Iranian Alert -- September 14, 2003 -- IRAN LIVE THREAD PING LIST

Mullahs Cooperating with the Jordanian Monarch?

September 13, 2003
Reuters
Yahoo News

AMMAN -- Jordan has charged 15 people suspected of belonging to the al Qaeda or Ansar al-Islam groups with planning terrorist attacks on U.S., Jordanian and Israeli targets, a Jordanian official has said.

The official said on Saturday only one member of the group, Ahmed Mahmoud Saleh al-Riyati, who was arrested by U.S. troops in northern Iraq in March, was in custody. The rest -- 12 Jordanians and two Iraqis -- were being tried in absentia.

The group includes Mullah Krekar, Kurdish Iraqi founder of Ansar al-Islam, a group accused by the United States of links to al Qaeda. Krekar, who has been living in Norway as a refugee since 1991, is also being sought by Jordan on drugs smuggling charges. He denies both charges.

State security prosecutor Colonel Mahmoud Obeidat filed the indictment about ten days ago, the official said, adding that no date had yet been set for the trial.

Jordanian newspapers said all the suspects -- apart from Krekar -- were living in Iran.

"The first suspect (Riyati), and the rest of the suspects belonged to al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam and members of the two groups have agreed to hit American and Israeli targets all over the world and to commit aggression against foreign tourists and security forces in Jordan," Jordan's Al-Rai daily quoted the indictment as saying.

According to the charge sheet, the group was linked to Ahmad Fadheel Nazal al-Khalayleh, better known as Abu Musab Zarqawi, a suspected associate of bin Laden and an expert in toxins. He was sentenced to death in absentia by a Jordanian court in September last year for plotting attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in the kingdom.

Jordan's Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb last December named Zarqawi -- who a Saudi official recently said was being held by Iran -- as the mastermind behind the murder on October 28 of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley on the doorstep of his home in Amman.

Jordanian media have speculated that King Abdullah, who this month became the first Jordanian monarch to visit Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution, was seeking -- among other things -- to establish broad cooperation and "specific data" on al Qaeda members recently arrested by Iran.

Iran did not confirm reports that it has Zarqawi in custody.

http://sg.news.yahoo.com/030913/3/3e593.html

Premature Iraqification

September 13, 2003
Weekly Standard
Reuel Marc Gerecht

Though far from fine-tuned, the Bush administration has finally developed an exit strategy for Iraq. The strategy has two prongs. Through the State Department, the administration will seek to "internationalize" the forces of occupation by obtaining a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would "authorize" Turks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Moroccans, Indians, and even the French to send their troops. Concurrently through the Defense Department, it will strive to create larger all-Iraqi police and military forces that can work together with--and ideally replace--American soldiers who battle former Baathists, militant Sunni fundamentalists, and foreign jihadists.

The approaches are complementary and separable: No matter what happens in the Security Council, the Pentagon will increasingly hand off internal security to the natives, sooner rather than later. Where only two or three months ago Ambassador Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad foresaw a distinctly gradual transfer of political and military authority to Iraqis, the time frame and the order of that transition are now blurred. The political process was to have preceded and determined the creation of police, paramilitary, and military forces. Now, with a sense of urgency provoked by the August bombings at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad and at a mosque in Najaf, the administration is stressing the "Iraqification" of internal security as a means of diminishing the American casualty rate and the terrorist-guerrilla activity in the central Sunni Arab lands of Iraq. As the chief of the U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, pithily put it, we've got to "do a lot more to bring an Iraqi face to the security establishments throughout Iraq very quickly."

Unlike the U.N.-internationalist argument, the all-Iraq approach is morally compelling. There is something unsettling about wanting to have foreign soldiers come die in Iraq in lieu of Americans, which is, if we are to be brutally honest, what many U.S. officials and, it appears, all the Democratic presidential candidates are asking for. The bombing of the U.N. headquarters drove home what should have been obvious: The forces that are killing American soldiers and their Iraqi allies will also gladly kill foreigners, be they European, Arab, or Latin American. As Senator John McCain remarked in a recent hearing, "So . . . we're going to ask for international troops to come in . . . and we'll tell them they'll take casualties, [but] Americans won't take the casualties. I don't get the logic there." To his credit, McCain has been the only voice in the U.S. government to have demurred at this kind of "burden sharing." This is, of course, the post-Vietnam mentality that Osama bin Laden so trenchantly mocked. By contrast, for Iraqis to die in lieu of Americans to ensure their country's freedom from Baathists and Islamic holy warriors does make moral sense. Ultimately, only the Iraqis can create a functioning democracy in their homeland.

