How NOT to Use Light Armored Vehicles

Military.com ^ | Aug 13, 2003 | William S. Lind

[centurion316]

William S. Lind: How NOT to Use Light Armored Vehicles

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About the Author

William Sturgiss Lind, Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation, is a native of Cleveland, Ohio, born July 9, 1947. He graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa from Dartmouth College in 1969 and received a Master's Degree in History from Princeton University in 1971. He worked as a legislative aide for armed services for Senator Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio from 1973 through 1976 and held a similar position with Senator Gary Hart of Colorado from 1977 through 1986. He joined Free Congress Foundation in 1987.

Mr. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985); co-author, with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986); and co-author, with William H. Marshner, of Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda (Free Congress Foundation, 1987). He has written extensively for both popular media, including The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Harper's, and professional military journals, including The Marine Corps Gazette, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Military Review.

Mr. Lind co-authored the prescient article, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," which was published in The Marine Corps Gazette in October, 1989 and which first propounded the concept of "Fourth Generation War." Mr. Lind and his co-authors predicted that states would increasingly face threats not from other states, but from non-state forces whose primary allegiance was to their religion, ethnic group or ideology. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the article has been credited for its foresight by The New York Times Magazine and The Atlantic Monthly.

Mr. Lind is co-author with Paul M. Weyrich of the monograph: "Why Islam is a Threat to America and The West." He is the author of "George W. Bush's `War on Terrorism': Faulty Strategy and Bad Tactics?" Both were published in 2002 by the Free Congress Foundation.

August 13, 2003

One day in the late 1970's, when I was a defense staffer for Senator Gary Hart, I got a call from an Armed Services Committee staffer asking if I knew anything about Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), which are what we used to call armored cars. A bit, I replied. What did I think of them, he asked? I said I liked them for operational maneuver, because they are wheeled, and most operational (as opposed to tactical) movement is on roads.

That was the beginning of the Marine Corps' LAV program. We soon roped in a one-star at Quantico named Al Gray, and within a few years the Corps had some LAVs. The concept for which they were purchased was very clear: to form soviet-style Operational Maneuver Groups for use against Third World countries. We all knew that LAVs are tactically fragile, and must be used in ways that avoid heavy combat. We also knew that the tank the U.S. armed forces were then buying, the M-1, was too heavy and used too much fuel to be able to maneuver rapidly over operational distances. The LAVs could fill the gap.

As one of the Urvater of the Marines' LAV program, I was pleased to hear a couple years ago that the Army was now also planning to buy LAVs. Good, I thought; they too have recognized that the M-1 is more a Sturmgeschuetz or a Jagdpanzer than a real tank, and they need something else for operational maneuver.

I should have known better, given that we are talking about the U.S. Army. Nonetheless, it was with unbelief, then horror, that I learned what the Army was really buying LAVs (called Strykers) for: urban combat. And now, the first Stryker units are to be sent to Iraq.

The magnitude of the idiocy involved in using Light Armored Vehicles in urban fighting, where they are grapes for RPGs, is so vast that analogies are difficult. Maybe one could compare it to planning a fireworks display on board the Hindenburg. Urban combat is extremely dangerous for any armored vehicle, including the heaviest tanks, as the Israelis can testify after losing several Merkavas in the Gaza strip (to mines--real big ones). Why? Because for opposing fighters, regular infantry or guerillas, the old sequence from the German "men against tanks" is easy. The sequence is, "blind 'em, stop 'em, kill 'em." Armored vehicles are already blind in cities, because distances are short; the safest place near a hostile tank is as close to is as you can get, because then it can't see you. Stopping is also easy, because streets are narrow and vehicles often cannot turn around. And with LAVs, once they are blind and stopped, killing is real easy because the armor is, well, light. That's why they are called Light Armored Vehicles.

In the first phase of the war in Iraq, the jousting contest, the Marine Corps lost M-1 tanks and it lost Amtracks, its amphibious personnel carrier. But it lost no LAVs. That is a testament, not to the vehicles, but to how they were employed.

