In Lincoln's Constitution, Daniel Farber, University of Chicago Press, 2003, (240pp), the case of Texas v. White is cited as a footnote on page 87, and the footnote is at page 216. I quote the relevant material here:
We can therefore focus on the narrow question of whether the act of ratification by an individual state is revocable. The text of the constitution does not speak explicitly to this point. Lincoln relied on the language of the Preamble establishing a "more perfect Union." When it considered the legality of secession after the Civil War, the Supreme Court also relied on this language. The Articles of Confederation claimed "to be perpetual," and a more temporary union could hardly be considered more perfect than a permanent one. This argument does have some support in ordinary usage. We would not be likely to say that a new welding method created a "more perfect Union" between two pieces of pipe if it was permanent than the existing method. Furthermore, the "perfect Union" phrase can be traced back to the 1707 union between England and Scotland, which was clearly viewed as permanent.36
[pp. 86-7][36] See Texas v. White 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868)
In American Constitutional Law,, Third Edition, Volume One, Laurence H. Tribe, 2000, (1470pp) the case of Texas v. White is in a footnote of an interesting review of some history of Constitutional law appearing at pp. 862-3.
Early Tenth Amendment jurisprudence* * *
Hammer and Bailey depended on nothing more than the principle of limited enumerated powers. Collector and Ashton, on the other hand, were grounded in a broad theory of "dual federalism" that held sway during the period from the 1870's to the mid-1930's.13 The idea was that "the powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres."14 The federal government, of this theory, could no more intrude in the state's sphere than the states could intrude in the federal government's sphere.15
Decline of "states' rights" judicial review.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in 1937 and immediately thereafter interred both these lines of cases, and in the process undercut both the theory of narrowly enumerated powers and the premise of "dual federalism." As to the application of the Tenth Amendment in Hammer and Bailey, the Court's broad reading of the commerce power essentially sealed the fate of that amendment as an independent source of states' rights; since Hammer and Bailey treated the tenth Amendment as covering only that which was not expressly enumerated, the expansion of the commerce power to encompass a much wider definition of "commerce" and to include that which was impliedly as well as expressly enumerated necessarily entailed the radical reduction of the Tenth Amendment's constraints.16 Separately, but relatedly, the Court recast the relationship between the federal government and the states, abandoning the idea that the two levels of government occupied independent, inviolable, and fully co-equal spheres.17 Part and parcel of this development was the Court's effective overruling of Ashton in United States v. Bekins18 and its explicit overruling of Collector in Graves v. New York.19 Justice Stone delivered what seemed to be the coupe de grace for the late nineteenth-century reading of the Tenth Amendment in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby: the Tenth Amendment, he wrote for the Court, "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."20
[13] This approach is discussed more fully in Chapters 7 and 8, infra.
[14] Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1859); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights 135 (1936).
[15] The Court stated the principle succinctly in Collector, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124: The federal government "in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States whehin the limits of their powers not granted [sic], or, in the the language of the Tenth Amendment, 'reserved,' are as independent of the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States."
This notion of reciprocity was central to the Court's implementation of dual federalism. In fact, in Collector the Court treated is prohibition of federal taxation of the salaries of state officials as the corollary of the principle of Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), that states could not tax the salaries of federal officials.
[16] Hammer was explicitly overruled in Unites States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Bailey was not overruled -- but, as was noted in § 5-7, supra, the Court's dramatic expansion of the scope of the Commerce Clause meant that limits on the taxing power became largely academic for over six decades; Congress could for a time justify virtually all such measure as regulations of commerce or as ancillary to such regulations See §§ 5-3 to 5-5, supra. Whether United States v. Lopez, 514, U.S. 549 (1995), will make Bailey relevant for the first time in many decades remains to be see.
[17] See Chapters 7 and 8 infra.
[18] 304 U.S. 27 (1938). See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 433 n. 42 (1946) (stating that Ashton, supra note 10, "may be said in effect to have been overruled by United States v. Bekins").
[19] 306 U.S. 466 (1939)
[20] 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). Of course, this is a "truism" only to the historically initiated; a grammarian reading the Constitution with the Tenth Amendment deleted, and without sharing the perception that the 1787 Constitution was meant to create a national government of limited powers might be forgiven for assuming instead that art I, § 8, was merely illustrative of the powers delegated to Congress, and that Congress indeed possesses all powers it might deem essential for national well-being, subject only to prohibitions like those of art. I, § 9, and those of the Bill of Rights.
We can therefore focus on the narrow question of whether the act of ratification by an individual state is revocable. The text of the constitution does not speak explicitly to this point.Article IV § 1 - 'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.'
"FULL" faith and credit - not partial faith and credit.
"Shall" be given - not "may" be given.
To "the" public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings - not "some" acts.
Of "every" other State - not selected states.