied the high ground of the Sorrentino peninsula, dominating the routes between the invasion beaches and Naples. To the south the Germans contained the main landing, preventing Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army from linking up with the Ranger position. Nevertheless, Darby's three battalions, assisted by paratroopers and British commandos, held their position against repeated German attacks. Lacking enough troops to hold a continuous line, the Rangers adopted a system of mutually supporting strongpoints and relied on the terrain and naval gunfire, which they directed to harass the routes from Naples until Clark's force broke through to them on 30 September.

Casualties mounted when the Rangers served as line infantry in the offensive against the German Winter Line. Lacking troops on the Venafro front, Clark used the Rangers to fill gaps in Fifth Army's line from early November to mid-December. Attached to divisions, the battalions engaged in bitter mountain fighting at close quarters. Although reinforced by a cannon company of four 75-mm. guns on half-tracks, they still lacked the firepower and manpower for protracted combat. By mid-December the continuous fighting and the cold, wet weather had taken a heavy toll. In one month of action, for example, the 1st Ranger Battalion lost 350 men, including nearly 200 casualties from exposure. Moreover, the quality of the battalions declined as veterans were replaced by enthusiastic, but inadequately trained, replacements.

The mission of Task Force Ranger was to use their special training for a night infiltration behind German lines and set up two major blocking positions following the Anzio Landing in Operation Shingle. This would relieve the pressure on the beachhead and possibly start the 30-mile drive to Rome. Somewhere along the last mile the Germans detected the Ranger infiltration. The Rangers fought bravely through the night and into the day, but without heavy weapons, the battle was lost as soon as they were caught in the open. In just under eight hours, the battle was over. Only six men returned to report to Colonel Darby; only six out of the 767 that began the mission.

A botched infiltration mission on the Anzio beachhead in early 1944 completed the destruction of Darby's Rangers. After a nearly unopposed Allied amphibious assault on 22 January 1944, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, commander of the VI Corps, failed to press his advantage, and the Germans were able to contain the Allies within a narrow perimeter. Seeking to push out of this confined area, Truscott, now a major general and commander of the 3d Infantry Division, ordered the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions to infiltrate four miles behind enemy lines to the crossroads town of Cisterna. One hour after their departure, the 4th Ranger Battalion and the rest of the division would launch a frontal assault and use the confusion created by the infiltrating Rangers to drive a deep wedge into the German defenses. American intelligence, however, had failed to notice a large German buildup opposite the American lines, and Ranger reconnaissance of the target area was poor.

Soldiers of the 3d Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all would be killed or captured at Cisterna (U.S. Army Photograph)

When the two battalions began their infiltration on the night of 29-30 January, the enemy quickly detected them and by dawn had surrounded them with infantry and armor just outside Cisterna. In a desperate attempt to rescue the isolated units, the 4th Ranger Battalion repeatedly attacked the German lines throughout the morning but succeeded in losing half of its combat strength in the futile effort. About noon, the remnants of the 1st and 3d surrendered. Only eight men escaped to American lines.

Left with a fragment of the Ranger force, American theater commanders decided to deactivate rather than reconstitute the damaged units. Even before Cisterna, the lack of time to train replacements had diluted the quality of the battalions. In truth, the Rangers had become little more than line infantry units, but without the firepower of the normal American infantry regiments of the time. Anticipating tough, methodical fighting for which Ranger units were unsuited, theater commanders preferred to use the remaining Rangers to alleviate the perennial shortage of replacements. Accordingly, in March Rangers with enough points for overseas service returned to the United States, while the remainder joined the 1st Special Service Force, a similar type of formation that had recently arrived in the theater.

The 1st Special Service Force

The 1st Special Service Force traced its origins to Marshall's trip to Great Britain in early 1942, the same visit that had inspired the formation of the 1st Ranger Battalion. Between conferences on grand strategy, Mountbatten had introduced Marshall to Geoffrey Pyke, an eccentric British scientist who had developed a scheme to divert up to half-a-million German troops from the main fronts. Under Pyke's plan, commandos, using special vehicles, would conduct a series of winter raids against snowbound German garrisons of such vulnerable points as hydroelectric stations in Norway and oil refineries in Romania. Exactly how the raiding units would enter and leave the target areas remained hazy, but the concept fascinated Marshall. After returning to the United States, he gave the project a high priority despite the skepticism of War Department planners. Studebaker, an automobile manufacturer, received a contract for the design and production of the vehicle later known as the Weasel. In June the Allies also agreed to form a Canadian-American force under Col. Robert T. Frederick to conduct the raids. Although as a War Department staff officer he had opposed the project, the tall, vigorous Frederick proved to be a natural leader, respected by superiors and idolized by his men.

