Posted on 07/05/2003 1:49:46 PM PDT by Pokey78
PATUXENT RIVER
NAVAL AIR STATION, Md.
IN the clear summer sky, the V-22 Osprey was showing its stuff. It went backward, zoomed at an angle, hovered close to the ground and then shot straight up into the air. Buck Rogers himself couldn't have created a more dramatic sight: a hybrid craft, half helicopter and half airplane, that danced in the sky and appeared to defy the laws of aerodynamics.
It was exactly the performance the Marine Corps wanted to show.
After two decades in development, the Marines, along with the Osprey's contractors, Boeing and the Bell Helicopter subsidiary of Textron, are making their final push to gain Pentagon approval for the Osprey, an aircraft as high in promise as in problems. The government has spent more than $12 billion so far on the Osprey, which has the notoriety of having suffered three fatal crashes in test flights, leading to the deaths of 30 people, 26 of them Marines.
Still, the Marines are determined, and they see the Osprey as crucial to their mission in the world. "It won't be long before everyone wants one of these," said Col. Daniel Schultz, the V-22 program manager. It's not hard to see why. The Osprey, which can take off like a helicopter and fly like a plane, can travel twice as fast and five times as far as the Marines' current helicopter fleet, from the Vietnam era. "It's the promise of the future," he added.
It is a future that some people hope never comes. Neither the Osprey's razzle-dazzle aerobatics nor the Marine Corps's doggedness has been able to silence critics, who remain convinced that the Osprey's design is too complicated and inherently flawed, that the craft is being pushed into production without adequate testing and that it is simply too dangerous and too expensive.
"The Marines have a tremendous can-do attitude," said Philip E. Coyle III, a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information, a military research group in Washington. "But when they're overly committed to a program like this, they can end up looking foolish as well as killing people." Mr. Coyle is a former assistant defense secretary who ran the Pentagon's weapons testing program in the 1990's.
Just last May, the General Accounting Office offered its own criticisms. It said the Osprey program "plans to enter full-rate production without ensuring that the manufacturing processes are mature" and that Osprey production continues with inadequate assessments.
But critics fear that the passion of its supporters and the weight of history will keep moving the project along. "The Osprey is on the road to recovery, and the proponents are pushing really hard," said Chris Hellman, a director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a research group in Washington. "My problems with the Osprey remain. The V-22 has gotten to the point where so much money has gone into it, it will probably go ahead regardless."
OR maybe not. Despite this aura of inevitability, the Marines and Osprey contractors know that, given the craft's troubled history, they can afford no more missteps. Clouding their optimism is the fear that something again could go terribly wrong. Should the Osprey have another fatal accident, even as strong a supporter as Colonel Schultz acknowledges, "we'd be out of business."
For that reason, the Osprey's backers are pulling out all the stops. After being removed from the skies for more than a year and a half after two fatal crashes in 2000, the Osprey is undergoing a redesigned round of test flights the Marines say should silence critics and ensure that the craft is safe.
In addition, the Osprey is starring in a publicity campaign aimed at opinion makers, both inside government and out. Members of the news media, as well as members of Congress, are being brought to the naval base here to see the Osprey put through its paces.
By the end of 2005, the Pentagon will decide whether to ask Congress to finance a combat-ready fleet of 458 Ospreys at a projected price of $48 billion. The bulk of the Ospreys would go to the Marines, with 98 for the Army Special Forces and the Navy. For the most part, the Osprey is designed for amphibious troop transport and assault.
The Osprey has also received backing from the Bush administration, which is calling for a "low rate" production of 11 test Ospreys annually in the fiscal 2004 Pentagon budget. A big boost came in May, when the Pentagon's departing weapons chief had an 11th-hour conversion and, on his last day on the job, switched from being a critic to a supporter.
That official, Under Secretary of Defense Edward C. Aldridge Jr., who previously said he had "some real problems" with the Osprey, said he had changed his mind because recent tests gave him "sufficient confidence" in its safety and reliability. In a statement, he added that the craft would provide "much-needed capability to the war fighter" and even called for increasing Osprey production above the current 11 test planes a year, of which 7 are now in the skies. A spokesman for Mr. Aldridge said he was not available to comment on his change.