But now, in the second phase of the Iraq war, and in future phases as well, there will be no role for operational maneuver. And there will be no role for LAVs or Strykers. If the Army insists on sending them into Iraqi towns and cities, they should first equip them with coffin handles, because all they will be is coffins for their crews.

When I first came to Washington in 1973, I was quickly introduced to an old saying about the American armed forces: the Air Force is deceptive, the Navy is dishonest, and the Army is dumb. It seems some things never change.

William S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. © 2003 William S. Lind. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

[archy]

As the Marines learned in the early street fighting, RPG's when volley fired can be used very effectively against infantry targets. Armored vehicles are absolutely necessary in uban fighting for support. Think Somalia, one single Armored Cav troop with Bradleys and Abrams would have saved the day.

The Russians, who've learned a few things about what happens when their light tracked BMPs and 8-wheeled BTR-70 anf -80 armored cars take multiple RPG fire in Chechnya and Afghanistan are rather busily rebuilding their older T55 and T72 tanks into armored infantry carriers, offering tank-level armored protection to the occupants. The Israelis, equally concerned about the 100-kilo-plus mines that have taklen out several of their Merkava 3 tanks, are doing the same with their old captured T55s and Centurion tank hulls.

Funny the Israelis aren't using LAVs or other wheelies if they're such a swell deal for fighting in urban streets....

[Tailback]

I hope Shinseki is Inouye's protege'...and I hope he wins.

Daniel Inouye has 32 years as a politician and a lifetime rating from the ACU of 7. Being a combat veteran does not mean someone will make a good politician.

I detest civilian scumbags!

I beleive this person has forgotten that whether he likes it or not, the US Military works FOR civilians.

[Saturnalia]

Of course Stug III and IV vehicles also fulfilled an anti-tank
role as time progressed, thanks in part to a low profile and lack
of anything else. Armament varied from the low speed 75mm StuK 37 L/24
to the 75mm StuK 40 L/48 antitank gun.

For those military nerds wanting more information,
visit http://www.achtungpanzer.com/panzer.htm

For those military nerds wanting to COMMAND a Stug III,
try http://invasion1944.operation-flashpoint.de/index2.php (for first-person)
or http://www.battlefront.com/products/cmbb/cmbb.html for larger scale battles.

[archy]

I hope Shinseki is Inouye's protege'...and I hope he wins.

Just so. You're aware, of course, that Inouye received his injuries during WWII shortly after an incident of souvenier taking in which he cut the finger off a dead Italian woman to steal her wedding ring? Accordingly, it will be interesting to see if Shinseki follows in his mentor's footsteps, aside from not having earned the CIB; I'll at least give Inouye credit for that.

[archy]

Of course Stug III and IV vehicles also fulfilled an anti-tank role as time progressed, thanks in part to a low profile and lack of anything else. Armament varied from the low speed 75mm StuK 37 L/24 to the 75mm StuK 40 L/48 antitank gun.

See also the use by Finnish troops of the Stug III, particularly the Stug III, [ausfuhrung G] primarily in two batches, 30 in summer of 1943 and 29 more in late 1944. As the innovators of the *Molotov Cocktail* during the 1939 Russian invasion of Finland, the Finns realized they needed the best possible equipment for fighting Russian tanks; the Panzerfaust became the answer for the individual Finnish soldier and the Stug III *Sturmi*became the vehicle of choice. The Finns still have a couple in museums, and the things soldiered on with the Finns right up into the 1960s.

Had the Russians come a-visiting the Finns again, as was threatened after the 1956 Hungarian and East German efforts by the Soviets, there's no doubt the old Stugs would have sung their song again, against T55s and T62s instead of the earlier T34 *Scaup*. It's interesting to consider how it would have fared, but it's nice it didn't come to that.

[archy]

Didn't the South Africans have some pretty decent and tough armored cars in the late 70's and early 80's before they were abandoned to the communists?

Yes, as did the Rhodesians before them, but note a few differences between their employment and that we have in mind.