At Fort William Henry Harrison, an isolated post near Helena, Montana, Frederick assembled his new unit, which he named the 1st Special Service Force in an apparent attempt to disguise its true purpose. Initially, it consisted of three battalion-size units of light infantry (officially designated as regiments) and a service echelon. For American personnel, who would constitute about 60 percent of the unit, inspection teams canvassed Army units in the Southwest and on the Pacific seaboard for hardened volunteers, especially those with a background as "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, north-woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers." As was the case with the Rangers, many post commanders used the recruiting drive to empty their stockades and rid themselves of malcontents, and some "volunteer" contingents even arrived at Fort Harrison under armed guard. Frederick soon weeded out unfit recruits, driving his men through an intensive program that stressed physical conditioning, weapons training, hand-to-hand fighting, demolitions, rock climbing, and the operation of the Weasel. For training in winter warfare, the recruits lived in boxcars on the Continental Divide while receiving instruction in cross-country skiing from Norwegian instructors. The accelerated schedule allowed only six days for airborne training. Frederick wanted to have the unit ready for operations by the winter of 1942-43.

Unfortunately for Frederick's raiders, the Allied high command canceled their mission before they could even take the field. When Frederick visited Great Britain in September 1942, he found that support for the project had evaporated. The Royal Air Force showed little enthusiasm for the diversion of the necessary planes from its bombing campaign, and the Special Operations Executive had already laid plans for a more economic sabotage program that was preferred by Norway's government-in-exile. Mountbatten thus recommended that the project be canceled, and Frederick agreed. While his unit broadened its training to include more general infantry skills and amphibious operations, Frederick investigated other areas where his men could use their special capabilities, including the Caucasus Mountains, New Guinea, and the North Pacific. In August 1943 the unit finally went into action for the first time, spearheading the bloodless recapture of Kiska in the Aleutians. The rapid conclusion of the campaign again left Frederick's unit without a mission. Finally, in October, General Clark, desperate for troops, secured the transfer of the 1st Special Service Force to his Fifth Army in the Mediterranean, and the combat history of the 1st Special Service Force began.

Shortly after its arrival in late November, the 1st Special Service Force received its initial mission. Looming over Fifth Army's front, the twin peaks of Monte La Difensa and Monte La Rementanea presented formidable barriers to the Allied advance into the Liri River Valley. A German panzer grenadier division deeply entrenched along the slopes of the two masses had already thrown back repeated Allied attempts to gain control of the heights. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Service Force received orders to carry the two peaks. After a personal reconnaissance of the 3,000-foot La Difensa, Frederick decided to avoid the trail leading up the south side and instead to launch a surprise attack via a 200-foot cliff on the opposite slope. On the night of 2-3 December 600 riflemen of the 2d Regiment moved silently up the face to a position only yards away from the German defenders on the crest. When noise from displaced stones alerted the enemy, the special servicemen assaulted the position and within two hours gained control of the crest. From there, they pushed down a saddle to capture neighboring Monte La Rementanea and to link up with British units on the other side of the valley. The fall of the twin peaks cracked the Winter Line and opened the way for the Allied advance to Cassino.

Any euphoria that Frederick's men might have felt over their success dissipated soon after the unit reentered the fighting as line infantry in late December. Poor weather and a skillful German defense among rocks and gullies slowed the advance to a crawl and took a heavy toll of the special servicemen. Like the Ranger units, they lacked the heavier weapons needed to blast the Germans out of their positions, as well as an adequate system to replace their growing combat and non-combat casualties. After a bitter struggle, the 1st Regiment captured Monte Sammucro but lost much of its fighting power. The 3d Regiment used a surprise night assault to overwhelm the defenders of Monte Majo but then suffered heavy casualties in a three-day defense of the height against German counterattacks. In one month of service before its transfer to Anzio, the force had lost 1,400 of its 1,800 men and badly needed the qualified replacements made available by the disbandment of the Rangers.

