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I think the post-conflict debate about the war is important. I also believe it is an unavoidable aspect of the human conscience - to judge our actions (for most of us anyway). If we were "fooled into war by our own government," we as Americans will not be satisfied to leave it at that.

As I understood the debate leading up to the war, much of the disagreement did focus on the issues being raised now.

1. Did Saddam's regime pose a threat, direct or indirect, to the US and/or her allies? What was the scope of the threat?

2. If yes, was that threat immediate (interchangeable with imminent for our purpose?) so as to justify a pre-emptive attack by the US, either unilaterally or with limited international support (because realpolitik would have authorized any action not opposed by UN veto holders)?

I think Wolfowitz accurately described the multiple concerns in the administration leading to war with Iraq. He stated those concerns in his Vanity Fair interview as, "One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two."

I think even the critics of this administration recognize there was public debate about these multiple concerns (which included administration members/advisors) when they note the numerous, conflicting, failed reasons for attacking Iraq. Bookman listed them in his infamous September 2002 "empire" column, "It is not about weapons of mass destruction, or terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions." I even remember reading commentary about how Bush needed a "bumper sticker" reason for the war and comparisons to similar arguments made by the Clinton administration.

Mixed in with this debate was the policy position expressed previously in the PNAC paper by many in, and advising, this administration. This was further buttressed by the similarities in the policy expressed in the NSS. This is where much of the material in the debate on pre-emptive, unilateral action by the US came from - and how it contrasted with other interpretations of international law.

But I don't think the administration ever put forward the immediate threat of Iraqi WMD to the US as a cause for war. The direct threat, yes. Which brought up comparisons with North Korea and the USSR. Those countries posed a direct threat (perhaps an even more imminent threat others argued) but we chose to contained them, or were demanding multilateral diplomatic solutions.

I offer the poll below as further argument that the administration did not try to convince the public that Iraqi WMD posed an immediate threat to the US. I could be wrong, and the administration did try and failed. But I don't think so, because I can't find where they made the "immediate" WMD threat argument.

*CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll*. Latest: March 14-15, 2003. N=1,007 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3 (total sample).
"Which comes closest to your view: Iraq poses an immediate threat to the United States, Iraq poses a long-term threat to the U.S., but not an immediate threat, or Iraq does not pose a threat to the United States at all?" Options were rotated. Form A (N=488, MoE ± 5)
		Immed- iate Threat	Long- term Threat	Not a Threat At All	No Opinion
		%	%	%	%
	3/14-15/03	36	54	10	-
	2/7-9/03	36	56	6	2
	1/31 - 2/2/03	29	61	7	3
						.

There was talk of the scope and mechanics of the threat, including drones and the danger of what we don't know, "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."

I think all this is important, because I don't think the issue of pre-emption, with it's precedence in history and attempts to restrain it in international law, became a part of the American collective consciousness. I think if we are really on the road to US dominated global empire, it is pre-emption that must be accepted. Unilateralism must merely be understood.

Personally, I think the US did face a threat from the Middle East of escalating, state sponsored, organized international terrorism. I think proliferation and terrorist's willingness to use deadlier weapons was part of that threat. I think ending our unresolved conflict with Iraq became necessary after 9/11. I think Saddam's actions leading up to the conflict justified our attack and, in a very Machiavellian way, strengthened our position (post-conflict) against other powers aspiring for multilateral or multipolar order in the world; and therefore more concerned with demonstrations of unquestionable US strength.

I'm also convinced Saddam had WMD in 1991, when we were exposed to chemical weapons at Khamisiyah and elsewhere during cleanup ops.

I think he still had them in 1995, when Kamel defected providing proof of Iraq's deception and continued efforts in it's WMD programs? Kamel said Iraq did not possess WMD in 1995. He also said it really was a baby milk factory we bombed in 1991 (and again in 1998) and there was no military significance to the air defense shelter we bombed (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9509/iraq_defector/, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/apparatus/crafting.html).

But then the documents on his chicken farm and the discovery by Dr.Diane Seaman on 25 September 1997 throws into question what Kamel said.

You could also compare the remarks by Khidhir Hamza (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html) and Kamel's comments on Hamza in UN transcript.

I think he had them in 1998, 2001 and 2002, when the world's intelligence agencies (including the CIA, Canadians and BND) and UNMOVIC were claiming Iraq was pursuing WMD? Personally, if he couldn't figure out after 12 years how to cooperate, meeting his cease fire obligations - using him as a pawn to achieve our regional objectives in the war on terrorism - doesn't tug at my conscience much or make me think the Bush administration needs to admit or apologize for anything.

Know what I mean, Verne?