Posted on 09/18/2003 8:18:50 AM PDT by FreedomPoster
Al-Sahaf Talks about the US-UK War on Iraq
The First Interview
Muhammed Sa'id Al-Sahaf, Iraqi Information Minister talking to Abu Dhabi TV Anchorman Jassem Obaid
Aljazeerah, September 18, 2003
The following is a summary, not detailed word for word, translation of the interview
Question 1: Were there any relations or communication between Iraq and the United States after the 1991 Gulf War in order to avoid conflict and war later?
Al-Sahaf: There were few times in which some contacts had happened. The US government rejected any attempts to open any communication since 1995. However, some US companies had some work in Iraq through European companies.
Once a Democratic Senator accepted an Iraqi invitation to meet with Al-Sahaf, who was then Iraq's Foreign Minister. The meeting was arranged by Nizar Hamdoon, the Iraqi representative in the UN. It took place in a restaurant. The Senator entered from the kitchen door in order not to attract any media attention. In that meeting, both sides exchanged their positions about how to resolve the crisis and prevent it from escalating to a conflict level. The insisted that he acted on a personal level. However, he delivered the US conditions to resolve the crisis. These were mainly changing the Iraqi policy to become moderate, recognition of Israel, accepting UN inspection, and pledging not own or develop any weapons of mass destruction.
Another meeting was held in Europe, in a hotel, in which the same demands were presented to the Iraqi delegation which was headed by Minister of Research. More indirect contacts happened through US companies doing business in Iraq. But the US government insisted not to have contacts or any dialogue with the Iraqi government. All contacts were nothing but an exchange of views about the crisis in relations.
Question 2: Did the Iraqi leaders know that the war was inevitable?
Al-Sahaf: Yes, they did. Starting from the year 2000, we knew that the war was coming.
Question 3: Why were you changed from the Foreign Ministry to the Information Ministry? Has this anything to do with intervention from Uday, the son of President Saddam Hussain, or was it as a result of a diplomatic failure to avoid the war?
Al-Sahaf: Not really, neither interventions nor failing diplomatic efforts had anything to do with that change. It was logical that the Foreign Finister be changed after several years to have fresh ideas. Actually, I was delighted to leave the Foreign Ministry because of the many interventions from Party members, Uday, and the President's Secretary. But these interventions were not serious enough to affect our work. The work atmosphere there was hard because of the embargo, the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and the expected war. Iraq's options became very few indeed. People working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became nervous as a result of these outside factors, not because of any internal criticism or intervention.
Question 4: How did President Saddam Hussain react to these interventions from his sons or his aids in the work of various government departments?
Al-Sahaf: He would not accept or tolerate them. Once, the Babil newspaper, which Uday was its editor-in-chief, made fun of an Iraqi artist, who complained to the President. Saddam ordered the newspaper closed for a month. He would be very angry if interventions were repeated.
Question 5: How did Iraq deal with members of the UN Security Council?
Al-Sahaf: We would contact any country which becomes a temporary member of the Council. We would send them delegations and materials to make our positions clear to them. More and continuous contacts were carried out with the three permanent members of the Council, France, Russia, and China. They were also given preference in oil contracts and trade to keep them as close as possible to the Iraqi side.
Question 6: What about mediation efforts to avoid the war, particularly the Qatari and the UAE initiatives that called on Saddam Hussain to leave the country as the only acceptable solution to the US?
Al-Sahaf: We asked several countries to mediate but in vain.
Question 7: I'll show you a video in which Arab leaders are described as Omala (collaborators or agents) by President Saddam and Vice President Izzat Ibrahim.
The video showed a meeting in which Izzat Ibrahim reported on the discussions inside the Doha Islamic Conference, in which the UAE initiative was rejected. Izzat Ibrahim mentioned that an Egyptian Undersecretary told him that Iraq was passing through what Egypt passed through during the 1956 Suez Campaign. He was suggesting that Iraq's resistance would be similar to the Egyptian resistance. Nasser then did not accept the Franco-British ultimatum. So, Saddam was doing the same thing.
Now, how can Saddam and Izzat Ibrahim describe Arab leaders as collaborators then expect them to mediate between Iraq and the US?
