I'm open enough to being convinced I've been wrong, but preferably from hands-on experience with the equipment under consideration, hopefully with a shakedown period before it comes under hostile fire. It looks like at least some Stryker crews going to Iraq won't be getting that opportunity, and some of them will likely die.
There are lots of agendas on the loose here. Very few of them seem to be designed to develop a better equipped and more capable army. Rearm and refuel, this fight is not over. I'll try to help cover your flank during the next engagement.
Just so. Mine is much less to develop a better equipped and more capable army than to insure the survival of those in the crew, platoon/squadron, company or troop using those vehicles. I would hope that by doing so a better equipped and capable army overall would result, but that's more a desirable byproduct than a concern that overrides my primary interest.
Have we learned nothing from the deaths of the lightly armored tank destroyer halftracks whose crews perished in Tunisia early in WWII? The answer was not that we needed to do away with the TD concept, leaving the infantry without sufficient protection from enemy armor, but that those vehicles taking on enemy tanks had to be able to at least offer minimal protection from enemy tank gun fire, as the successful M10 and M36 tank destroyers did.
That beat the ½-inch thick armor of the M3 halftrack with 3-inch gun by a good deal. Or the ½-inch thick plating of the Stryker....
-archy-/-
Design of armored vehicles revolves around an equation of firepower/mobility/protection (as if I'm telling you something you don't already know). Sounds like you come down on the protection side of the equation. I have seen nothing, including the classified data, that convinces me that there is a significant difference on this measure between the M113 series and the LAV III. I have seen first hand the effects of RPGs on M113's, M551's, and all many of odd armored vechicles including many Warsaw Pact types. RPG's can penetrate the crew compartments of most, excluding the M1 tank. The question is, how to mitigate this risk. Stand-off armor, applique armor, active armor, spall liners, etc. all help to some degree. The trade-off is on the mobility side of the equation. Stryker has well-known vulnerabilities, but so does ever other vehicle in the 20-ton weight class. The Army has made a choice that has clearly upset those with M113's to sell, but its a reasonable choice in my view.
We are not talking about tanks here. SBCT's are not designed for a tank battle, and likely won't ever see one. They will provide vastly increased mobility, firepower, and protection to light infantry units that did not have enough firepower to fight their way out of a wet paper sack.
Light armored vehicles (all of them) are designed to provide protection against small arms fire, artillery fragmentation, and limited protection against lightweight anti-tank weapons. The laws of physics don't permit anything else. Now, if your argument is about wheeled vs. track, then you are on more solid ground. The Army abandoned wheeled armored vehicles after WWII. Many believe that its a mistake to go back to them. Advocates argue that the improvements in suspension, driving, mobility technologies swing the argument. Appears to me that its a close call. On balance, it looks to me like the Stryker is delivering a much needed capability, and that the Army has done a pretty remarkable job getting the brigade up and running in a very short time. Of course, the MGS is missing, and this is the big question mark. Some are saying it will never see service. They may be right.
By the way, I saw a M36 tank destroyer in a ditch in Bosnia. Appears to have been taken out by a RPG. And whatever happened to the Tank Destroyer Corps anyway?