Deploying to the Anzio beachhead in early February 1944, the 1st Special Service Force anchored the Allied right flank along the Mussolini Canal and later spearheaded the drive on Rome. At Anzio Frederick's 1,300 troops defended 13 kilometers of the 52-kilometer-long Allied perimeter. Their position in the flat, open tableland adjoining the canal was dominated by German artillery in the heights overlooking the beachhead. Defending its sector, the unit used night patrols to locate targets for artillery, conduct raids on German outposts, and maintain control of the area between the lines. In late May Frederick's troops participated in the breakout from the beachhead and reinforced an armored task force covering the flank of the subsequent Allied drive on Rome. Early on the morning of 4 June the first elements of the combined force entered Rome and secured the bridges over the Tiber River. The 1st Special Service Force then withdrew to Lake Albano for rest and reorganization.

Taking a breather from the retreat at Kasserine Pass.

After the fall of Rome, the unit's final six months proved anticlimactic. Assigned to Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army for the invasion of southern France, the force received orders to seize German batteries on the Iles d'Hyeres, three rocky land masses on the left flank of the invasion beaches. On the night of 14-15 August the special servicemen, now under the command of Col. Edwin A. Walker, used rubber boats to land on the shores of Ile de Port Cros and Ile du Levant. Within forty-eight hours, the surprised defenders on both islands had surrendered, and Walker's troops prepared to join the main army. Guarding the right flank of Patch's advance, the unit's ensuing drive along the Riviera, the so-called Champagne Campaign, seemed more like an extended route march than a battle. Only a few German rear guards offered any resistance. By early September the unit had established a static defensive position in the mountains along the Franco-Italian border, where it remained for the next three months. In early December Eisenhower's headquarters, under orders from the War Department, dissolved the unit, returning the Canadians to their own army and transferring the Americans to a separate infantry regiment assigned to Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group.

The Office of Strategic Services in the Mediterranean

In North Africa and Italy the Army ignored the role that commando-type units, such as the 1st Special Service Force, might have played in operations behind enemy lines, leaving the field to the Office of Strategic Services. Both OSS personnel and their British counterparts in the Special Operations Executive were supervised by the G-3 Division of the theater headquarters, but the Americans tended to be dominant in North Africa, while the British enjoyed greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Although OSS personnel initially lacked experience, resources, and the respect of skeptical staff officers in the theater, the agency soon proved its value. Prior to TORCH, agents established contact with Allied sympathizers in North Africa and gathered intelligence vital to the invasion. To guard against a possible Axis thrust through Spanish Morocco into the Allied rear, two civilian operatives even organized warrior tribesmen of the region into a guerrilla force. At Salerno an OSS detachment provided critical tactical intelligence to Darby's Rangers during their defense of the Sorrentino peninsula. Nevertheless, OSS personnel often complained that their operations were misunderstood by field commanders, citing one colonel who expected them to "sit in foxholes and toss petard grenades and Molotov cocktails at German heavy tanks as they rolled over us." Nevertheless, their activities earned the interest and approval of General Clark, who gave them vehicles, rations, and a free hand.

Rangers enter Comiso, Sicily.

As the Allied armies expanded their foothold on the Italian peninsula during the fall of 1943, the newly arrived operational groups began to establish bases on offshore islands for raids against the German-held northern coastline. In February 1943 Eisenhower agreed to allow the OSS's Special Operations staff at Algiers to employ four to eight of these commando cells to organize and otherwise assist guerrilla forces in Italy and southern France. Shortly after the Italian surrender in September, Donovan, who was visiting Algiers at the time, ordered an operational group to accompany a French expeditionary force to Corsica, where partisans had revolted against the German garrison. Since the Germans had already decided to withdraw their troops to the Italian mainland, the operational groups and their French allies merely harassed the departing enemy. Immediately following the German evacuation, the groups established an advance base there, as well as observation posts on the nearby islands of Gorgona and Capraia. At Corsica, they were only thirty-five miles from the Italian coast.

