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* The Confederates had repeatedly put out peace feelers to the Union, but since their basic negotiating position implied recognition of Southern independence, they had always been non-starters and amounted to little more than propaganda ploys for the home front.

The head of the Blair family, Old Man Francis P. Blair, had been friends with Jefferson Davis for two decades, and decided to see if he could make any progress with a strictly unofficial visit. Armed with a pass signed by Mr. Lincoln, Blair had gone to Richmond late in 1864 and spoken with Jefferson Davis in early January. Blair had proposed a far-fetched plan where the North and South would forget their differences, work together to drive the French out of Mexico, and then come to an agreement on reunion.

Davis wasn't impressed with this scheme, thinking it sounded like one of Secretary of State Seward's wild ideas, though Blair denied it. However, Davis was impressed that a Northerner of power and influence such as Old Man Blair was in Richmond at all. Davis gave Blair a letter to take back to Mr. Lincoln that suggested negotiations to end the war between the "two countries" would be appropriate.

Blair presented the letter to Mr. Lincoln on 18 January. The President took one look at the comment about the "two countries" and knew it was more of the same nonsense, but Blair added that he had met many prominent Confederates in Richmond who were perfectly aware that the South would lose the war very soon. Mr. Lincoln decided to respond with a letter of his own, indicating his desire to see peace restored to "our one common country." Old Man Blair returned to Richmond and handed it over to Mr. Davis four days later.

This was of course a nonstarter for Mr. Davis and he immediately dismissed the letter in his own mind. However, Mr. Davis saw it as a good opportunity to put the defeatists, or "submissionists", in the Confederate government in their place, and spoke with his perpetually annoying vice-president, Alexander Stephens, to consider engaging in negotiations.

Following this discussion, on 25 January Davis commissioned Stephens, Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell, and Senator R.M.T. Hunter to discuss peace terms with the Union. Mr. Davis carefully specified that they were empowered only to discuss a peace between "the two countries".

A messenger came over to Union lines at Petersburg on 29 January, bearing a letter for General Grant outlining the Confederate peace mission. Grant was down the coast in North Carolina at the time, talking strategy with Schofield, but he returned swiftly on hearing the news, and the three Confederates came across the lines in a carriage on the afternoon of 31 January. The parapets of both the Union and Confederate works were lined with soldiers, and even a good number of the proper ladies of Petersburg, who thought the event meant that peace was at hand. The soldiers cheered resoundingly, shouting "PEACE! PEACE!", and the ladies fluttered their handkerchiefs.

* Grant made his guests comfortable but kept them at arm's length, and in fact he soon got a message from Mr. Lincoln indicating that the presence of the three commissioners was not to be interpreted as a truce of any sort.

The three officials were met on 1 February by Major Thomas Eckert, normally the head of the War Department telegraph office back in Washington, now serving as Mr. Lincoln's personal representative. Eckert had been instructed to review the mission of the three in order to see if their agenda was to determine terms for reunion, or pretend that they could secure a Union agreement to disunion.

Eckert inspected their instructions. He then told them in essence that there was nothing to discuss, and informed Washington DC. However, the next morning, 2 February, Grant sent a long telegram to Secretary Stanton asking the government to consider dealing with the commissioners anyway. Stanton immediately took the message to Mr. Lincoln.

Grant had spoken with Stephens and Hunter and concluded they were in earnest, and at least deserved a fair hearing from somebody who had the authority to deal with them. Grant was not the sort of general, like McClellan, who presumed to give the President advice, and his credibility with the Lincoln Administration was very good. Mr. Lincoln wired back:

SAY TO THE GENTLEMEN I WILL MEET THEM
PERSONALLY AT FORTRESS MONROE AS SOON
AS I CAN GET THERE.

The President left on immediately, and that evening arrived at the steamer RIVER QUEEN, anchored near Fort Monroe. Secretary of State Seward was waiting for him, having arrived two days earlier on expectation of meeting the commissioners.

* The President and Secretary of State Seward met the three men on the RIVER QUEEN on the morning of 3 February. There were old and fond acquaintances among them, and they traded small talk for a time.

Then they got down to business. Responding to a probe on how to resolve the conflict from Stephens, Mr. Lincoln replied: "There is but one way, and that is for those who are resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance." In response to further probes along this line, Mr. Lincoln made it absolutely clear that as far as he was concerned the war would only end with the restoration of the Union. Justice Campbell took that as a given, and asked what the policy of the North would be for handling the rebel states once they were returned to the Union. Mr. Lincoln made it clear that slavery was finished, with Seward informing the commissioners of the approval of the Thirteenth Amendment three days earlier.

Mr. Lincoln then added that he would prefer some scheme of compensation for slave-owners, but observed that Congress had shown no enthusiasm for the idea. As for the readmission of a state to Congress, the ultimate authority for such an action rested with Congress itself and was subject to their rules and conditions, though he would encourage them to be flexible. He would also grant executive clemency to rebel officials to the extent that he was able.

The commissioners had clearly been hoping for much more, but Mr. Lincoln was holding all the ace cards and did nothing to pretend otherwise. Robert Hunter finally said: "Mr. President, if we understand you correctly, you think that we of the Confederacy have committed treason; that we are traitors to your government; that we have forfeited our rights, and are proper subjects for the hangman. Is that not about what your words imply?"