First off, the Boers had no intention of trying to air transport their vehicles, and weren't particularly contemplating their use off-road during their region's 6-week rainy season, nor in snow. And the *Kasspir* vehicles used for police services and population control in the troubled urban townships were not particularly fighting vehicles, but essentially armored 5-tonne trucks. Even the S.A. produced *Eland* armoured car, basicly a license-built copy of the French AML-90, was meant for use as an antitank weapon of desperation, should the *frontline states* choose to send in their T55s and T62s.

The real threat to the Afrikaners' vehicles was mines, particularly the Soviet TM-46. And note too the South African development of the six-wheeled G6 155mm artillery piece. As support vehicles, yep, the wheelies do fine. But as a stand-alone vehicle for mech infantry combat, those inside are going to be showing up on a lot of casualty lists.

[LibKill]

The Tank will be with us for a long time.

These Strykers might be good in the country, but I'd rather walk into a hostile city than ride in inside a Stryker.

[archy]

Thanks. I have to say I fall pretty much on the tracked side of the debate, but I think there is a role for some wheeled vehicles.

For use as mortar carriers [the Stryker mortar setup requires carrying the tube inside and setting up the unit outside the vehicle, rather than fire from inside; even the WWII half-track mortar carriers were an improvement...and less likely to fall victim to counterbattery fire.

The wheelies are okay for such tasks as MP checkpoint support and airfield defense, and can probably be worked up into a much better mortar vehicle than what's now proposed. Likewise, there'' be an ambulance version desperately needed, as the high center of gravity virtualy guarantees rollovers- as has already happened with testybed Strykers at Ft Irwin.

The really sad thing is that a pretty fair vehicle could probably be worked up around the chassis of the 6-wheeled 5-ton truck [without duals in back; the M34 of the old M35A2 family] with about a 2-person crew and 4 or 5 passenger payload...and which really would be transportable by C130. It'd be cost-effective as all get out, though no more [or less] survivable than a Stryker if it'd hit a serious mine. News item:

Chechen ambush in Grozny

31.01.2002

Chechen Resistance Fighters blasted a Russian military armoured BTR vehicle in Michurina township of Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya. Chechen sources said that the remote controlled mine blast of Yesterday killed 5 Russian soldiers. The strong explosion completely destroyed the carrier.

Chechen Resistance Fighters carried another attack to two different Russian check points in Gudermes at around 11:00 hours Yesterday. 2 Russian soldiers are exed in this action.

Other action is reported from locations near Duba-Yurt and Samashki settlements in Chechnya.

Sorta sounds like what we're facing in Iraq, doesn't it?

-archy-/-

[archy]

The Tank will be with us for a long time.

The ground-launched Hellfire is going to change a lot of the ways tank business is conducted, but it's a fair bet that the vehicles that launch them [and the 6 KM-ranged Russian 9M123 Khrizantema and followon equivalents] are going to resemble turretless tanks or tank destroyers, maybe armed with a 25-30mm autocannon for soft targets not worth a quarter-million dollar missile. Think truck convoys being set upon by something along the lines of the old West German Jagdpanzer Rakete, but with a much superior missile system aboard.

These Strykers might be good in the country, but I'd rather walk into a hostile city than ride in inside a Stryker.

Concur. But note that on the country roads, the wheelies require a road at least twice as wide as their length to turn around in, whereas a tracked vehicle can neutral steer out of such a situation.

[archy]

but I'd rather walk into a hostile city than ride in inside a Stryker.

Of course, riding out of a city in a Stryker or other wheelie might not be a bad idea....

[LibKill]

tank destroyers

Did someone call for The Thing? (Will open in window.)

[archy]

Did someone call for The Thing? (Will open in window.)

I had two experiences with the USMC Ontos, once when Marines accompanied a convoy I was riding shotgun on. They dropped a couple of the things into the back of a M54 5-ton truck, loaded the guns up with 106mm canister, and were good to go; we had no problems that day. The other time a Marine detatchment working in a city area had a little problem with .50 MG fire in a location where a vehicle couldn't get in to take care of the problem. No worries, an Ontos crew dismounted one of their guns and hauled it and several rounds of ammo to an upstairs roof where they commanded the terrain beneath. I recall to this day a little rooster of a Marine lieutenant infuriated by the fire his platoon was taking demanding that *This! $h!t! Will! Cease!...This! $h!t! Will! Cease! IMMEDIATELY!....