From their new bases, the operational groups conducted raids against German communications along the Italian coast in an attempt to divert enemy troops from the main front (Map 3). The narrow, rocky coastal plains of the Italian peninsula were crossed by numerous roads and railways, which the Germans used as lines of supply. Night after night, operational groups crawled ashore to attack the most vulnerable points and reconnoiter enemy installations. Observers at Gorgona directed air strikes against oil tanks in the harbor at Livorno before German raids finally forced evacuation of the island. But not all OG missions ended successfully. In March 1944 a fifteen-man force, code named GINNY, landed south of La Spezia with orders to dynamite a railway tunnel on the main supply line for the front south of Rome. Local inhabitants discovered the party's poorly concealed rubber boats and alerted the Germans, who found the party hiding in a barn. Although in uniform at the time, the captured OG members were summarily executed in accordance with Adolph Hitler's orders to liquidate all commandos.

Rangers securing Arzew habor, Algeria

After transferring its bases to the Italian mainland in the late summer of 1944, the Office of Strategic Services placed a greater emphasis on partisan warfare. Up to that time, the lack of airlift and other resources and the confused political situation resulting from the sudden collapse of Italy in the fall of 1943 had hindered OSS efforts to establish contact with the resistance in northern Italy. In mid-1944, however, the Americans began to drop supplies and operatives into the region on a much larger scale. At that time, nine operational groups parachuted into the area to discover an indigenous resistance movement already in place, but desperately in need of equipment and supplies. As supply drops and word of Allied successes swelled their strength, the partisans subsequently took the offensive, harassing German forces withdrawing to the Gothic Line during the summer and fall of 1944. With winter, the decline in air resupply due to poor flying weather enabled the Germans to strike back against the guerrillas, who faded into the mountains. Their retreat proved only temporary, for by the spring of 1945 seventy-five OSS teams were equipping and training the resistance bands in preparation for the final Allied effort in Italy.

When the Allied offensive crossed the Po River in late April 1945, partisans, supported by operational groups, rose in revolt throughout northern Italy. Assisted by these American operatives, partisans cut key routes from Lake Como to the Brenner Pass, while south of Piacenza and Parma OG teams organized successful roadblocks on key transport routes and harassed German columns and troop concentrations. Guerrilla roadblocks aided the 92d Infantry Division in its capture of Pontremoli, and in Genoa 15,000 partisans, directed by operational groups, prevented the destruction of the port facilities and took some 3,000 prisoners. In all, Italian partisans killed or wounded over 3,000 Axis troops, captured 81,000 others, and prevented the destruction of key facilities in the Genoa, Milan, Venice, and Modena areas.

Ranger fully loaded.

Although British SOE agents dominated operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the Office of Strategic Services still played an important role there. Seeking to pin down German forces far from the OVERLORD invasion, American operatives agreed to provide arms to Communist and socialist guerrillas in Greece as early as October 1943 in return for their subordination to the authority of the theater commander. While the partisans increased their activities, operational groups began to infiltrate into Greece early in 1944 to conduct a series of raids against German road and rail communications in Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus. With the aid of Communist guerrillas, an SO party in May demolished two bridges on the Orient Express line, temporarily interrupting the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany. Extensive OSS operations in Greece continued up to the German withdrawal, ending only in December with the outbreak of a local, but bitter, civil war between the various resistance groups. Off the coast of Yugoslavia, operational groups helped defend the island of Vis, a key base for the supply of Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, and joined British commandos in raids along the Dalmatian coast, remaining in the field up to the German departure from Yugoslavia in July 1944.

Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick (U.S. Army Photograph)

In the initial assault against Axis-dominated Europe, U.S. forces could thus claim many significant achievements in the field of special operations. At Arzew, El Guettar, Gela, Salerno, Monte La Difensa, Anzio, and the Iles d'Hyeres, the Ranger battalions and 1st Special Service Force had performed missions critical to the success of conventional forces, while in the interior OSS commandos had raided German communications and provided direct support to partisans in northern Italy and the Balkans. The ability of these forces to take advantage of the rough terrain and extended coastlines characteristic of the theater proved to be a major factor in their success. Nevertheless, for the most part, the conventional Allied campaign in the Mediterranean proceeded as if special operations never existed. The relative insignificance of such activities reflected both American inexperience and a chronic shortage of materiel and manpower resources. But the basic cause was the absence of any doctrine of special operations. Field commanders, uncertain about the proper employment of the Ranger battalions and the 1st Special Service Force, depleted their strength in line operations and eventually disbanded them rather than employ them in a systematic program of raids that would have used their special capabilities. Moreover, the partisan efforts in Italy and the Balkans had only a nuisance value and were rarely tied into the operations of conventional Allied combat units. Thus, despite some isolated successes, special operations made only a limited contribution to the hard-earned success of Allied arms in the Mediterranean.