Yet "Iraqification," as it may soon be advanced by the Bush administration, isn't likely to solve Iraq's most pressing problems. Indeed, if the Pentagon and the Coalition Provisional Authority move too expeditiously, they may well repeat the great sin of modern Iraqi history by creating security forces before the political system can absorb, socialize, and politically neutralize them. If the United States moves too quickly to rebuild an Iraqi army designed primarily to root out former Baathists, Sunni militants, and jihadists, it could unintentionally reinstall the structure and ethos of the pre-Baath Iraqi army, whose primary mission from its inception was to confront internal, not external, threats. The pre-Baath army--contrary to the public reminiscences of the former military officers in the opposition groups paid for by the Central Intelligence Agency--was a predatory institution that consistently defined its interests as the nation's.

In moving hastily, the administration could be tempted to draw significantly from the former Sunni Arab military officer corps, the Sunni Arab rank and file, and the few Shiite Arab officers who had risen to senior positions in Saddam Hussein's completely politicized army. Unintentionally, the administration could transgress a red line with Iraq's Shiite clergy, who are closely watching how America handles the reconstitution of Iraq's security forces. It was the army, in Sunni Arab hands, and the British that denied the Shiites their rightful predominance in the country's first parliament after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Without the army, Iraq's succession of dictators could never have destroyed its once vibrant culture.

It bears repeating: Any action by the Coalition Provisional Authority that fundamentally compromises its relationship with the Shiite clergy is unwise. Whatever trouble the Bush administration thinks it is currently having in Iraq, it will look back wistfully to this time if the Shiites go into opposition. The bombings in Najaf have already partially reactivated the Badr Brigade, the Iranian-created paramilitary force behind the slain Shiite leader, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim. If there are any more major bombings in the Shiite south, especially in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, the Badr Brigade will unquestionably become a permanent, active component of the Shiite landscape. So far, the Badr, along with the rest of the Shiite community, have reacted to al-Hakim's death and the attempted assassination of his nephew, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, with equanimity. However, if the Coalition Provisional Authority missteps in the eyes of the Shiites in its rebuilding of Iraq's internal security forces, a collision with the Badr corps is by no means unthinkable. Indeed, the Authority should be prepared to preempt such possible hostility by trying to incorporate units of the Badr into any new Iraqi army.

Obviously, enormous care must be taken in building Iraq's future armed forces: This is easily the most critical task confronting the Bush administration. The finest decision of Ambassador Bremer in Iraq was to retire the remnants of the old, Sunni-dominated military. The retention of that force could have put us hopelessly at odds with the Shiites and Kurds, who are at least 80 percent of Iraq's population. However badly the U.S. military wants to share the burden in Iraq, it would be an egregious mistake to have a functioning Iraqi army before the Iraqi people have a constitution, to which Iraqi soldiers must swear their allegiance. Indeed, this is the yardstick by which we can best gauge whether Defense, panicked by the bombs of August, has become its own worst enemy.

Until recently, the bright minds in the Coalition Provisional Authority knew that the United States would be welcome in Iraq for no more than two or three years. After that, the Shiites, led by their very nationalist clergy, would likely declare the Americans defunct, no longer helpful to their political aspirations, which appear to be democratic. The authority's old birthing schedule--a constitutional convention within a year, a constitution within 18 months, national elections within 24--was a rough but sensible outline, which was to be shortened or lengthened depending on how much initiative the Iraqis displayed and how much encouragement the Americans gave them. Considering the tone and commentary now coming from the Pentagon, one has to wonder whether this outline has been jettisoned and replaced by a very loose slide rule that measures the maturity of Iraqi constitutionalism primarily by the American body count.

