Replies

WHO KILLED MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-HAKIM?

By Kathleen Ridolfo

A symbolic funeral was held in the holy city of Al-Najaf in Iraq on 2 September in memory of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. The ayatollah was killed in a car bombing on 29 August as he left the Imam Ali Mosque in Al-Najaf following a noon Friday prayers sermon. Some 80 Iraqis were killed and more than 100 injured in the incident. Al-Hakim's body has yet to be identified, and mourners carried a casket containing only his wristwatch, ring, and pieces of his turban in a three-day procession from Baghdad to Al-Najaf.

The tension in the holy city is a reflection of the environment of turmoil seen in other Iraqi towns, where acts of sabotage and terrorism occur far too often in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Just one week before al-Hakim's killing, his nephew Muhammad Sa'id al-Hakim was targeted when his office in Al-Najaf was bombed. He escaped uninjured. While Iraqi police claim they already have suspects for 29 August car bombing in custody, there would be no shortage of non-Iraqi suspects. Al-Hakim was indeed a target for Hussein loyalists, but he also could have died at the hands of Iranians, rival Shi'a groups, or Islamist militants.

Al-Hakim came from a prominent Iraqi Shi'a family, and like many of his relatives, he was a leading opponent of the Ba'athist regime. He was jailed in 1972, 1977, and 1979. Upon his release in 1980, he sought refuge in Iran and in 1982 founded the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which became the most prominent Iraqi Shi'a group. SCIRI enjoyed Iranian political and financial support, and used Tehran as a base for operations for its armed wing, the Badr Brigades. Prior to the U.S.-led war in Iraq this year, SCIRI claimed to have some 10,000-armed men inside Iraq.

The group had contacts with the United States and participated in the pre-war meetings of Iraqi opposition groups. After the downfall of the Hussein regime, many Badr fighters returned to Iraq and established a presence there. The armed wing was reportedly disarmed by the United States in early June, although a small number of men remained armed to provide security for high-ranking SCIRI members. Al-Hakim returned to Iraq in May and reinstated himself as a leading ayatollah at the Al-Hawzah al-Ilmiyah Shi'ite seminary in Al-Najaf. He told reporters that month that he would not seek a political role in Iraq, but would remain the spiritual leader of SCIRI.

But in the holy city of Al-Najaf, things were not peaceful. A fierce power struggle erupted between the older, established clerics and the younger generation of clerics, none more vocal than Muqtada al-Sadr, the young son of slain Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was gunned down along with Muqtada's two older brothers reportedly by Hussein's men in 1999. Muqtada's followers, the Sadriyun, are thought to be responsible for the 10 April killing of U.S.-supported cleric Abd al-Majid al-Khoi, who was killed in a bloody attack just steps from where al-Hakim was assassinated at the Imam Ali Mosque. Accounts vary, but it is believed that al-Khoi was killed when assailants attacked him and the mosque's custodian, an Iraqi Sunni cleric who might have been collaborating with the Hussein regime, as the two men emerged following a meeting of reconciliation. It is unknown whether al-Khoi or the Sunni cleric was the target of the attack.

Muqtada al-Sadr denied that the Sadriyun had any role in the attack. He has since become increasingly critical of the U.S.-led occupation, and has established the Imam al-Mahdi Army, a volunteer movement that he claims will protect the Shi'ite seminary in Al-Najaf and spur a nonviolent movement to rid Iraq of coalition forces. Al-Sadr has also clashed with more prominent Shi'a clerics in Al-Najaf, largely because of doctrinal differences, and has openly criticized clerics who were on good terms with the United States. A cleric of little standing, al-Sadr attached himself to Qom-based cleric Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri and relies on the elder cleric to issue fatwas, or religious edicts, that support his agenda. Soon after al-Khoi's death, al-Sadr criticized Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani for meeting with U.S. officials, which might have prompted the ayatollah to announce that he would have no relations with the U.S.-led coalition. Al-Sistani promptly took refuge inside the Al-Hawzah, refusing visitors and interviews.

Al-Sadr was equally critical of al-Hakim and SCIRI, particularly when the ayatollah's brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, assumed a seat on the Iraqi Governing Council, which al-Sadr refused to recognize. Furthermore, al-Sadr, while of little religious standing, reportedly claims thousands more followers than SCIRI, and is particularly popular with the young, the poor, and the disenfranchised. But, while al-Sadr and his Sadriyun have a motive, it is unlikely he would sanction a terrorist attack of this kind just steps from the holiest mosque to Shi'ites in Iraq.