Aiding the Marines' push in Washington are two formidable lobbying powerhouses, Boeing and Textron. Each is a 50 percent partner in the Osprey and has platoons of lobbyists working Capitol Hill, along with those of the Osprey's many subcontractors.
An example of their efforts was on display last month as Boeing, Bell Helicopter and the Marines jointly sponsored a V-22 media expo at the naval base here to demonstrate the Osprey's prowess to those who could spread the word. Wearing identical sea-foam-green polo shirts with a V-22 logo, dozens of Boeing and Bell employees, along with similarly clad Osprey subcontractors, set up booths in the airfield's hangar to promote their wares and echo the positive spin of the Marines. "Forward with Confidence," was the theme.
The enthusiasm of Boeing and Bell is not surprising. Right now, each Osprey has a price tag of $68.7 million; by comparison, an F-16 fighter jet costs around $20 million. One of the challenges for the Osprey program is to bring the per-craft cost down to around $58 million, a number critics say is still staggeringly expensive for a craft that is essentially a replacement helicopter.
With numbers this large, the Osprey is expected to give each company up to $20 billion over the life of the 12-year project. For Boeing, which had revenue of $54 billion last year, this is a nice additional source of cash. For Bell Helicopter, it is more important than that. Even today, the project accounts for 38 percent of the annual revenue of Bell Helicopter, which also wants to use the Osprey's tilt-rotor technology to make a commercial version of the craft. The Osprey also accounts for 6 percent of Textron's $10.7 billion revenue.
"While Boeing has a lot in development, Textron does not have any new military helicopters," said Paul H. Nisbet, an aerospace analyst at JSA Research in Newport, R.I. "This is a major program for them." Luckily for Textron, it has the Marines. "In Washington, the Marines usually get what they want," Mr. Nisbet said.
IN a presentation before the aerial demonstration here, Colonel Schultz defended the revised testing program that began when the Osprey returned to the skies in May 2002. In the new program, many of Osprey's initial developmental tests were eliminated to the dismay of many critics and replaced with ones that Colonel Schultz said were better designed to simulate battlefield conditions and address the problems underlying the crashes. The main problems involved the Osprey's aerodynamics and hydraulics.
"This has not been a fluffy flight-test program," said Colonel Schultz, with a model V-22 in his hand to demonstrate his points. "It's time to take another look at this plane. We have made incredible strides. We have confidence in this plane, and we are ready to give it to the fleet."
Not only do the Osprey's backers feel that it's good enough for the military, they also feel it is good enough for the president. They are angling to have a V-22 Osprey selected in the current competition to replace Marine One, the presidential helicopter. "It would be perfect for the president," said Bob Leder, a spokesman for Bell Helicopter.
Among the unconvinced are retired military aviators, some members of Congress and other military industry analysts. They say the problems behind the multiple crashes have not been resolved and that the complicated design is only setting up the Osprey for more tragic problems the current optimism notwithstanding. For years, a group of retired military aviators, calling itself the "red ribbon panel," has issued one critical warning after another.
"While there are some very good design tricks, it's got the same basic problems," said Harry P. Dunn, a retired Air Force colonel who heads the group. "It's not a question of if someone gets killed, but when."
Most critics say the Osprey lacks enough maneuverability at low altitudes, and they question whether the manufacturers have solved an aerodynamic problem, called vortex ring state, that caused an April 2000 crash in Arizona in which 19 Marines died. In that condition, the craft becomes caught in its own turbulence and loses lift.
Representative Jim Gibbons, a Nevada Republican who flew F-4's in Vietnam and in the Persian Gulf war as an Air Force combat pilot, is a doubter, too. "This has all the earmarks of becoming the Edsel of the aviation industry," he said. "The Osprey is a nice tool, but is it the right tool in the circumstances?" asked Mr. Gibbons, a member of the House Armed Services Committee.
He questions Osprey's effectiveness at high altitudes, like the mountains of Afghanistan. He also says the downdraft that comes from the Osprey's powerful rotors as it hovers is so great as to make Marine rescue missions impossible, especially over water.
