NATIONAL IRANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL
www.niacouncil.org
Washington DC, October 9, 2003 – As the days creep toward the October 31 deadline for Iran to comply with IAEA protocols regarding its nuclear status, "Iranologist" Ray Takeyh finds himself frequently called upon to characterize Iran's outlook and policy alternatives with regard to nuclear development. Today as a guest of the South Asian Studies department at John Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the National Defense University scholar fit his analysis of issues of nuclear weapons and terrorism into a sketch of the trajectory of Iran's foreign relations since 1979 (and the isolation of the decade under Khomeini), which he sees as "a halting process of transition from a revolutionary state to a pragmatic state," though the process of "graduating" is "neither absolute nor comprehensive."
He thinks that the Iranian approach to non-proliferation, terrorism and changes in the political landscape of its neighbors has increasingly reflected and will demonstrate, to some extent, an awareness that direct confrontation with the United States is not a risk the state can afford.
On Iran's self-limitation of relationships with Al-Qaeda or saboteurs in Iraq, for example, Takeyh pointed out how a cautious outlook, if not rhetoric, may be required in this era of an American doctrine of military intervention as a preventative measure for both proliferation and terrorism: "Flirting with terrorist organizations can not just get you condemnation, but a visit from General Sanchez." In fact, he said, even directly after September 11, Hizbollah leadership was called to Tehran with a message of, "This better not be you!" Takeyh also revealed in the question and answer period that Iranian conservatives have secretly sent representatives to study the China model: political passivity for economic rewards.
Takeyh, Director of Studies at the Near East and South Asian Institute of the NDU, posits that a realization of the necessity for some form of relationship with the United States has affected Iranian policy especially in the past two years, though he stipulated, "We can't really speak of Iranian government; we have to speak of Iranian governments." He implied that the "perplexing impasse" on certain issues between conservatives/hard-liners and liberals/reformists Additionally, Takeyh pointed out that while the American instinct is to interact with other regimes based on package agreements that incorporate all areas of overlapping concerns, the Iranians would prefer what he calls "compartmentalized pragmatism," relations with the United States on certain issues where there exists a coincidence of interests, such as a stable Afghanistan, which led them to participate cordially in the Bonn and Tokyo conferences on the matter.
As well, Iran's policies on issues that have historically been guided by their religious ideological cores have seen significant shifts as the need for economic growth and some friends in the international community outweigh them. For example, Takeyh cited the example that though Iran's longstanding and tried relationship with Hizbollah remains intact and problematic, the policy of opposition to a Palestinian-Israeli peace has been narrowed to opposition of an American-brokered peace. The shift in part represents a following of Saudi Arabia's lead, with which (as early as 1995) the Iranian government prioritized a relationship over support for Shi'a dissidents in Saudi Arabia, though it is a state that Khomeini spent pages of his will denouncing.
The pattern of non-involvement in Shi'a minority rights can be observed most places except for Lebanon, says Takeyh, such as in Kashmir, because of the primacy of Iran's relationship with Moscow, and even in Iraq, though Iran does hope to have interlocutors (though not necessarily representatives) in the future government. Additionally, he marks Khatami's election as the beginning of active Iranian interests in trade and international dialogue with members of the European Union and India, for example, with whom efforts to establish a viable commercial relationship based on their purchase of Iran's natural gas continue.
With respect to non-proliferation compliance, Takeyh believes that there is a real debate going on in Iran now, for "this is not an issue that breaks down on pragmatist and conservative/hardliner." Outlining three schools of thought on the issue, he predicted that Iran will sign the additional IAEA protocols in the next couple of months, approaching but not crossing the threshold (as India has done), he says. The first school of thought, in favor of developing nuclear weapons, uses the "dangerous neighborhood" argument, which Takeyh considers somewhat difficult to support. Iraq was formerly a threat because of its chemical weapons programs, but no longer, Pakistan is less frequently cited because the relationship is murky and it is a fellow Muslim country, and Israel is most accurately characterized as a condition conflict in which both parties use proxies-Iran acts through Hizbollah and other such pro-Palestinian groups, and Israel acts through US-imposed sanctions.
The second school of thought on nuclear development advocates going forward with a program under IAEA auspices, during the three-to-four-year window it takes to implement full monitoring, and the two years it would take them to complete your survey, but negotiating and splitting the coalition on the US side all the while. Finally, some of those Takeyh refers to as pragmatists or reformists take the position that for Iran to possess nuclear weapons would only exacerbate its strategic vulnerabilities, resulting in further isolation and commercial weakening. Among most views there is some consideration of the national pride, the question of why some states may have nuclear weapons while Iran is told they should not be among them.
In the future, then, Takeyh sees coalitions shifting based upon Iran's relations with the United States, and an Iranian interest in the security architecture of the post-war Persian Gulf because it is crucial for access to the international petroleum market. Hardliners will continue to desire isolation, because under its conditions internal concessions are not needed as "you can talk about external threats, external enemies which you yourself created."
Ray Takeyh recently published an article in the journal entitled National Interest including many of the themes of this talk, and has written a soon-to-be-published book, Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam. He has written extensively on various international issues and was previously a fellow at Yale University in International Security Studies.
http://www.niacouncil.org/pressreleases/press125.asp
According to the testimony of three Iranian exiles, Ron Arad, unable to walk, was held until at least three years ago in a small and secret prison cell in northern-Teheran.
The Hebrew news site Ynet contains a detailed account of the testimonies of the three Iranian exiles who said they saw Ron Arad. According to the picture drawn by the three - which is being treated respectfully but cautiously by Israeli intelligence - Arad, unable to walk, was held at least until three years ago in a small and secret prison cell in northern-Teheran.
The testimonies of the three Iranians, which were gathered at different times over the past three years and mostly within the last three months, tell many heretofore unknown details of Ron Arad's tribulations over the past ten years. In mid-'94, the Iranians purchased him from Mustafa Dirani, who took cruel control of him in Lebanon, has since been captured by special IDF forces, and is now being held in Israel.
The Iranians brought him to Hizbullah headquarters in Lebanon, and later took him to Iran for a security interrogation. Arad was dressed in an Iranian Revolutionary Guard uniform and placed on a well-guarded truck bound for Damascus.
One source said that while still in Syria, a cruel operation paralyzing him at his knees and down was performed on him, in order to prevent him from trying to escape. He had apparently tried to do just that while still in Lebanon. The operation left Arad bound to a wheelchair. He was flown from Syria to Iran, held in various tightly-guarded buildings, and underwent some long interrogations sessions. No details on the interrogations were provided.
About five years ago, he was transferred to the prison in which he was seen three years ago and in which he might still be today. Each cell in the complex is 20 square meters in area, with no windows but with an air conditioning system. Two 24-hour video cameras are installed in each room, and the prisoners are taken out - one at a time - to breath fresh air twice a day.
One source said that he once asked Ron how he was doing, and received a short reply in Arabic, "with maybe a word in Hebrew as well." Arad was hospitalized at least twice because of heart problems.
Ron Arad was described as very thin and gaunt, with a sad and hollow expression, and as one who underwent tremendous hardships but has strong standing power.
Israeli sources say that the report has "more than an iota of truth."
A rally on behalf of Ron Arad will be held Thursday evening, October 16, at 19:30 at the Tel Aviv Museum Plaza in Tel Aviv.
http://www.israelnn.com/news.php3?id=50937