And once the Ontos crew was in place and set up, it did.

The MoGas engine of the Ontos would need to be replaced with a more modern Diesel, the armour could stand to be upgraded with a Kevlar/Nomex padded interior to spevent crew damage from armour spalling or stray round penetration, and adding a TOWII/Jevelin/Ground launch Hellfire to the 6 guns would be a worthwhile addition- see my comments above about a missile tank killer, but substitute the Ontos' recoilless guns for the 25/30mm autogun I suggested; there's probably room for a mix there- and other modernization would be required; SINGCARS radios and a PLUGGER GPS unit, at a minimum. But it could be done, and cheap, and I'd rather take one of those into combat than a Stryker....

And I bet that several Ontos, so outfitted, could be carried in a C130, maybe even one or two in a C47 $hi!hook helo, which is more than a Stryker or even a Tow HUMVEE can say. Was the Ontos amphib-capable? Even if not, it's certainly no worse than a Stryker or HUMMVEE in that respect.

[CatoRenasci]

Indeed, I agree that the armored car is best deployed essentially as a military police asset. I always thought the BTR-60 was overrated by most Western analysts as an IFV.

To be effective, armored vehicles need to be tracked, and better armored, gunned, more maneurverable, and with better fire control than their opponents. It helps to have more of them also, but if you don't, they have to be qualitatively (including the crews) much better than their opposition.

The real opposition to heavy tanks is their weight, cost and fuel appetite, not their battlefield peformance. Penny wise and pound foolish.

[archy]

The real opposition to heavy tanks is their weight, cost and fuel appetite, not their battlefield peformance. Penny wise and pound foolish.

Survivability is becoming more and more of an issue as well, and God help us in an enviornment in which we don't *own* the skies. But *smart* mines are becoming more of a threat, as are fire-and-forget missiles with ranges up to 10KM, well beyond the ability of the tank's crew to detect an immediate hostile threat. Neither do DIPCM make the tanker's lot a happier one, but the use of ICM sure does reduce the load on the user's logistical chain.

The question arises why those nasty old tanks aren't upgraded to the best possible condition, then maintained stateside for the national defense of CONUS, probably by NG or reserve forces, where transportation overseas would not be a factor.

Or it may simply be that in the event of such a situation in which such employment would be required, the leaders now planning our FCS forces simply plan to surrender.

-archy-/-

[archy]

To be effective, armored vehicles need to be tracked, and better armored, gunned, more maneurverable, and with better fire control than their opponents. It helps to have more of them also, but if you don't, they have to be qualitatively (including the crews) much better than their opposition.

I was an enlisted tank gunner when the BMP was still fairly new and the airborne BMD had just taken its place among the ASU57 and ASU85 in the Soviet airborne forces. We always expected that the MICVs we'd face would be BMPs, and that when second-line reservist motor rifles in BTR60/70 vehicles [or old BTR152s!] showed up, we'd know we were doing some good...if we lasted that long, and continued to get ammo/fuel resupply. The preferred weapon aboard for taking out a BTR was the tank commander's .50, with hopes of saving the main gun ammo for more deserving targets, though if a BTR with a missile launcher was a likely threat, they'd have gotten the kitchen sink, plus.

At that time the T72 hadn't yet been fielded, and the USSR's 50,000-plus T54/T55 tanks were really still the backbone of their armoured formations, not that the T62 was anything to sneeze at. But we figured that if the balloon went up, we'd be outnumbered about 8 to 1, and around 20 to 1 if they maneuvered properly and used their artillery right. One thing we wouldn't have any shortage of would have been targets.

-archy-/-

[LibKill]

One thing we wouldn't have any shortage of would have been targets.

That's the spirit!

We're surrounded, excellent. Now we can shoot in any direction and kill communists.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Treadhead bump.