Mr. Lincoln thought it over for a moment, and then answered: "Yes. You have stated the proposition better than I did. That is about the size of it."

The men talked for four hours in all, but the two sides really had nothing to discuss. They finally parted and Mr. Lincoln, not happy about having been able to do so little for his old close friend Alexander Stephens, asked: "Well, Stephens, there has been nothing we could do for our country. Is there anything I can do for you personally?"

Stephens replied: "Nothing ...... unless you can send me my nephew who has been twenty months a prisoner on Johnson's Island."

"I'll be glad to do it. Let me have his name." He was Confederate Lieutenant John A. Stephens, taken prisoner during the Vicksburg campaign and currently locked up on an island in Lake Erie.

As the commissioners set off in a rowboat from the RIVER QUEEN, with the oars handled by a black servant, they were given a basket of champagne as a parting gift by Secretary of State Seward. As they were rowed away, Seward called out to them: "Keep the champagne but return the Negro!"

A week later, Lieutenant Stephens was brought to the White House, where he spoke with Mr. Lincoln and was given a pass through Union lines. Mr. Lincoln also gave him a photograph of himself: "You had better take that along. It is considered quite a curiosity down your way, I believe."

* Confederate die-hards used the futile talks as a basis for calls for sterner resistance. The South still had many men and resources, they pointed out. Some newspaper editors suggested that the Union was not as all-mighty as many Southerners seemed to assume, that Sherman's march through Georgia had been little more than a raid that had come and gone, leaving the land behind them still in Confederate hands.

That was appealing rhetoric, but no more than that. Sherman had gone where he pleased and the Confederacy had been unable to oppose him, in fact was still unable to oppose him now as he marched his army northward for a meeting with Grant. Hood had tried to exploit the "opportunity" and threaten the Union in Tennessee, only to be sent back South in humiliation. Confederate military resistance was crumbling away.

A town meeting was organized in Richmond on 6 February to rouse support for the cause. Robert Hunter was one of the speakers, blasting the arrogance of the Union and their demand for "unconditional submission". Then, much to everyone's surprise, Jefferson Davis, the arch-diehard, showed up unexpectedly and took the podium.

Davis delivered what was regarded as one of the finest, most rousing speeches of his careers, admired even by his enemies in the audience. The text of that speech was not recorded, but it almost certainly repeated elements from speeches Mr. Davis had given elsewhere, mocking the arrogance of "King Abraham The First"; calling for Southerners to rally to the flag, their flag; and claiming that if they showed true courage in the face of disaster, they would prevail. Davis even brought up the topic of arming slaves to help fight for the cause, and the audience accepted it without protest.

Justice Campbell was too demoralized to attend, but Alexander Stephens was there. Stephens, too, was impressed by Mr. Davis's rousing oratory, though looking back on it later Stephens called it "little short of demention". After the meeting broke up, Davis asked Stephens what his plans were. Stephens replied that he would "go home and remain there." He returned to Georgia and quietly waited for the last act of the drama to play itself out.

Davis had reason to be satisfied with how things had gone. He had managed to send annoyances like Stephens packing, and the indignation that flared through the South over Mr. Lincoln's uncompromising attitude united the Confederacy behind the government. Even editors who had done nothing but snipe at Mr. Davis for years rallied to the cause. How long they would stay on board as the water began to wash over the decks of their sinking ship was another question.

Of course, it had not been Mr. Lincoln's intent to stiffen Confederate resistance. He had made it clear that nothing less than reunion would be satisfactory in order to suggest that there was no hope of holding out in expectation of another deal.

At the same time, Robert Hunter's belief that Mr. Lincoln wanted unconditional submission was not quite the truth. The war had grown to the point where the old status quo was absolutely doomed, but even Mr. Lincoln wasn't sure what the new status quo would be. When the Union won the war, as it now surely would, how would the affairs of the South be managed? What would the rights and status of the states so recently in rebellion be in the new order?

The President clearly felt that it would be in the best interests of both sides that the new order be as agreeable as possible given the circumstances. He couldn't give promises, since he wasn't the only person who would establish that new order, but he had a great deal of influence. The Confederate commissioners couldn't see this, wouldn't see it, but they had not stopped the game, just dealt themselves out of it. Even before meeting the commissioners, Secretary Seward had told his wife that "the condition of the South is pitiable, but it is not yet fully realized there."

Soldiers on both sides understood the pitiable condition of the South, and late in the month Generals Ord and Longstreet, meeting between the Petersburg lines to discuss fraternization between pickets and arrange a prisoner exchange, got to talking and came to the idea that maybe the soldiers might do better if they had a few talks among themselves. Longstreet liked the idea and passed it up to Lee, who ran it past Mr. Davis and Secretary of War Breckinridge. They thought it was worth a try, and so Lee sent a message across the lines to Grant on 3 March.

Grant immediately wired Washington DC for instructions, and Mr. Lincoln promptly replied that Grant could deal with Lee to accept the rebel surrender, or on prisoner exchanges and the like, but that political matters were out of his brief. Grant sent a response to Lee, saying that he, Grant, lacked the authority to discuss such matters.

Since Lee had spoken to Davis about the proposal, such discussions would have been futile anyway. Mr. Davis was not would interested in talking about surrender and would never authorized Lee to do so, and surrender was almost the only option left to the Confederacy.

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