"IRAQ AS IT STANDS"
BY AMIR TAHERI,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
There is good news, and bad news, and a country given a chance
by Amir Taheri
National Review
October 13, 2003
There is good news, and bad news, and a country given a chance
AMIR TAHERI
As millions of Iraqi children start a new school year, they face two uncertainties. The first: Will enough of their teachers show up in the classrooms? The Ministry of Education has appealed to all teachers to be present at their posts — but many, associated with the Ba'ath, the former ruling party, have gone into hiding for fear of being taken to task by people who suffered under the fallen regime. The second: What kind of textbooks will be used? Under Saddam Hussein the principal goal of all education was to worship the despot. A phrase that adorned most textbooks simply stated: Learn the instructions of the Leader and all science shall be yours!
Nevertheless, there is also one certainty: The thick fog of fear that hung over all schools, indeed all Iraq, under Saddam has been lifted. This year there will be no mysterious disappearances from the classroom. No teachers and pupils will be found dead in the school doorways. There will be no suspicious characters dropping in during lectures to sit in the back row as the eyes and the ears of the Mukhaberat (secret police). Teenage schoolgirls will not be abducted and taken to one of the many harems maintained by Uday, Saddam's sadistic elder son, and other apparatchiki of the regime.
Anyone who knew Iraq before liberation and who visits the country now is immediately struck by the impact that the feeling of freedom has had on almost everyone. A society where people hardly spoke to one another, let alone to strangers, is bustling with talk, debates, disputes, and demonstrations for every cause under the sun. Thousands of banned books are on sale in the streets, and over 200 new newspapers and magazines have started publication. People are no longer afraid to turn on their radios and TVs as loud as they wish; there is no Mukhaberat to eavesdrop on what they are hearing or watching.
KEEPING THE PEACE
And yet, Iraq still faces a number of major challenges. The liberation phase was completed with remarkable ease and minimal human and material loss, largely because few Iraqis wanted to fight for their oppressor. The regular army almost never entered the war. The various parallel armies set up by Saddam Hussein also proved unreliable. "We had enough men and arms to put up a decent fight," says Gen. Toumah Abbas, a former chief of staff of the Iraqi army. "But no one wanted to fight; there was nothing worth fighting for." Iraq is now passing through the phase of pacification. That phase, too, is nearing completion in many parts of the country. In some areas, pacification efforts are threatened by criminal elements linked to the fallen regime. In a dozen or so towns, well-organized bands of thieves, smugglers, black-marketeers, and racketeers are taking advantage of the lack of adequate police coverage to rob and loot not only public buildings but also private homes and shops. Since the mid 1990s, bandits, backed by local tribes, have been active in some segments of the western Iraqi desert. The dissolution of the army, and the disappearance of all police presence, means that these bandits are now able to operate with almost total impunity.
Another threat to pacification comes from diverse elements opposed to liberation. Some remnants of the Ba'ath have regrouped and are engaged in a campaign of murder and sabotage in parts of the Sunni Triangle to the north of Baghdad. But there are also disgruntled elements in some former garrison towns such as Fallujah, Ba'qubah, and Ramadi that had benefited from the largesse of the Ba'athist regime. To these must be added some elements of the 20 or so Arab and Islamist terrorist organizations that had been sheltered by Saddam Hussein since the mid 1970s. The capture of some of their leaders by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq has not deterred these groups; it has persuaded them, rather, that their best chance is to help the remnants of the Ba'ath in making life difficult for "the occupiers." Several hundred Islamist militants who have infiltrated Iraq from Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia also contribute to the current level of violence in Iraq.
But the threat of all those elements should not be exaggerated. Since early May, Iraq has witnessed 29 attacks that could be described as terrorist. Of those, 22 took place in just five localities. Some, such as the blowing up of the Jordanian embassy and the U.N. office in Baghdad, were spectacular. That said, Iraq — judged by Middle Eastern standards — is still way down the Richter scale of terrorism. More important, the various groups that threaten pacification are not growing in number or resources. Although the coalition lacks enough forces to devote to search-and-destroy operations, many terrorists and saboteurs are tracked down and neutralized each day. Almost 90 percent of the acts that threaten pacification have taken place in less than 5 percent of Iraqi territory.
If all goes relatively well, pacification will be completed by the end of the year. The coalition then will face two other crucial tasks: reconstruction and democratization. Physical reconstruction efforts so far have been modest, limited mostly to private citizens rebuilding their homes, workshops, and stores. Hundreds of contracts, big and small, worth billions of dollars have been granted or negotiated. But five months after liberation there is still no agreement even on the basic economic rules of reconstruction. On democratization, too, a start has been made, with the establishment of a Governing Council and a Council of Ministers. A new constitution is being drafted. Over 40 political parties, old and new, are getting organized. The first free trade unions, professional associations, and guilds are taking shape.
Although Iraq is by no means out of the woods — it would be surprising if it were, after 35 years of the most vicious rule in the region's modern history — the transition from liberation to democratization is assured. The greater hope is that Iraq will become a model for democratization for Arabs, and Muslims in general. The removal of the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad has changed the political architecture of the Middle East, opening new opportunities for peace — and for a positive Iraqi role on the global energy scene.
SHAKING UP THE REGION
The impact of change in Iraq is already being felt throughout the region. Since 1980, when Saddam's army invaded Iran to start a war that would last eight years, Iraq has been unable to play its full role in regional politics. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 deepened Iraq's isolation. Iraq was shut out of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the six-nation organization created by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with the participation of four smaller petro-emirates, to coordinate key aspects of their economic and defense policies. Excluded from the Arab League for some six years, Iraq also lost its voice in the broader council of the Arab nations.