The sociology and politics of constructing a new Iraqi army aside, it also isn't clear that bigger internal Iraqi security forces are key to thwarting the terror-cum-guerrilla attacks of the former Baathists, Wahhabi fundamentalists, and foreign Sunni holy warriors coming over the Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi borders. It is certainly true that better Iraqi-generated intelligence about the whereabouts of these forces would greatly aid the coalition's efforts to destroy them. But it's not immediately evident why increasing the number of Iraqis under arms from approximately 50,000--the current level according to the Pentagon--to, say, 75,000 or 100,000 in the next year is going to make a decisive difference, unless the additional numbers come from the regions where the Baathists, fundamentalists, and jihadists are thriving.

It would be interesting to know, of the 50,000-plus Iraqis under arms (an impressive number given that the war ended in April), how many come from the Sunni/Baathist strongholds of Ramadi and Tikrit. In all probability, the numbers there aren't large. The advantage of "all-Iraqi" security forces in these towns, where popular sentiment definitely seems to be nostalgic for the rule of Sunnis, the Sunni-dominated Baath, or both, would be in such forces' ability to sleuth out the whereabouts of the guerrillas and terrorists and their most operationally critical sympathizers. Sending more non-Ramadi and non-Tikriti Iraqi security officials into these towns might conceivably spur the patriotism of the hard-core denizens who have become guerrillas-cum-terrorists and their key supporters, but it doesn't seem likely. These pro-Saddam and militant Sunni fighters are playing for keeps. An Iraqi face on security doesn't appear likely to make them less inclined to kill Iraqis, Americans, or other foreigners. These men know their world is over unless they down both the Americans and the Iraqis--overwhelmingly Arab Shiites and Kurds--who will inherit power in Uncle Sam's wake. With either the Americans or the Iraqis on the cutting edge of internal security or in control of the national government, the hard-core insurrectionists have to be arrested or killed. One day they might, just possibly, be reeducated (converted Communists and Nazis have existed), but increasing the number of armed Iraqis whom they consider traitors can't accomplish this over the next several months.

And does the Bush administration really want newly constituted Iraqi security forces in the thick of things in the hostile Sunni belt? Any successful national internal security force will have to reflect more or less the composition of the Iraqi population. Do we want to send so soon a force overwhelmingly composed of Shiites and Kurds into Tikrit or Ramadi? If local police in the Sunni regions have so far proved ineffective in penetrating and thwarting homegrown or imported guerrilla and terrorist forces in their regions, it may well be because they lack the will to do so.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested this when he chided Iraqis on his recent visit to their country. "This country belongs to the Iraqi people, and in the last analysis it's the Iraqi people who will provide the security in this country," he said. "Instead of pointing fingers . . . at the security forces of the coalition because there are acts of violence taking place against the Iraqi people, . . . it's important for the Iraqi people to step up and take responsibility for the security by providing information to . . . [the Americans] to a greater extent than they're doing."

Of course, Iraqi Sunnis might not want "to step up" because the Americans did a lackadaisical job of arresting former Baathists after the fall of Baghdad. These Iraqi Sunnis may think that America's "footprint" in their neighborhoods is too light, not too heavy. They might disagree with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz when he recently echoed the sentiments of former New York City police chief Bernie Kerik, who was overseeing the creation of a new national Iraqi police force: ". . . if you triple the number of coalition forces, [per Kerik], 'You'll probably triple the attacks on the troops.'" (According to this logic, the Pentagon ought to have a pint-size force patrolling the heartland of Saddam's power.)

In a post-totalitarian society, it is, of course, quite understandable for even the bravest individuals to fear coming forward. In Iraq, where Saddam's killers may in many areas control the streets, it's sensible to stay ignorant and keep your head down. It is also possible that a great many Iraqi Sunnis are still spiritually allied with the old Sunni Baath order. If this is true--and this is the worst-case scenario--then the Pentagon is going to have to be much more intrusive than it has so far been. Counterinsurgency wars are ugly and labor intensive.

