Posted on 09/25/2003 8:00:58 AM PDT by Matthew James
The United States Army’s Stryker program is misguided because Desert Storm demonstrates that threats still exist to which Stryker’s protection and firepower are insufficient.[1] In addition, it does not pass basic mobility and deployability requirements.
The measure of success for a combat vehicle is determined by its level of crew protection and its firepower. Many modern vehicles in various stages of testing and development attempt to make maximum use of technological sensors and diagnostics to augment the vehicle’s protection. Modern variants also use technology to augment their fire capabilities by attempting to digitally link them to other modern weapons platforms on the battlefield. But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable. Such circumstances are not a matter of speculation, they will and do happen all the time. Combat vehicle designers must therefore design the vehicles so that they can fight – and win – in such a “degraded mode.” A vehicle that cannot fight in degraded mode should get a grade of “F” for survivability.
This paper will show why the Stryker concept is misguided, by comparing the Stryker to the M2/M3 Bradley. The Bradley is the most comparable modern fighting vehicle, and as such the Stryker should be markedly better if the Army is to adopt it for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This paper will compare the two systems in the areas of Protection, Firepower, Mobility and Deployability.
Protection
The most obvious area to measure from a protection standpoint is the vehicle’s armor. The Bradley provides 65mm of protection on the sides compared to the Stryker’s 14.5mm.[2] These figures are provided by the respective manufacturers. Bradley armor is supposed to offer protection against everything short of direct hits by artillery or tank main gun rounds. However, this writer (an Armor officer with 15 years of experience, to include combat in Desert Storm) personally witnessed the effects of .50 caliber, 25 millimeter (both American), and 12.7 mm (Soviet) machine gun fire against a Bradley. All calibers easily penetrated the front, sides and rear of the Bradley, killing the crew.[3]
As stated above, the Stryker protection level should be better than the Bradley’s; but is it? It appears that the Stryker’s armor is no better than the Bradley’s, and may be worse. During a rigorous field test of the Stryker (Millenium Challenge 2002) conducted in August 2002, “thirteen of fourteen Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions.”[4] Such performance does not outshine the Bradley’s; but perhaps the Stryker is more lethal?
Firepower
A reasonable criterion to measure success is whether the vehicle can shoot while on-the-move. Stabilized gun platforms have been used on various American and Soviet weapons systems for over two decades; therefore it is well within the limits of technology that such systems be incorporated into future designs due to the decided advantage they provide. In fact, not having a stabilized platform has become a serious disadvantage.
The Bradley’s main weapon systems are a 25 millimeter chain gun, and a TOW missile launcher. One of the vehicle’s offensive limitations is that it cannot fire its TOW while on-the-move. The Bradley must first stop, raise the TOW launcher, arm the missile, then fire. This entire process takes approximately 30 seconds. Therefore, the TOW is usually employed while the vehicle is in a defensive position offering as much protection as possible (hull defilade), but its 4000 meter range gives it exceptional stand-off distance.[5]
The Bradley’s 25mm chain gun can be effectively fired while moving, and has an effective range of 2000 meters.[6] It is a very lethal weapon, capable of penetrating all infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. This writer has also seen the effects of the 25mm chain gun against older Soviet tanks (T-54/55 and T-62). When able to get a shot at the tank’s thinly armored engine compartment in the rear, the Bradley caused enough damage to disable the tank and engulf it in flames from its own fuel.
In contrast, the Stryker’s main weapons are a 105mm gun (on the Mobile Gun System variant) and a grenade launcher; but neither variant can fire on-the-move. Furthermore, the entire target acquisition process takes approximately two minutes.[7] An evaluation by the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) noted that soldiers had trouble using the vehicle’s remote weapon station periscope, and instead were forced to engage the enemy by climbing on top of the vehicle and using Javelin missiles (not part of the vehicle’s weapons system).[8]
Once again, the Stryker cannot compete against the Bradley. Stryker loses the lethality battle.
Mobility
The Bradley is capable of maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour, and has a range of 300 miles. It was specifically designed to be able to keep up with the M1 series tank on the modern battlefield, over any terrain. In fact, over extremely broken terrain, the Bradley can actually travel slightly faster than the M1. The reason for the Bradley’s cross-country success is that is has a set of wide tracks, powered by a 600 horsepower engine.