Under a new regime, Iraq could quickly regain its position as a major regional player. A democratic Iraq could find itself the natural leader of a small but growing group of Arab states that have taken timid steps toward democratization. Countries such as Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and even Kuwait — all of which have developed new systems based on some form of elections — could find themselves closer to a new democratic Iraq than to a Saudi Arabia that rejects all forms of elections as a matter of principle. The group could be joined by Yemen, which has held at least two reasonably clean general elections.
The new Iraq might also balance the power of Ba'athist Syria, which seems to be backtracking on the reform project initially presented under President Bashar al-Assad. It is not far-fetched to suggest that change in Iraq will, in time, be followed by change in Syria, as has actually always been the case since the 1950s. The new Iraq will almost certainly revive Baghdad's traditional opposition to the Syrian domination of Lebanon. Since any future Iraqi government is likely to include a strong Shiite element, Iraq is likely to become the key Arab player in Lebanon, where Shiites form the single largest community.
The return of Iraq to regional politics would break the duopoly established by Egypt and Saudi Arabia within the so-called Arab world. Iraq, which has the world's second largest oil reserves, could match Saudi Arabia in terms of economic clout. In terms of population and the deployment of an intellectual elite, it could emerge as a serious challenger to Egypt's current dominant position among the Arabs. And it is not only Iraq's Arab brethren who will be affected by the regime change in Baghdad: The new Iraq has already recognized full national rights for the Kurds, an action that will reverberate in Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Armenia — which have all oppressed their ethnic Kurds, albeit in different ways.
Iran, where Shiites account for some 88 percent of the population, is already affected by the possibility of a democratic pluralist government in Baghdad in which Shiites would have a leading role. The Iraqi Shiites, representing some 60 percent of the population, have always rejected the Iranian system of walayat al-faqih (custodianship of the jurisconsult) that, translated into practical politics, means despotic rule by a small group of politicians disguised as mullahs. Iraq could show that a different Shiite model is possible — and thus deal a serious blow to the claims of the Iranian rulers that walayat al-faqih is the only divinely sanctioned form of government in Islam. Since the liberation of Baghdad, thousands of Iranian Shiite clerics have left their traditional seminaries in Tehran and Qom to settle in the Iraqi Shiite cities of Karbala and Najaf. "The American presence in Iraq is a guarantee for religious freedom that we do not have in Iran," says Hussein Khomeini, a mid-ranking mullah and grandson of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the 1979 revolution in Iran. "The Americans are not going to tell me how to live my Shiism as do the present rulers of Iran."
Iraq's relationship with neighboring Turkey is also certain to undergo important changes. For almost five decades, successive Iraqi regimes have pursued a policy of provocation against Turkey, in the name of Arab nationalism. Also in the name of pan-Arabism, they have maintained an irredentist claim on the Turkish province of Iskenderun, where ethnic Arabs form a majority, and pressed a dispute over the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates. The new Iraq, however, is almost certain to have no pan-Arabist hangovers. In fact, many Iraqis want their country to withdraw from the Arab League and emphasize its ethnic and cultural diversity. For them the key word is uruqa (Iraqi-ness), not uruba (Arabness).
MORE REVERBERATIONS
Since all Iraqi political forces have agreed to end Baghdad's traditional policy of hostility to Israel, the new Iraq could act as a positive influence on the Palestinians. With Iraq leaving the "destroy Israel" camp of the Arab states, the Arabs as a whole might move toward a strategic peace with the Jewish state. Right now, 12 of the 53 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference maintain full diplomatic ties with Israel. If Iraq were to join them, as it almost certainly will do as soon as possible, a further 20, including at least nine more Arab states, are likely to follow suit. Beyond the Middle East, the emergence of Iraq as a democratic state with close ties to the U.S. and other Western democracies is likely to strengthen the position of those Muslim countries that seek — in the words of Iranian author M. A. Forughi — "a grand alliance between the two halves of the same civilization," that is to say, Islam and the West.
And Iraq's importance will go beyond politics. Its vast untapped oil resources could redefine the basic rules of the global energy market by mobilizing production capacities beyond the dreams of many oil strategists. It is a cliché in the oil business that Saudi Arabia is capable of pumping up to 10 million barrels of oil a day, thus making sure that the global economy can cope with any eventuality with regard to energy. But this claim made for Saudi Arabia has not been tested, or properly investigated, since the late 1980s; it is actually not at all certain that the Saudis could reach such production levels easily and speedily. Saudi Arabia's largest oilfields are over half a century old and in a state of "fatigue." Saudi efforts to attract foreign — principally U.S. — investment in modernizing its oil industry and increasing production capacities have produced little result.
The Iraqi fields, however, are new and robust. The island of Majnun, close to the Iranian border, and the South Rumailah fields, close to the border with Kuwait, represent the world's largest reservoirs of crude oil. Most experts believe Iraq could produce an average of 4.2 million barrels a day within five years, thus emerging as the world's second largest exporter of crude. This would be good news for the European Union and the Far East, notably Japan and China, which heavily depend on imported oil from the Persian Gulf. The policies and attitudes of the European Union powers, as well as Russia, China, and Japan, with regard to the process of change in Iraq are sure to have an impact on relations with the future regime in Baghdad: Those who sided with Saddam Hussein until the bitter end may find that their choice will prove costly.
Iraq has another advantage: its relatively large population, projected to hit the 30 million mark by the end of the decade. That could turn it into the richest market in the Middle East, where other states are either too small, in demographic terms, or too poor to be attractive trading partners.
It's still early, but change in Iraq has put paid to the traditional post-1950s model of the Arab state, based on single-party rule backed by the military and centered on one charismatic leader. Some circles, especially in the European Union, fear change and warn of instability. But the Middle East needs a period of creative instability. A stability symbolized by Saddam Hussein and other despots is not worth preserving.
Mr. Taheri is the author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam.
http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/585