Yet with Boeing, Bell and Osprey subcontractors spreading V-22 work in over 40 states and 200 Congressional districts, Mr. Gibbons is one of the few critics in Congress. "The industry has a very heavy hand when it comes to making the program work in Washington," he said. "All they have to do is go to Congress with those employees."
The history of Osprey crashes casts a long shadow over the sales effort. The April 2000 crash that killed 19 Marines occurred just as the Pentagon was to decide whether to approve the Osprey. The following December, an Osprey crashed in a forest outside Jacksonville, N.C., killing four more Marines. After that crash, which was attributed to a leak in hydraulic lines, the Osprey was grounded and testing suspended.
Nearly a decade earlier, in July 1992, a test Osprey crashed into the Potomac River, killing four Boeing employees and three Marines. Even at that early date, the Osprey was catching flak. Vice President Dick Cheney, who was defense secretary at the time, repeatedly tried to halt the program, arguing that it was too costly. But every time he tried to starve the Osprey for financing, he was overruled by a Congress that kept the money flowing.
AT the Osprey demonstration here, Colonel Schultz and his team of test pilots put the Osprey through aerial paces intended to counter specific complaints. In a mere 12 seconds, the craft can tilt its rotor, switching from helicopter to airplane mode. As the Osprey hovered like a helicopter 25 feet off the ground, doing a tap dance of gyrations, Colonel Schultz said: "Can't maneuver? I believe this shows maneuvers."
The craft then rocked back and forth in the air, did a nose dive toward the ground, hovered, and finally put its nose in the air and headed upward. It even demonstrated that it could land with only one engine. (The other was idling.) When the Osprey finished its 15-minute show, it dropped out of the sky and put its rotors into the air. Then, one by one, each blade of the rotor collapsed downward, like fading flower petals. Once collapsed, the blades then bundled themselves together. With its blades compactly tucked away in this fashion, the Osprey showed that it would not take up a lot of space on an aircraft deck addressing another complaint.
As he stepped out of the Osprey, Boeing's top V-22 test pilot, Thomas L. MacDonald, said the air show here explained why the Marines are so gung-ho for the Osprey. "As a former Navy airplane and helicopter pilot, I'm acutely aware of the limitations of both," Mr. MacDonald said. "With the Osprey, the Marines will be able to get to the fight without dying on the way and get out without being killed on the way back."
Like any aircraft that loses all power, a safe landing will depend on the several factors: aircrew performance, weather and flight envelope. Will the aircrew be trained to attempt a landing if in the unlikely event that both engines are lost in the same flight hour; the probability of which is 1x10(-10)? Yes.
Now some questions for you, oh nattering nabob of negativity. Can a CH-53E land safely if it loses all three engines and its tail rotor? Can a CH-53D land safely if it loses both engines and its tail rotor? Can a CH-46E land safely if it loses both engines and its tail rotor? Can a UH-1N land safely if it loses both engines and its tail rotor? Can a AH-1W land safely if it loses both engines and its tail rotor? Can a VH-3 land safely if it loses both engines and a tail rotor? Can a VH-60 land safely if it loses both engines and its tail rotor? What are the MTBF figures for powerplant failures in the above helicopters? What is the MTBF figure for the powerplant in the Osprey?
/2/ If due to mechanical failure or battle damage, the rotors cannot convert from forward to overhead, can it land safely?
Once again you ask the wrong question. The question you should have asked is can the Osprey attempt to land if the engine nacelles cannot be tilted? The answer to that question is yes. The design of the proprotors, which has been confirmed in testing, is such that they will broomstraw when striking a solid object. The proprotors do not shatter. Incidentally, in the ~8,000 hours of flight testing there has never been a single failure of the engine nacelle tilt mechanism.
/3/ How can it fire weapons forward for protection, now that the nose gun has been removed from consideration as too heavy?
The nose gun has not been removed. The contract for the GDAS GAU 19/A was awarded in the first quarter of 2001. All production MV-22s and CV-22s will be equipped with the gatling gun.
By the way does your heart go out to all the victims of the 100+ Blackhawk crashes? I seriously doubt it.
How do you feel about the parents of those Marines flying around in 40 year old helicopters that are known in the FMF as Boeing Body Bags? How do you feel about the actions that night of Major John Brow? Do you wish that he had been piloting one of the other three Ospreys' that were on the same flight as Nighthawk 72 instead of the one your son was on?