Yet the Pentagon's contention is undoubtedly true that more Iraqis are needed to aid the coalition forces. "Iraqification" ought to be a question of degree and speed, not kind. Having more anti-Saddam Iraqis directly reaching out to their countrymen would certainly work vastly better than having Kevlar-clad Americans in armored vehicles waiting for tips. The Iraqi National Congress's Ahmad Chalabi was right when he argued long before the war began that America would need Iraqi eyes and ears both attached to and independent of U.S. military forces.

The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency strenuously and successfully fought this plan. Truth be told, the Pentagon, including its civilian leadership, failed to go to the mat to ensure that a large Iraqi expeditionary force was ready by March. It is worth noting, too, that the Sunni-dominated oppositionist groups that the CIA and the State Department liked--most famously the coup-plotting Iraqi National Accord--have, according to Pentagon and CIA officials, so far accomplished little to nothing on the ground in Iraq. Whatever influence the Iraqi National Accord had among the Sunni military elite and the Baath party, it's not translated into any intelligence punch on behalf of U.S. soldiers fighting in the Sunni belt. By comparison, the Iraqi National Congress, whatever its faults, has been more successful in its tactical understanding of the post-Saddam battleground.

In any case, the Pentagon's all-purpose refrain that it could succeed if only it had good intelligence is a truism that suggests its offensive tactics may be lacking. On the ground, intelligence, particularly the human kind, is always less than it should be. The CIA has been for decades between mediocre and awful in supplying human intelligence on Iraq. With hard targets like ex-Baathists, Wahhabi fundamentalists, and foreign jihadists of various stripes, there is no reason to believe that the clandestine service will be any more effective now than in the past.

If the Pentagon really doesn't think the coalition is winning on the ground--and any honest observer who's been to Iraq can certainly make a case that the coalition is doing passably well--then it should switch tactics and stop scolding the Iraqis for their sub-par performance. In the short-term--and given the likely two or three-year maximum mandate the United States will have from the Iraqi people, the short-term is what matters--the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq is for the United States to lose, not for all-Iraqi security forces to win. The latter have an important role to play in securing their country for a freer, democratic future. But we need to be careful not to put the cart before the horse.

The mandate and daily practice of the Iraqi Governing Council, the coming, tempestuous constitutional convention, and the new constitution itself are what ought to preoccupy the Bush administration after the bombs of August. The forging of decent new political institutions should be the means by which we transfer power to the Iraqi people and neutralize the forces that want to destroy a democratic Iraq before it is born. Would that the Pentagon, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the State Department spent more time talking in detail about that exit strategy.

From the September 22, 2003 issue: Why creating Iraqi government and security can't be done overnight.

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/103webeo.asp

Iraqis are Wary of International Involvement

September 14, 2003
Los Angeles Times
Alissa J. Rubin

BAGHDAD, Iraq — Iraqis say they are concerned that moves by the United States to bring other countries into the military and reconstruction efforts here are likely to create more problems than they solve, and may prolong the occupation of Iraq by foreigners.

There is broad agreement that including soldiers from any of the neighboring states — especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Iran — would run the risk of creating more instability because all three have highly charged relationships with some Iraqi groups. The Kurds, for instance, are extremely wary of the Turks, who they see as oppressors. And, many Iraqis are uncomfortable with the United Nations, which they see as a heavily bureaucratic organization that is unable to unwilling to spend enough money to put the country back on its feet.

"Generally speaking we would not want other foreign forces to enter Iraq . . . the point is that Iraqis should take control, not foreigners, as soon as possible," said Naseer Chadirji, a member of the Governing Council and president of the National Democratic Movement.

Mohammed Tawfiq, a leading Kurdish politician from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who now serves as the minister of minerals and industry, was blunt about the prospect of soldiers arriving from neighboring countries. "It is very important to us that none of the neighbors are involved," he said.

Kurds live primarily in three countries — Turkey, Iraq and Iran. They have long struggled for an independent state, which the Turks view as a threat to their territorial integrity.

Habib Jabber, a professor of political science at Baghdad University, said any benefit to Iraq was not the primary reason the United States was seeking broader international involvement.

