Iran's Race for Nuclear Weapons
September 29, 2003
Asia Today Online
Erich Marquardt
In March and June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested access to a small complex of buildings at the Kalaye Electric Company in a suburb of Tehran. The agency suspected that the Iranians were using this site to research and develop nuclear weapons. During two attempts to gain access to this site, the IAEA was refused. Finally, after construction and cleanup had been completed at the site, the IAEA inspectors were allowed entrance. After conducting a thorough search, the IAEA discovered traces of weapons-grade enriched uranium.
This is now the second site in Iran where traces of weapons-grade enriched uranium have been found; the first discovery took place at the nuclear facility at Natanz, located in central Iran. Tehran's explanation for these two discoveries is that residual weapons-grade uranium was left on second-hand nuclear equipment purchased from Pakistan. While this explanation is possible, since Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state, it is a dubious one at best. Instead, these two discoveries by the IAEA lend further credence to the accusation that Tehran is on a course to develop nuclear weapons.
For the leadership in Tehran, the quest to acquire nuclear weapons has become a race. With the United States in inextricable situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington will have a difficult time using military power to prevent Tehran's pursuit of nuclear arms. With troop levels nearly exhausted, a military attack on Iran would have to rely mainly on air power, which would not produce the desired results of completely eliminating Iran's nuclear program or altering the government structure in Tehran.
Indeed, the Pentagon has been arguing, for the first time in years, that the US may have to increase the size of its military. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have exhausted the active duty forces, and the US has been continually calling up additional National Guardsmen and Reserves to maintain its current troop levels. With US forces not designed to fulfill extensive peacekeeping roles, the US Army's vice chief of staff, General John Keane, recently admitted, "We do not have enough military police in the active duty force, as well as in the Reserve ..." This failure has taxed US troops, with General John Abizaid, chief of US Central Command, recently warning the US Senate and House Armed Services Committee, "We have to address the issue of fatigue." Based on the preceding statements from US military personnel, Washington has enough to worry about in both Afghanistan and Iraq for it to also consider taking military action in Iran.
Tehran's desire to develop and acquire nuclear weapons is based on its deteriorating national security situation. Before October of 2001, when the US began military action against Afghanistan, Iran had less to fear regarding its territorial integrity or the survival of its government. Afghanistan to the east was plagued by inner turmoil and did not pose much of a threat to Iran's eastern border. Iraq, to the west, was more of a concern, yet the United Nations-enforced sanctions did much to keep Iraq in a state of perpetual weakness. The UN and the US were intent on keeping the status quo in the Middle East.
Iran's only major threat, Israel, was being kept largely at bay, having to deal with its own internal problems centered on the continuing resistance by its large Palestinian population. Yet the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11 would soon alter the geopolitical makeup in the Middle East and Central Asia. The attacks on that morning provided justification for the Bush administration - which consisted of an abnormally aggressive cabinet - to become involved in the affairs of Central Asia.
Beginning with its attack on Afghanistan, the Bush administration greatly increased its influence in the affairs of Central Asian states; indeed, before the invasion of Afghanistan, the US had little to no involvement in the affairs of Central Asia. During the Soviet era, the US did not have the military power to become involved in this region, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US lacked the political power to become involved. It was not until Washington could use the justification of retaliating to the devastating attacks on its homeland that it could establish military bases in former Soviet states and therefore increase its influence with the governments in those states.
After establishing military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Bush administration had engineered the successful projection of US power and influence into Central Asia that could then be used to achieve US interests in the region. As alarming as this sudden influx of US troops and influence was for Tehran, it was eclipsed by the ability of the Bush administration to gain political support for not only overthrowing the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, but in establishing a military occupation of the country. Plus, by taking this action unilaterally, the Bush administration could not be directly influenced by member states of the UN.