[archy]

One thing we wouldn't have any shortage of would have been targets.

That's the spirit!

We're surrounded, excellent. Now we can shoot in any direction and kill communists.

Tankers have always been enthusiastic killers and hellraisers by the very nature of their tools of the trade and the characteriastics of their use: firepower, mobility and shock effect. When I arrived in Germany to my first posting, it was to the headquarters company tank section, 3 M60A1 tanks in a battalion [51 tanks worth, in three companies of 17 tanks each] of a tank battalion assigned to support an infantry division- so we weren't *pure* tankers, a tank battalion in an armored division.

Nevertheless, since I'd been trained on the M48, I began by going over the differences between the bigger M60A1 and my old M48A2C. The first thing my tank commander told me? We carry more main gun rounds, so we can kill more stuff! Hmmmm.

Neither was the attitude limited to the tank crews. Later, when I was tasked with teaching tracked vehicle operation and maintenance to our medics when their wheeled jeep and ¾-ton Dodge ambulances were replaced with M113A1 and M577A1 tracked evac ambus, the battalion surgeon made it very clear that he expected me tio be as cross-trained in the medics' jobs as any of his pillpushers. Doc lived and breathed with the idea that his medic section could be dealing with the casualties suffered by 700 guys going in harms way with some of the most state-of-the-art killing equipment then available, but against numbers way out of reasonable proportion. Before it was over, I learned how to start an IV, run a line of sutures, or stich a blood vessel together; Doc took his and my job seriously.

Understand that as with a fighter pilot, you really want either the most enthusiastic killer or the most dispassionate one available as a tank's commander, gunner or driver, and even the rookie-in-training gun loader may get his chance sooner than later. 50 tons of steel is unforgiving and unyielding, and in a year's time it's the rare unit that doesn't have at least one or two of it's own men *bitten* either fatally or nearly so by their own beastly tools. Accordingly, the opportunity to turn them loose on *the other people* is not only welcomed, but savored.

Our unit's scouts, working in the gasoline-engined, aluminum-armored M114 recon track, a fairly miserable machine, worked up a triple gun mount for the tanker's M85 .50 caliber MG after their own 20mm cannon proved undependable...and after field testing to ascertain that it worked okay and was suitable for an Army-wide modification to the M114A1E1, they really, really looked forward to finding some enemy trucks or BMDs to testfire the things on. It was NOT just a gung-ho attitude on the part of any one individual- we were ALL that way.

And it wasn't just limited to us at that particular time and place, either. When I was at Ft Knox in the 1960s, our unit messhall had one back wall reinforced with plywood paneling; when renovated, the plywood came down- and on the original back wall there was a beautifully painted mural, dating back to the WWII period.

It showed one of the old early war M3 Grant tanks in the desert, driving off toward the horizon across a line of sand dunes, the arrow-straight path from its tracks leading back across those dunes across the entire wall, fading to infinity in the other direction of the near-trackless wasteland.

With one exception: In the center of the painting there had been a deviation from the true course to check out an oasis and well where a single desert palm tree had grown. And the tank's driver had strayed from their intended path to cross over to the only living thing within sight, maybe within a hundred miles. And knock it down flat, then to return to his original course. It said volumes about the way tankers think.

That's just the way tank crews do their business, then, in my time, or now. I've never wanted any animal's head or rack or horns over my fireplace mantle, just the burned and blackened roadwheel of another tank, victim of a time when I saw or shot first or more accurately, and gave its crew a real bad day at the office. So far, the closest I've come is a fine collection of belt buckles and a truck's radiator cap. But perhaps I'll get that chance yet.

I hope so.

-archy-/-

[Cannoneer No. 4]

LAV III

[wolverine38]

I agree with you. I can only speak for the Marines and there is a reason they call their units LAR's. It stands for light armored reconnaissance. LAV's can't match up to tanks and their firepower. Usually there is only 1 TOW vehicle in a platoon. Recon is what they are best used for. They are swift, relatively silent, and have the ability to ford rivers and small water ways in order to escape. They have no place in urban terrain and should not have their hands tide down like that.