"This is being done for your own internal reasons — political reasons, economic reasons, he said. "This isn't for the Iraqi people."

Jabber, like many Iraqis, rattled off an array of reasons why internationalization made little sense to Iraqis. The Iraqis' biggest complaint is that the U.S.-led occupation force has failed to bring security and stability, both of which are prerequisites for a vigorous rebuilding effort. They say it is doubtful that international troops will do any better, and might even worsen the situation because of language and cultural barriers.

"If they sent 500,000 Iraqis to Jordan to police the country, do you think they would do a good job?" he asked. "And in that case, they speak the language and share traditions, but still, wouldn't Jordanians do a better job themselves?"

If foreign troops do come in, they should be under American control to prevent coordination problems, said Tawfiq.

The Iraqi view of the United Nations seems anything but sanguine, in part due to the organization's role in imposing and enforcing sanctions against the country during former President Saddam Hussein's rule. The U.N. is viewed as an agent of the United States, but a more difficult one to manage because of the multilateral interests that govern it.

Policymakers regard the United Nations as underfinanced for the rebuilding job facing the country.

"Iraq needs a lot of money, the infrastructure is destroyed; Iraq needs to recover in every aspect of life," said Tawfiq, adding that when he worked with the United Nations in Kurdistan, he found the bureaucracy overwhelming. In Iraq, the biggest need is for adequate financing of the ministries so that they can do their job, Tawfiq said.

Jabber, the political scientist agreed: "We know the bureaucracy of the U.N. is huge and they will not spend the money necessary to reconstruct Iraq."

http://www.bouldernews.com/bdc/nation_world_news/article/0,1713,BDC_2420_2258561,00.html

U.N.-FIT FOR IRAQ

By AMIR TAHERI
NY Post
September 14, 2003

AS the U.N. Security Council debates the draft of a new Iraq resolution sponsored by the United States and its allies, two questions need to be asked.
First, what is the problem that the coalition faces in Iraq? Second, what is it that the United Nations can do that the coalition cannot?

Like other liberated countries, Iraq will have to go through four phases.

1) Liberation itself - that is to say, the toppling of the regime and the dismantling of its apparatus of control.

When the war started, some 12 percent of Iraq's territory, inhabited by the Kurds, was already "liberated." A further 85 percent was liberated within three weeks. In some cases, liberation came even before U.S.-U.K. troops arrived on the scene.

Now the fallen regime still maintains a presence, though no control, in some 3 percent of the territory, in the so-called Sunni Triangle. What is needed there is search and destroy action - a task that the United Nations cannot perform.

2) Pacification: This means disarming non-state groups and re-imposing law and order.

That task is already under way in large chunks of Iraqi territory. Some parts of central and northern Iraq are, in fact, moving beyond pacification into the phase of reconstruction.

But in a number of localities - notably parts of Baghdad, plus the former garrison towns of Faluja, Baaquba, Durra, Ramadi and Anah - pacification is in early stages. Also, parts of the desert between the Euphrates and Jordan are infested with bandits, allied with smuggling networks created in the 1990s.

THE presence of a dozen foreign terrorist groups further complicates the situation. Some of these looted abandoned army arsenals in the first phases of the war. Others have received reinforcements, often through Syrian and Iranian borders.

Pacification needs a strong police presence and patient detective work, backed by anti-terrorism expertise. That, again, is something the United Nations cannot offer.

3) Reconstruction: In some parts of the country, that phase has began. Iraq's main wealth-producing infrastructure, including the oil industry, the hydroelectric complexes, the railroads, the airports and the seaports have been secured and, where damaged, repaired. On the other hand, in public services such as hospitals, schools, and parts of the bureaucracy, reconstruction remains modest or non-existent.

Here, the United Nations, acting through specialized agencies, and helped by non-governmental organizations and charities, could play a role.

4) Democratization: This phase, too, has started. A new, privately-owned and free media industry is being established. Dozens of political parties are active in a country used to one-party rule since 1958. People are discovering the excitement of holding demonstrations without being herded by the authorities. Shops, tea-houses, mosques and village squares have been turned into agoras where anything and everything can be discussed.

