Middle East
Enemies from within: Iran and Saudi Arabia
By Ehsan Ahrari
Jul 22, 2003
Iran and Saudi Arabia are edging closer to political instability and even cataclysmic change. In the case of Iran, the United States prefers a change of regime, but not for Saudi Arabia. However, regime change might be the eventual outcome in both countries for reasons that are essentially similar: the enemies of regimes are inside the borders. But there are also certain important aspects of dissimilarity in both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic revolution occurred in Iran in 1979 as a powerful protest against a highly corrupt and equally ruthless regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlevi. At the risk of oversimplification, it should be stated that the vanguards of that revolution at the very outset made two significant mistakes whose ramifications might bring about its end.
First, they created a constitution which established the Vilayat-e-Faqih (rule of the clergy). As such, it made the head clergy (the Supreme Leader) both infallible and beyond reproach. The concept of infallibility is essentially an anti-Islamic concept, since from theological perspectives no one is infallible, save God. At the same time, the notion of the Vilayat-e-Faqih sowed the seeds for the establishment of a theological dictatorship, which was going to be as exclusionist of the common people as the monarchy that it replaced.
The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is fundamentally anti-democratic in the sense that it allocates too much power to the Supreme Leader and his handpicked cronies. Only a cursory review of the Iranian constitution makes it clear that it has created an absolute dictatorship of the Supreme Leader. The Iranian parliament is held in check by the Council of Guardians, a body that has power to "examine all laws passed by the parliament to determine their compatibility with [the] Sharia or Islamic law". The Supreme Leader appoints half of the members of this council, and the second half are recommended by the head of the judiciary and confirmed by parliament. The radically conservative nature of the council may be underscored by the fact that it has been known to strike down up to 40 percent of the laws passed by the government.
Another powerful body is the Assembly of Experts, which elects the Supreme Leader from within its ranks and has no record of challenging any of his decisions. Under the Islamic Republic, Iran might be the only country where the president of the republic does not control its armed forces. On this issue as well, the Supreme Leader has ultimate authority.
The second mistake of the Iranian constitution is that there are virtually no institutional constraints on the authority of the Supreme Leader or provisions to create some balance between his authority and that of the president of the Republic, who is an elected official. The Iranian constitution makes this elected official - indeed the entire executive branch - subordinate to the Supreme Leader. This theological dictatorship of the Supreme Leader, along with his cohorts in the Assembly of Experts, Council of Guardians, Expediency Council and the judiciary have become the chief enemies from within of the survival of the Islamic Republic. It is befuddling, then, why Iran even pretends to be a democracy.
Iran is a country in which about 70 percent of the population is below the age of 30. It is within this age group that the unemployment rate is reported to be hovering around 24 percent. It seems that Iran's ruling class and its young population are focused on entirely different agendas. Within the rank and file of the ruling establishment, the issues of contention are liberalization of the government (rather, the denial of it) and strict interpretation of Islam. The youth of Iran, on the contrary, like young people anywhere else in the world, are driven by their collective ambitions of getting quality education so that they can get promising jobs and a good standard of living. Many are also enticed by the consumerism and free lifestyle of the West. But the hardliners' insistence on making their lust for the "good life" a crime, becomes just another reason why the feeling of alienation regarding the Islamic government is reported to be mounting among young Iranians.
While the hardline ayatollahs see popular demands for liberalization as a threat to their authority, the liberal or moderate clerics do not fare that much better among Iranian youth because of their unwillingness to challenge the hardliners. The hardliners in Iran have learned nothing from the miserable legacy of the regime of Reza Pahlevi, its brutality, and, above all, its repudiation to compromise. By wittingly or unwittingly emulating those traits of the previous regime, the hardline Islamic clerics are pushing their rule toward the same fate.
The United States is on the sidelines of this brewing struggle in Iran, but it is not a disinterested party. As much trouble as the Bush administration is currently encountering, stemming from regime change in Iraq, it would still welcome a regime change in Iran if it was carried out by the Iranian youth, a la the Islamic revolution of 1979.
The pro-democracy elements are showing their interests through radio broadcasts from the comfortable environs of Los Angeles, urging the Iranian youth to overthrow the ayatollahs. Like Iraqi expatriates in the United States and Britain, the pro-democracy groups are supported by the American neo-conservatives. The Mujahideen-e-Khalq has their own fight with the Islamic regime. They have even approached the Bush administration to use them as a proxy force to carry out regime change in Iran, much like the Northern Alliance was used to dismantle the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Despite the disparate endeavors of these groups to oust the Islamic government from Iran, the chief threat to that country's stability, in the final analysis, stems from the enemies from within - the hardline ayatollahs who would rather be swept away by the winds of change than bend and survive.
The problem in Saudi Arabia is similar to that in Iran in the sense that the legitimacy of the regime faces challenges from within. But the challenge to the stability of Saudi Arabia stems from a constant pull and push between the forces of Islamic orthodoxy and the nexus between militant orthodoxy and al-Qaeda. The general understanding is that the support of that terrorist organization comes from a number of Sunni Muslim clerics and the population at large. However, since Saudi Arabia is a closed society, it is well nigh impossible to make even a reasonable judgment about the actual number of these supporters. There is little doubt about the strength of their commitment, though. They will go to any extreme to fulfill their objectives of ousting the monarchy. The suicide attacks in Riyadh of May 12 were a declaration of war by these militants on the Saudi monarchy.
The current dilemma for the Saudi government is how much violent tactics it should use to suppress and eradicate the militant orthodox and their al-Qaeda cohorts before alienating even a larger portion of its population. At the same time, in the eyes of their American interlocutors, the government's willingness to suppress these groups has become a litmus test of its earnestness in dealing with terrorism.
The Saudi monarchy is going through an unprecedented era when its own legitimacy is being threatened by the hardcore orthodox-al-Qaeda nexus. At the same time, its ties with the US have also experienced considerable strain and tensions. It seems that the Saudi rulers are hearing from both parties that now-famous line of George W Bush, with a slight modification, "Either you are with us or you are with the enemy." Except in this case, they seem to be doomed by choosing either side. But remaining neutral in the evolving hardball in their polity is not an option.
Stability-related problems of Iran and Saudi Arabia should be viewed in the larger context of South and West Asia. Afghanistan continues to be highly volatile. Pakistan's domestic tranquility remains a mirage. Further west of Pakistan, Iraq is a place where the escalating spirals of anti-Americanism have pushed all prospects of stability into the distant future. If Iran and Saudi Arabia were also to face instability, then the world might witness chaos on a very large scale.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EG22Ak03.html