This sudden change of the geopolitical map on both Iran's western and eastern borders has led to the conclusion in Tehran that it must make itself militarily powerful in order to continue to secure its interests and, most importantly, its territorial and governmental integrity. This explains why in recent days Iran has continued to focus attention on its Shahab-3 missile, which was fully and successfully tested on July 15, 2000. According to the Federation of American Scientists, these missiles have the ability to strike targets within a 1,350 kilometer to 1,500 kilometer range, putting them well within striking capability of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also within striking distance of Israel.
By coupling the development of nuclear weapons with its ability to strike targets in the Middle East and Central Asia, Iran will have transformed itself into a powerful state that would be able to protect its national interests and territorial integrity. If these ends were achieved, rival states such as the US and Israel would lose massive foreign policy leverage in the Middle East. It is for this reason that Israel and the US are extremely concerned over Iran's continued development of nuclear technology that could be used to develop nuclear arms.
It is clear that the military card is currently not a desirable option for Washington. The threat of Iranian retaliation in addition to an extremely taxed US military has caused Washington to seek alternative means in dealing with Iran. The Bush administration has been pushing the UN and the international community to apply political and economic pressure on Iran. So far, the Bush administration has achieved the establishment of an October 31 deadline for Iran to sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This protocol would allow the IAEA to conduct surprise inspections of suspected Iranian nuclear sites. Unfortunately for the White House, it is not clear if this added pressure will halt or delay Iran's nuclear plans.
As of now, Iran has said that it will not sign the additional protocol. In the meantime, work is continuing on the main Iranian nuclear reactor in the city of Bushehr, which is being built with the technical support of Moscow. President George W Bush recently met with President Vladimir Putin of Russia in continued attempts to get Moscow to cease assistance to the Iranian government, but Putin refrained from taking a solid stance against Russia's nuclear assistance to Iran. Putin said, "It is our conviction that we shall give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to continue and expand its cooperation with the IAEA." Furthermore, the Russian president said that Moscow would continue to assist Iran's nuclear program, even if Tehran does not sign the additional protocol to the NPT that would pave the road to surprise inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities.
Moscow's reason for assisting Iran at the expense of the US lies in the same distaste that Tehran has over the increasing US presence in Central Asia and the Middle East. By boosting support to Iran, Moscow is ensuring that Washington will be unable to further increase its dominance in the Middle East and Central Asia. One of the main purposes that Washington has in establishing US military bases in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia is to encroach on Russia's borders and limit Moscow's influence in the rich oil and gas region of Central Asia. Therefore, while Russia certainly does not want to damage relations with the US, it will still make foreign policy decisions - such as supporting Iran - that will work to contain US influence in Eurasia.
In light of this, Tehran is racing to develop and acquire nuclear weapons before the US has the military leverage again to effectively deal with Iran. But once the main Iranian reactor at Bushehr is loaded with nuclear fuel - possibly in 2004 - it will become much more costly for Washington to launch an air attack on that reactor as any such attack would risk nuclear fallout. But Washington may not have the military or political ability to attack Iran before then.
Therefore, the wildcard to this festering conflict is Israel. Like Washington, the Israeli government does not want to lose foreign policy leverage in the Middle East. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region would end. This result is undesirable to the leadership in Jerusalem. In 1981, Israel was in a similar predicament. At that time, the French were assisting Iraq in Baghdad's pursuit of nuclear energy at the Osirak nuclear reactor. Before the reactor was loaded with nuclear fuel, Israel launched a surprise air attack and partially destroyed it. Leaders in Israel have warned that Israel will take such action again, if necessary, before the Iranian reactor at Bushehr is loaded with fuel.
If in 2004 the Bushehr reactor is ready to be loaded with nuclear fuel, the US may quietly encourage an Israeli attack on Iran. An Israeli attack would achieve Washington's objectives of weakening the Iranian government, but without putting US military forces in jeopardy from Iranian retaliation. The state of Israel, however, will be at risk from possible Iranian retaliation with its Shahab-3 missiles. It is still unclear whether Israel will risk such retaliation in exchange for its desire to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East.
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