It is important to note that General Shinseki and his supporters (during the vehicle selection phase of Stryker’s development) attempted to seed disinformation by claiming that wheeled vehicles are more mobile than tracks, in a blatant attempt to effect vehicle selection. There are also many allegations of rigged tests in favor of the wheeled vehicle, and Shinseki has stated that his ultimate goal is to rid the Army of tracked vehicles. But despite Shinseki’s disinformation attempts, armor experts know very well that wheeled vehicles cannot compete against tracked vehicles for mobility.[9]
In addition to the Bradley’s superior off-road mobility, it is fully amphibious. Different variants have either a pontoon or a skirt, which take between 15 and 30 minutes to deploy, respectively. Once ready, the Bradley can swim by using its tracks to propel it through the water at a top speed of four miles per hour.[10]
The Stryker also has a maximum range of 300 miles, but can travel at a top speed of 62 miles per hour while on roads. During its Millennium Challenge field testing, the Stryker impressed some dismounted soldiers by its speed at getting them to the fight. But the vehicle had its problems when operating off-road; “a total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed to be replaced during the 96-hour war game."[11]
Wheeled vehicles in Desert Storm, to include the much-vaunted HMMWV, had significant problems operating in the desert sands; and the rocky portions of the desert wreaked havoc on tires. Every wheeled vehicle in this writer’s unit had tire problems. The situation became so bad that the brigade leadership issued a directive requiring all wheeled vehicles to remain on paved (or improved) surfaces whenever possible.
Deployability
The Bradley weighs approximately 25 tons. It can be transported by any mean, to include transport aircraft, but must utilize aircraft larger than the C-130 which is only capable of transporting 13 tons when it is fully fueled and outfitted for combat operations.[12]
The original requirement for an interim armored vehicle stated that it must be easily transportable by C-130. At 19 tons the basic version of the Stryker is lighter than the Bradley, yet it is still too heavy and too tall to be deployed by C-130.[13] The Stryker is not yet certified for C-130 transport. While Strykers were transported by C-130 for their field test during Millenium Challenge 2002, they required a special one-time waiver from the Air Force. In addition, the C-130s lightened their load by using as little fuel as possible, and by discarding additional armor protection normally required for combat operations.[14]
The Strykers do not meet the “easily transportable” test because they must be modified for flight. The crew must disassemble and remove the remote weapon station (40mm grenade launcher, or .50 caliber machine gun), as well as externally mounted ammunition and racks, so that the Stryker can fit into a C-130.[15]
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Stryker cannot surpass the Bradley in lethality or survivability, as demonstrated by the Bradley’s successes during Desert Storm and Stryker field-testing. The Stryker is, in fact, inferior to the Bradley in these areas. Mobility and deployability are two additional fields in which the Stryker demonstrates its inferiority. Stryker is not a leap ahead in technology or innovation, but merely an inadequate weapons system championed by senior Army leadership who have wed themselves to a wheeled vehicle, at any cost. Ultimately, Stryker will fail before it reaches full production, and where it counts the most – on the battlefield. This failure will have a significantly adverse effect on Army Transformation, and will cause the new Army leadership to cancel (or drastically change) the entire transformation process.
End Notes
[1] Preliminary data coming back from units in the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm the same.
[2] “M2A3 Bradley,”[data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003; and “Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems [data on-line] www.gdls.com; accessed 11 August 2003. The Stryker’s 14.5mm armor is applique (bolt-on) that must be added to the vehicle once it reaches its destination. No data is available concerning the Stryker’s actual armor thickness, although it is rumored to be only ½ inch aluminum.
[3] This incident occurred on 26 February 1991 in southern Iraq, during an engagement between a Bradley from Task Force 4-32 Armor (3rd Armored Division) and an Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tank. A partial account is given in Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Certain Victory (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 274. Staff Sergeant Christopher Stephens and Private First Class Adrian Stokes were both killed in action.
[4] Frank Tiboni, “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002: 2.
[5] “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org.man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Don Loughlin, “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” 9 October 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003. Loughlin uses quotes from the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) 6 August 2002 report entitled “Stryker Findings.” The report was originally presented as a vugraph presentation, and was formerly available at http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger/strykerfindings.htm. Several authors reference this ATEC report, yet I have been unable to locate a working link the actual document.
[9] Loughlin, 16-19; and David T. Payne Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003, 2.