Additional Sources:

www.thedropzone.org
www.grunts.net
www.rangerfamily.org
www.ranger.org
www.oldgloryprints.com

Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby was presented with the Distinguished Service Cross, America's second highest decoration for bravery. In the meantime, General Bradley had asked Patton for Darby to command a regiment of the 45th Division, which had come in beside the 1st Infantry on Gela Beach. As Bradley pointed out, "It would have meant a promotion for him and a choice combat command."

But, Patton had chosen not to order Darby to accept the promotion. Instead, according to Bradley, "George propositioned him instead."

Darby was reported to have grinned and said, "You mean I get a choice, General? I'm not used to choices in the army." Patton quickly replied with, "Take the regiment and I'll make you a full colonel in the morning, but I won't force your hand. There are a thousand colonels in this army who'd give their eyeteeth for this chance."

Bradley, who was present, remembered, "Darby looked first to me, then to Patton." Then, unwilling to leave his beloved Rangers, Darby answered, "Well, thanks anyhow, General. But, I think maybe I'd better stick with my boys."

An amazed Patton wrote in his diary that night, "This is the first time I ever saw a man turn down a promotion. Darby is a great soldier."

Veterans Day 2003 - Attention Northern California
PDN News Desk ^ comwatch

Veterans Day is right around the corner.

It's an opportunity for us to support our troops, our country and show appreciations for our local veterans. It's another way to counter the Anti-Iraq campaign propaganda. Would you like to help? Are there any VetsCoR folks on the Left Coast? We have a school project that everyone can help with too, no matter where you live. See the end of this post for details.

Three Northern California events have been scheduled and we need help with each:

Friday evening - November 7th Veterans in School (An Evening of Living History, A Veterans Day Ice Cream Social)

http://www.patriotwatch.com/V-Day2003c.htm

Saturday - 11 a.m. November 8th: Veterans Day Parade (PDN & Friends parade entry)

http://www.patriotwatch.com/V-Day2003b.htm

Sunday November 9, 2003 Noon to 3:00 PM Support our Troops & Veterans Rally prior to Youth Symphony Concert

http://www.patriotwatch.com/V-Day2003d.htm

Each of the WebPages above have a link to e-mail a confirmation of your interest and desire to volunteer. These are family events and everyone is welcome to pitch in. We'd really appreciate hearing from you directly via each these specific links. This way, we can keep you posted on only those projects you want to participate in.

Veterans in School - How you can help if you're not close enough to participate directly. If you are a veteran, share a story of your own with the children. If you have family serving in the military, tell them why it's important that we all support them. Everyone can thank them for having this special event. Keep in mind that there are elementary school kids.

Help us by passing this message around to other Veteran's groups. I have introduced VetsCoR and FreeperFoxhole to a number of school teachers. These living history lessons go a long way to inspire patriotism in our youth. Lets see if we can rally America and give these youngsters enough to read for may weeks and months ahead. If we can, we'll help spread it to other schools as well.

Click this link to send an email to the students.

GOOD MORNING EVERYONE AT THE FOXHOLE!!

Thank you service men and women, past and present, for your service to our country!!

.......FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole!

.......Good Thursday Morning Everyone!

If you would like added to our ping list let us know.

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole. It's a bit nippy here in Oklahoma.

Checking in, snippy. Good morning, all!

Good morning EGC, chilly here in Ohio too.

Good morning Samwise, thanks for "fallin' in" the Foxhole this morning. I'm out the door and headed for work!!

Today's classic warship, USS Missouri (BB-11)

Maine class battleship
displacement. 13,500 t.
length. 393'11"
beam. 72'2"
draft. 25'8"
speed. 18.15 k.
complement 592
armament. 4 12", 16 6 ", 6 3 ". 8 3-pdrs.