I have the Marines going after my 17 yo son right now.
I am so sorry about your son but am at a loss for words. No words can make up for that.
I will use your words to direct my son's activity and life in a different direction.
I have been here for awhile. But as far as I am concerned, your words are the most important ones I have ever read. I can't thank you enough.
You aren't a general by any chance are you? Otherwise, you must own stock in the program.
No to both questions. Not affiliated with the program in any way whatsoever. Are you affiliated with or own stock in United Technologies?
But, let's pretend Maj. Brow did make a mistake - perhaps a horrible error in judgement that caused the April crash. How do you explain the other crashes? I suppose they were Maj. Brow's fault too. He was "The Best of the Best", but not really that good?
There's no pretending about it. Brow violated NATOPS procedures and caused the deaths of 18 other Marines besides himself. Pilot error was the cause of the Marana crash and that's a fact. Brow was a former KC-130 pilot, not a rotorhead and had limited experience in rotary winged aircraft, desribing him as the best of the best is simply not true. The actions of the aircrew in the New River crash contributed to the accident. Other Ospreys experienced hydraulic failures and safely landed. Sweaney and Murphy violated NATOPS and continued to fly an aircraft they were trained to immediately land if the FCS did not reset. One of them continued to press the FCS reset inducing further anomalies to the FCS. The crash at Quantico in 1992 was due to a design flaw which resulted in an engine fire. However, there is a high probability that the aircrew exceeded airspeed limits on the flight from Florida which may have accelerated the pooling of flammable materials in the intake. The Delaware crash was caused by a miswired gyro.
In another article I hold in my hand, it discusses the very topic of safety and potential cover up.
Once again I ask you to provide me the documented source of that report.
Yet it had required 600 repairs while the Marines had it...one repair for every 15 minutes it was flying."
Helicopters require ~16 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight. I suggest you look at the VIDS MAF board in any helicopter squadron production control office as well as the repair history of any military helicopter. That number of repairs is not unusual particularly for the aircraft in question. EMD and LRIP aircraft traditionally require a number of repairs, most of which are minor.
I think the words spoken by a Commanding Officer to a Marine mom I know sums it all up perfectly..."The MV-22 Osprey is a black mark on the history of the Marine Corps."
Please provide us with the name of that officer.
Put your life where your mouth is.
I'd glady fly aboard an Osprey before I'd fly on a CH-46.
It has been my belief that a Marine watches out for his Brothers, he does not lead them to slaughter.
The actions of John Brow killed your son. If you had read the data from the FDR and the after accident report you'd know that. It wouldn't mave mattered what rotary winged aircraft was being flown that night. If Brow had flown any of them in the same manner as he did the Osprey your son and 18 other Marines would still be dead. That's an indisputable fact.
I did not say it exploded...
I didn't say you did.
You don't watch your Brothers burn to death, look death in the eye yourself, , and not have it affect you.
I've helped clean up the crashes of four EA-6Bs with the loss of 11 pilots/ecmos including pulling charred body parts out of trees and swamps. I've seen the effects of a pilot who executed a command ejection while inverted and sent three aviators downward into a pine tree forest. I've seen the decapitated head of an ecmo still strapped into its flight helmet at ALF Coupeville on Whidbey Island. I witnessed a Marine recruit kill himself at the pistol range at Edson Range, Camp Pendleton. I witnessed a Marine recruit drown in the pool at MCRD San Diego. I saw a drunk Marine and a drunk sailor get hit by a train while fighting on the railroad tracks outside MCAS Iwakuni in Japan. So save me the holier than thou sanctimony lady because you haven't seen anything that I haven't.
Incorrect. Brow violated both NATOPS and his training during that flight. I suggest you read the after accident report and the FDR data which proves that Brow screwed up and killed 18 other Marines and himself.
however, do you have a clue who the December crash pilot was? Why don't you pick on him, or was he your good ole buddy?