Another possibility is that elements within the Iranian regime targeted al-Hakim. While al-Hakim and his men lived under the patronage of Iranian clerics for more than 20 years, his return to Iraq was reportedly viewed in Tehran as a loss for the clerics in Qom, both in standing and in financial terms, since Qom had become the center of Shi'ite theology over the past two decades. Furthermore, the decision of the Al-Najaf clerics to welcome Hossein Khomeini, the grandson of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini -- who moved from the Qom-based Al-Hawzah al-Ilmiyah in Iran to the Al-Najaf Hawzah in early August -- might also have ruffled the feathers of some clerics in Qom. Khomeini, who said that he moved to Al-Najaf to continue his religious training and to teach, quickly made a name for himself by criticizing the Iranian clerics. International press reported that the move reflected a growing division in Iran between some Qom-based clerics and the Iranian religious authorities.

Moreover, Khomeini praised the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and claimed that Iranians were ready to topple their regime, and might even welcome the assistance of the United States in doing so.

Arab militants have also been suspected in the attack on al-Hakim. While the number of foreign militants inside Iraq is unclear, U.S. government officials continue to claim that foreign fighters -- particularly from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia -- infiltrate Iraq on a daily basis. A leading Saudi cleric told AP on 31 August that the militants, once shielded and supported by the Saudi regime, are now under fire at home due to U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to crack down on terrorist cells. "Most youths think the only safe road is to go to Iraq," Muhsin al-Awajy told AP. "They are trapped between the international campaign against terrorism and this campaign at home."

Kuwait's alwatan.com.kw reported on 27 August that Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan sources claim that some 1,200 foreign fighters linked to Al-Qaeda had made their way into northern Iraq from Afghanistan via Iran in recent days. A senior Iraqi police official told AP that there were nine key suspects in the bombing in custody, including two Saudis and one Palestinian carrying a Jordanian passport. The official said all nine, the remainder being Iraqis, admitted ties to Al-Qaeda, the news agency reported on 2 August.

Muhammad Husayn al-Hakim, the son of Muhammad Sa'id, may have unwittingly foretold the attack on Muhammad Baqir when he was quoted in the same article as saying, "We ask the American forces to set up numerous border posts," alluding to the possible involvement of foreigners in terrorist attacks on the UN and Jordanian Embassy. "If they managed to reach and attack UN headquarters, they can carry out assaults in Karbala and [Al-Najaf]," he said.

Hussein loyalists have been blamed for the assassination of al-Hakim, and, as noted earlier, there was no love lost between the ayatollah and deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The governor of the Al-Najaf province has said that the number of Iraqis being held after the bombing is fewer than five and that all are Iraqis tied to the former regime. It is also possible that Al-Qaeda fighters have teamed up with Hussein loyalists to launch attacks to sow discord and chaos in Iraq.

Hussein has purportedly denied any involvement in the incident in an audiotape released to Arab satellite channels on 1 September. However, the type and amount of explosives used indicate the involvement of regime forces. Moreover, nearly every leading Shi'ite figure blamed Hussein loyalists for the attack, with many expressing disbelief that any rival faction -- be it Shi'ite or Sunni -- could carry out such a deadly attack on a site revered by both sects. Shi'ite leaders -- in fact all Iraqi leaders -- agree that the loyalists' motive is to stir up discord among Iraqis in the hope of sparking a civil war in the country. The United States has yet to comment, but the FBI is assisting in the investigation.

In his final sermon on 29 August, the slain cleric denounced Hussein loyalists. "The Ba'athist regime targeted the Marjiya [the leading Shi'ite religious leaders] and carried out acts of aggression against the Marjiya. It killed...[Grand Ayatollah Ali] al-Gharawi, and Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and targeted al-Sistani and Bachir al-Najafi [leading Marjiya]," AFP quoted al-Hakim as saying. "The men of the ousted regime are those who are now targeting the Marjiya," he said. He might have been right.

source: RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 167, Part III, 3 September 2003

Comment: At present people are working overtime in Tehran to investigate if someone from any of an official or unofficial agency was involved in the attack. Some fingers are pointing in certain directions, we will see if the government dares to disclose it.

Many mullahs in Qom are worried about the involvement of the "power authorities" in the destruction of Shi'ia theology. Expect increased exodus from Qom to Najaf.