Al-Sahaf: The Iraqi leadership knew that war was inevitable. As a result, Saddam's departure would not stop the invasion. Then, why would he do it? That's why he rejected such initiatives.
Question 8: Has Saddam ever thought about leaving Iraq?
Al-Sahaf: No, absolutely not. Nobody would dare to say it to him. Mahatir Muhammed (the Malaysian Prime Minister) said that we need a miracle to prevent the war. The US-UK were determined to launch the war and Saddam was determined to stay and fight it.
Question 9: How did the Iraqi government prepare the country for war, when you were sure that it was inevitable?
Al-Sahaf: Every ministry (government department) prepared in its own field. We stocked food for four months and actually distributed it to people. We started to produce more quantities of unconventional weapons as we could not import any weapons.
Question 10: Were there any weapons of mass destruction (the US-UK official allegation and justification of the war)?
Al-Sahaf: There were no weapons of mass destruction. All the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile programs, that we had, were destroyed during the 1991 Gulf War. The UN inspectors documented that destruction in detail to the extent of accounting even for the janitors who worked in the facilities of these programs.
Question 11: What about the presence of US unmanned aircraft in Al-Anbar Province (Western Iraq), just before the war?
Let's see this video which shows a meeting in which President Saddam Hussain discussing the issue with one of his military commanders.
Al-Sahaf: Al-Anbar Province is the largest in Iraq. It borders Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It is the Western Iraqi Desert, a huge area. US special forces entered the area (from Jordan) before the war. They used these unmanned aircraft for surveillance and for jamming Iraqi communication systems. We knew that back then and the discussion was about these aircraft.
Question 12: Why did many Iraqis criticize Saddam's decision to divide the country into four military regions, just before the war?
Al-Sahaf: The main criticism was that he appointed four civilians as commanders for these four military regions. This proved to be counterporductive later on during the war. It has caused problems for the military commanders. Civilian leaders could not make the right decisions.
Question 13: How did you prepare the Information Ministry for the war?
Al-Sahaf: We expected that the Iraqi TV and radio stations would be targeted during the early days of the war. Therefore, we thought about creating mobile alternatives. We created radio stations for every province, composed of four trucks each. We supplied each one of them with 500 hours of materials to be broadcasted. These were general materials, such as music, songs, talk, interviews, and Qur'anic recitations and studies.
The main problem was the antenna, which is usually about 173 meters high, which makes it a visible target. The problem was solved by adopting a technological invention by an Egyptian engineer, called cross-field antenna. We knew about it from the internet. This enabled us to build 45 mobile radio stations, 15 mobile TV stations, and 22 alternative TV and radio stations.
Jassem Obaid: Thank you Mr. Muhammed Sa'id Al-Sahaf. In our next interview, we will start with the story of the Iraqi farmer, Alli Obaid Mingash, who was reported by Iraqi TV to have downed a US helicopter with his old rifle. See you next time.
Muhammed Sa'id Al-Sahaf: Live from New York, it's Saturday Night!
This is what the U.S. Government should be doing. Getting our message out throughout Iraq. Have Iraqi patriots telling the good stories and using PsyOps on the Bathists....etc.
Key news here for me is the admission that they made, IN ADVANCE, lot's of "programming" in anticipation of broadcast during the war.
That's practically an inadvertant admission that the 'videos' of Saddam walking among the people were FRAUDS.
Why didn't the questioner here ask Bagdad Bob whether he had PERSONALLY seen Saddam after the Day 1 decapitation strike? The press has an overt antagonism to even THINKING about that question that strikes me as treasonous. There whole modus operandi is to turn over rocks, so to speak, and yet they are totally incurious about this.
Yeah, that's probably what he meant. No need to ask, or anything rash like that.
It worked.
Question 9: How did the Iraqi government prepare the country for war, when you were sure that it was inevitable?
Al-Sahaf: Every ministry (government department) prepared in its own field. We stocked food for four months and actually distributed it to people. We started to produce more quantities of unconventional weapons as we could not import any weapons.
More and continuous contacts were carried out with the three permanent members of the Council, France, Russia, and China. They were also given preference in oil contracts and trade to keep them as close as possible to the Iraqi side.
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