Sure do. Keith M. Sweaney and Michael L. Murphy were the pilots of the mishap aircraft which crashed near New River in December of 2000. If you've paid attention to all the Osprey threads on this forum you'd know that I've repeatedly pointed out that their mistakes in attempting to reset the FCS and not immediately landing when the FCS failed to reset, as they were trained and the NATOPS instructs, were contributing factors to the crash. Sweaney and Murphy were both experienced pilots but they made mistakes that cost them and two other Marines their lives. Ever hear the saying "There are old pilots and there are bold pilots but there are no old, bold pilots"? Are you related in any way to John Brow?
In this respect, it is no different from the CH-46 Sea Knight or the CH-53E Super Stallion. Violation of the NATOPS manual or the maintenance publications is going to cause a fatal crash.
On April 8, 2000, 19 Marines were killed, many of them just kids. One of those Marines on board that night was my son.
Please accept my condolences on your loss.
It is just a matter of time before another goes down, taking someone else's kids to their graves.
Again, the same can be said of the current tactical lift aircraft used by the Marine Corps. Should we dispense with the concepts of vertical envelopment and operational maneuver from the sea and go back to one-dimensional beach assaults?
The powers that be don't care about these young Marines who have to fly in Ospreys, or the families left behind in agonizing grief when they die. Why should they care? It's not their loved ones being forced to board this death trap. As it has proven all too well, when it crashes, there is no hope for survival.
Look at the survival statistics for a Sea Knight or a Super Stallion. They are just as lethal in a crash--the presumption is that all aboard will perish, and any survivors are treated as God's grace.
While those who push for the Osprey sit around their holiday tables, or share in various family celebrations, we, the victims of their greed,
I have no financial interest in the Osprey; I served eight years in Marine Corps aviation, and I know what a deathtrap the Sea Knight has become. Thank you for your slander.
I wish that when Col. Schultz shares in his next family celebration that he is aware of those of us whose lives are left shattered. If he would not put his child on an MV-22 Osprey and send that child through the same maneuvers that my son and the others went through, then he should never put someone else's child in that same danger.
OK, so Col. Schulz should dragoon his children into the Marine Corps, eh?
My son did not sign up with the Corps to be dead in 14 months.
Nobody does. Unfortunately, some always do.
When the recruiter came to my house to talk to me about my son going to boot camp early, I voiced to him my concerns about my son's safety.
He said, "Ma'am, we would never put your son in harms way".
Excuse me...this is where I must hoist the "Bravo Sierra" flags.
My recruiter sat all of us down and made it 100% crystal-clear that we could be called to combat duty at any time, that even "routine peacetime training" had its dangers, and that the USMC was NOT the Boy Scouts.
The intent of the question to Travis McGee was to see if he was paying attention....Sure it was....
Spend some time on the ramp at New River around an HMM or on the flightdeck of an LHA or LHD and listen to the mechs informally referring to the aft rotor on a CH-46 as a tail rotor. I seriously doubt you've ever spent a single day in uniform, despite your claim, let alone anywhere near any type of aircraft.
...I served eight years in Marine Corps aviation....I can and do appreciate that. What was your job in Marine Corps aviation?
The H-46 was getting too damn dangerous to stuff troops into starting 1989--we lost about one bird every three months to the same problem (main rotor blade separating from the main rotor hub in flight), for a 18 months. That's half a squadron right there.
In 'Nam, the CH-46 had this habit of falling apart in midair because of gross NATOPS violations by pilots.
BTW, the CH-53E Super Stallion had a FAR higher crash rate than the Osprey during its T&E and IOC phases. At one point, there was talk of just killing the entire program, because the Super Stud was "just too dangerous."
The CH-53E was (and is) an aircraft singularly unforgiving of sloppy maintenance practices and violations of its flight envelope (When the angle of bank hits 90 degrees, the lift kind of slides off of the rotor disc). I was a plank owner in HMH-466, and that squadron literally saved the CH-53E program. We had SNCOs who actually made sure that the work was done all the way instead of "close enough for gubmint work." We had pilots who flew the bird TO and not BEYOND its flight envelope.
Bottom line: the CO of VMMT-204 who ordered the paperwork fudged ought to be making big rocks into very small rocks for the next 20 years. We ought to NOT let KC-130 pilots transition into rotary-wing aircraft. We ought to expect that if the FCS computer doesn't reset, the pilots ought to LAND THE BLOODY THING as the NATOPS manual says.
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