The USS Missouri was laid down by Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., Newport News, Va., 7 February 1900; launched 28 December 1901; sponsored by Mrs. Edson Galludet, daughter of Senator Francis Marion Cockrell of Missouri, and commissioned 1 December 1903, Capt. William S. Cowles in command.

Assigned to the North Atlantic Fleet, Missouri left Norfolk 4 February 1904 for trials off the Virginia Capes and fleet operations in the Caribbean. On 13 April, during target practice, a flareback from the port gun in her after turret ignited a powder charge and set off two others. No explosion occurred but the rapid burning of the powder suffocated 36 of the crew. Prompt action prevented the loss of the warship and three of her crew were awarded Medals of Honor for extraordinary heroism. After repairs at Newport News, Missouri sailed 9 June for duty In the Mediterranean from which she returned to New York 17 December.

Fleet operations along the east coast and in the Caribbean during the next years were highlighted by her relief to earthquake victims at Kingston, Jamaica, 17 to 19 January 1907. In April she took part in the Jamestown Exposition.

With the "Great White Fleet," Missouri sailed from Hampton Roads 16 December 1907, passing in review before President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of a world cruise which was to show the world that American naval might could penetrate any waters. Calling at ports in the Caribbean and along the east coast of South America, the fleet rounded Cape Horn to call in Peru and Mexico before arriving San Francisco 6 May 1908 for a gala visit. In July the fleet turned west for Honolulu, New Zeal and, and Australia, arriving in Manila 2 October. The most tumultuous welcome yet came in Yokohama, and with a call in Amoy, China, the fleet began the passage home by way of Ceylon, Suez, and ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Departing Gibraltar 6 February 1909, the fleet was again reviewed by President Roosevelt upon its triumphant return to Hampton Roads 22 February. An important diplomatic mission had been carried out with the greatest success.

Placed in reserve at Boston 1 May 1910, and recommissioned 1 June 1911, Missouri resumed east coast and Caribbean operations with the Atlantic Fleet. In June 1912 she carried marines from New York to Cuba where they protected American interests during a rebellion. The next month the battleship carried midshipmen for training then decommissioned at Philadelphia 9 September 1912.

Missouri was modernized and recommissioned 16 March 1914 for that summer's Naval Academy Practice Squadron's cruise to Italian and English ports. She returned to ordinary at Philadelphia 2 December 1914, but recommissioned 16 April 1915 to train midshipman in the Caribbean and on a cruise through the Panama Canal to California ports. She returned to the Reserve Fleet at Philadelphia 18 October 1915, recommissioned 2 May 1916, and again conducted training along the east coast and in the Caribbean until placed in ordinary for the winter at Philadelphia.

Upon the entry of the United Stated into World War I, Missouri recommissioned 23 April 1917, joined the Atlantic Fleet at Yorktown, Va., and operated as a training ship in the Chesapeake Bay area. On 26 August 1917 Rear Adm. Hugh Rodman broke his flag in Missouri as Commander, Division 2, Atlantic Fleet, and the warship continued to train thousands of recruits in engineering and gunnery for foreign service on warships and as armed guards for merchant vessels.

Following the Armistice, the battleship was attached to the Cruiser and Transport Force, departing Norfolk 18 February 1919 on the first of four voyages to Brest to return 3,278 U.S. troops to east coast ports. Missouri decommissioned at Philadelphia Navy Yard 8 September 1919. She was sold to J. G. Hitner and W. F. Cutler of Philadelphia 26 January 1922 and scrapped in accordance with the treaty limiting naval armaments.

Mornin' Snippy, Mornin' Sam. Just checking in. Didn't get a chance yesterday.

Y'all have a good day! :)

....to show the world that American naval might could penetrate any waters.

Yet the world today doesn't seem to "get it", though they should.

Thanks for the history of the USS Missouri today.

Good morning radu.

Mornin' SC, good to see you, thanks for "fallin' in" today.

God uses ordinary people to carry out his extraordinary plan. I am willing Lord, use me!

Good morning Mayor, we missed you yesterday.

I was on the road at 5 am and didn't get home till 8pm

Had to go to Albany all day..

Do you have to make that trek often, and if so, will you have to do it in the winter time too? I imaging the drive could get bad in winter.