When it comes to holding a constitutional referendum, and then parliamentary elections, the United Nations can and must play a key role.

THE Bush administration has not offered any clear reason for going to the United Nations at this time. The reason most commonly cited is that a new resolution would enable the coalition to attract troops from other countries. But how many additional troops are needed?

Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the U.S. commander in Baghdad, says he would be happy with a few thousand more men. The State Department talks of an additional division, around 15,000 men. Some retired American generals, failing to resist the temptation of second-guessing those now in command, have cited figures as high as 30,000.

Supposing the coalition gets an additional 30,000, its total strength in Iraq would be close to 200,000 men. Taking into account the share of the back-up personnel and the realities of rotations, that would mean an additional 10,000 men in the field at any given time. And that is hardly worth the risk of exposing Iraq to the dangers of the diplomatic skulduggery that has paralyzed the United Nations since last December.

IN any case, it is not at all certain where the 30,000 men would come from. Russia, half of its army bogged down in Chechnya, has no troops to spare. France is unable to make a significant contribution because of commitments in Cote d'Ivoire and Congo. Germany may be able to send a few hundred men, provided Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder can sell the idea to the left of his party. The Arab countries are out - either because their armies are committed to internal or external conflicts of their own, or because they would be unwelcome in Iraq.

Neighboring Iran has lots of troops. But would anyone want Iranians to have an army in Iraq?

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has pinned his hopes on India, Pakistan and Turkey.

He is mistaken.

Last June, India agreed to send 10,000 troops - but soon backed out because the opposition Congress Party seized the issue as a plank of its strategy in the forthcoming general election. The coalition government led by Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee tried to fudge its change of mind by claiming that it needed a U.N. resolution. But even if there is a U.N. resolution, India will not commit troops to Iraq at this stage.

Pakistan has agreed to send 4,000 men. But would the Iraqis want them?

For the past two decades, Pakistan has been the scene of sectarian feuds between Sunnis and Shiites with the army's intelligence service, ISI, playing a diabolical role. (An estimated 20,000 people have died in those feuds since 1980). Is the risk of bringing Pakistani sectarian feuds into Iraq worth taking?

FINALLY, we have Turkey, one of Iraq's neighbors. Ask any Iraqi, and you will see that Turkey's motives are suspect. The Kurds regard Turkey as hostile because of its decades-long campaign to wipe out Kurdish culture and language. Iraqi Arabs fear that Turkey's hidden agenda includes the annexation of Iraq's oil-rich northern provinces.

What matters is the attitude of the Iraqi people.

If the Iraqis were hostile to foreign military presence, not even a million troops would be able to move the country from pacification to democratization.

Yet not a single Iraqi party or politician is asking the Americans to leave. They want the United States to stay and help Iraq stand on its feet again - and then leave.

What the coalition needs is manpower to relieve the GIs from such mundane tasks as patrolling streets, protecting officials and doing police work for which they are not trained or equipped.

That type of manpower is best found inside Iraq.

HERE is how. The two "governments" in the Kurdish "safe haven" have a combined force of some 80,000 fighters. With Saddam gone, the bulk of that force is no longer needed. The coalition could easily ask for at least 10,000 to be assigned to such tasks as guarding the borders with Kuwait and Jordan, for example, and protecting buildings and infrastructural installations, thus relieving U.S. and British combat troops.

The various Iraqi political parties present in the Governing Council had their armed groups numbering around 12,000. Last May, the coalition decided to disarm and disperse them. That was a mistake. At least half of those forces could be quickly reconstituted and assigned to tasks such as protecting political figures and technical experts, again relieving the coalition's combat troops.

Since liberation, an estimated 400 Iraqi army officers, including several generals, who had defected to the US and Europe, have returned home. They would have little difficulty recruiting and training a division within weeks.

The dissolution of the Iraqi army was a mistake. The best way to correct it is the creation of a new army that incorporates elements from the old.

WASHINGTON also sees a new U.N. resolution as a way of sharing the cost of the occupation. That, too, is an illusion.