[10] Military Analysis Network, 2.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Military Analysis Network, 2; and Tiboni, 9.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Loughlin, 4-8.
[15] Tiboni, 3.
Bibliography
Books
Clancy, Tom and General Franks, Fred, Jr., Into the Storm – On the Ground in Iraq. New York: Berkley Books, 1998.
Kraus, Theresa L. and Schubert, Frank N. General Editors, The Whirlwind War – The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.
Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Certain Victory – The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994.
Periodicals
Cox, Matthew. “Airborne Units Land Fast, Hit Hard, Remain Relevant,” Army Times, August 14, 2000.
Gourley, Scott R. “Stryker’s Mobile Gun System,” Army Magazine, May 2003.
Svitak, Amy and Tiboni, Frank. “DoD May Scale Back Stryker to Fund FCS,” Defense News, October 7, 2002.
Tiboni, Frank. “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.
“Inside the Army,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.
Other
Loughlin, Don. “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” October 9, 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.
Payne, David T. Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003.
“Future Combat Systems: Badly Reinventing the M113 or ‘Cash Cows’ That Will ‘Morph’ into the ‘LAV-4’ Armored Car?” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/wheeledfcscashcow.htm; accessed 12 August 2003.
“M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.
“M2A3 Bradley,” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003.
“M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” United States Army Center for Military History, June 11, 2001 [data on-line] http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/256.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.
“Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems, available from www.gdls.com; Internet, accessed 11 August 2003.
The weapons systems suck. No automatic stabilization of the guns or optics. Slow target asquisition and engagement.
Might as well make something that is low-profile, highly mobile and fast as hell, since speed would probably provide better protection than the Stryker's armor.
I heard the same. But I think the recent purge of Shinseki general officers is a good sign; and I heard that was only round one.
This soldier is mounting the Remote Weapons Station for the Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher on his Stryker. Turreted vehicles would be too high to drive up the ramp into the C-130. The RWS is not stabilized and the vehicle must come to a stop to fire the weapon accurately. The high-tech RWS is less capable of shooting on the move than a free gun on a pintle mount.
Sir, you are misinformed. The Stryker is only billed as an alternative to the Bradley by the wingnuts over at militarycorruption.com. The Army has said no such thing.
Air deployment is another great myth that has taken flight devoid of reality. Strategic deployments are conducted today and into the foreseeable future by a combination of sea and air means. Airlift is inadequate to accomodate the vast majority of the Army's requirement. Lift in the opening days of any crisis goes almost exclusively to the Air Force. The Army gets precious little. The Army will deploy by sea, using high speed vessels and normal sea lift. We will have pre-positioned equipment sets in parts of the world where we most expect to use it. We will use available strategic airlift for critical people and equipment. The C-130 is not a strategic deployment aircraft. It is used for in-theater lift. The reason that it is a requirement is to permit air land of small numbers of Stryker assets to reinforce an airhead. We will never deploy a Stryker brigade by C-130 - only politicians and reporters would conjur up such a scenario. What we will do is similar to what was done in Northern Iraq. The 173d Airborne Brigade executed a parachute assault to seize an airfield. There was an Iraqi armored threat in the vicinity, so we reinforced that airhead with M-2 Bradley and M-1 tanks from the 1st Infantry Division in Germany. They were deployed by C-17. If there had been a Stryker Brigade in theater, then Stryker assets could have been inserted by C-130, even with the limitations so well described so many times on this forum. No, we wouldn't insert the entire brigade - a company or at most a battalion.
Bradleys will remain in the force and continue to provide very valuable service, executing a 12 division strategy with a 10 division force.
LOL! I guess that pretty well describes me.
But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable.
OK, let’s dump every weapons system that might have a failure.
That leaves us with sticks and stones – if the sticks don’t break.
It amazes me that the Stryker critics still want a troop transport to have the armor and armament of a Main Battle Tank, be large enough to transport a squad of fully equipped infantry, yet be small and light enough to fit inside a C-130. Next they’ll bitch about the fuel mileage.
It's been my impression too that the Stryker concept came out of the Task Force Hawk fiasco. Frankly, I was glad at the time that they didn't accomplish the deployment until after the Kosovo war was over. The idea of deploying attack helicopters in the rugged Yugo mountains with no ground support and limited air support was a really dumb idea. They would have been sitting ducks for antiaircraft missiles. Another dumb idea from Gen. Wesley Clark.
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