My very first response cited the enjoyment of a particular sort of liberty by Judge Moore that he denied to others - namely, the liberty to express his beliefs in a public space, which he denied to others who sought the same rights. Hopefully, now that you understand my position a bit better, we can indeed move on ;)
If you want to discuss how the 14'th Amendment incorporates the establishment clause, which it does these days, we can begin with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303 (1940), move on to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), and close with a discussion of Justice Brennan's concurrence in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963). That should either put you right to sleep, or give you lots to read :^)
When John Locke ventured in 1689, "I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other," he anticipated the necessity which would be thought by the Framers to require adoption of a First Amendment, but not the difficulty that would be experienced in defining those "just bounds." The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our scheme of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by solemn constitutional injunction may not officially involve religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or oppress, a particular sect or religion. Equally the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice. The constitutional mandate expresses a deliberate and considered judgment that such matters are to be left to the conscience of the citizen, and declares as a basic postulate of the relation between the citizen and his government that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand . . . ."- Justice Brennan, Abington School District v. Schempp
Cantwell dealt with the free-exercise clause, not the establishment clause, Everson supported my view of the first amendment (it did not find a violation in the case before it), and your quote from Brennan made no mention of the 14th amendment.