Russia and China have no money to spare. France and Germany, for their part, are running budget deficits in excess of what is allowed under Eurozone rules. Both face negative economic growth. Having opposed the war, they won't be able to persuade their publics, whipped into a frenzy of anti-Americanism, to pay for its consequences.

So, where could the money come from?

There are three obvious sources.

The first is Iraq itself. By next January, Iraq should be in a position to reach its OPEC quota. That would produce an annual income of $22 billion, almost exactly what the US is now spending in Iraq.

The second could be Arab countries. In the 1980s, several Arab states subsidized Saddam Hussein to the tune of $3 billion a year. So why not help Iraq rebuild itself now?

The third source of cash could be an Iraq reconstruction bond, issued in global capital markets. With interest rates at an all-time low and a glut of capital, such bonds, backed by the world's second largest oil reserves, would not be frowned at.

THE practical contribution that the United Nations can make in Iraq today is minimal. Its presence in a position of command could cause more problems than it might solve. It may be useful only in support of coalition, and not as its replacement.

E-mail:amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com

http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/5663.htm

U.N.-FIT FOR IRAQ

By AMIR TAHERI
NY Post
September 14, 2003

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/982146/posts?page=24#24

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Iranian cleric in nuclear rage

15sep03
Herald Sun

IRAN'S leading Islamist, Hussein Shariatmadari, yesterday called for diplomatic retaliation against Australia over the nuclear controversy.

He also threatened popular action against the Australian embassy if Iran failed to expel the Australian ambassador.
Australia backed the United Nations nuclear watchdog's ultimatum to Iran that it answer questions and fully co-operate with inspections. The International Atomic Energy Agency gave Iran until October 31 to respond.

Iran's Foreign Ministry said last night Tehran was considering whether to continue co-operating with the IAEA.

"The nature of our co-operation . . . is under consideration," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said.

Iran has said it has no nuclear arms ambition and its nuclear program is solely geared to generating electricity. It has accused the United States of seeking a pretext to invade Iran, as it had Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ali-Akbar Salehi, the Iranian envoy to the IAEA, told the Ger man magazine Spiegel Iran could block all co-operation and possibly even follow North Korea in pulling out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But he said Iran was "still committed to our international obligations on our nuclear programs".

Mr Shariatmadari blamed Aus tralia, Canada and Japan for passage of the IAEA ultimatum.

Demanding a formal apology, he said supporters would not allow their embassies to operate in Iran.

http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,7266465%255E662,00.html

Selling reconstruction bonds is an excellent idea. Iraq should think seriously about that one.

Policymakers regard the United Nations as underfinanced for the rebuilding job facing the country.

How could this possibly be? The UN made millions of dollars from the "oil for food" program.

"adopt measures to expel from Iran the ambassadors of Japan, Australia and Canada."

Keeping the regime fighting everyone is good.
They're not used to having to deal with so much unrest and so many issues from different countries all at once.
Let's keep them occupied.

Shots Near British Embassy Staff Compound in Iran

Mon September 15, 2003 01:17 AM ET

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Shots were fired opposite the main gate of the residential compound of the British Embassy in Iran, but nobody was hurt, a British diplomat said Monday.
Britain protested "strongly" to Iran last week after the second of two drive-by shootings around the British embassy in Tehran in under a week.

The latest shooting took place Sunday, British diplomat Andrew Greenstock told Reuters. "There were witnesses. It seems to be two men on a bike again," Greenstock said.

On September 9, a British diplomat in Tehran said three or four shots were fired at or near the embassy. Witnesses said they saw them coming from two men on a motorcycle.

There was a similar incident the previous week when gunshots also apparently fired from a passing motorcycle pierced windows in the embassy building that stands near a busy street.

Tensions have been rising between Tehran and London over Britain's arrest at Argentina's request of a former Iranian diplomat over the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people

Iran has said the case is politically motivated and called for the swift release of Hadi Soleimanpour, who was Iran's ambassador to Argentina at the time of the bombing. He was studying in Britain when arrested last month.

http://asia.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=3441953

Another Related Link:
http://famulus.msnbc.com/FamulusIntl/reuters09-14-214647.asp?reg=MIDEAST

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