Posted on 04/17/2003 12:33:07 PM PDT by a_Turk
Ethnic rivalries, persistent militias and hidden weapons in Iraq (news - web sites) will greatly increase the burden on our postwar occupation. In fact, the Iraqi conflict has exposed a looming manpower problem: A full-blown peacekeeping operation would require as many as 500,000 troops. To avoid stretching our forces too thin, President Bush (news - web sites) will be forced to sacrifice at least one of three cherished policy goals:
* Establishing a secure environment in which to build a democratic Iraq.
* Continuing the war on terrorism against the remnants of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (news - web sites), Pakistan, the Philippines and, if necessary, against states such as Syria, Iran and North Korea (news - web sites).
* Avoiding unpopular measures such as reinstituting the military draft or calling up large numbers of military reserves to extended active duty.
Unfortunately, the numbers for all three don't add up. History shows that two factors determine the force level necessary for policing operations: the size of the population and the underlying level of violence. As documented by Rand Corp. analyst James Quinlivan, societies with relatively low levels of civil violence, such as the United States, require only two to three police officers per thousand residents. By contrast, during instability in places such as Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Bosnia and Kosovo, intervention forces have required approximately 20 troops per thousand residents to maintain order.
Postwar Iraq will likely fall in the latter category. Even before this war, Iraq was seething with ethnic discontent, partly due to Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s vicious suppression of Kurdish and Shiite revolts in 1991. Now, Iraqi Kurds are taking back their former homes in the north, sending Arabs fleeing for their lives. In the south, Iraq's Shiite majority likewise seeks revenge against anyone associated with the Sunni-dominated regime of Saddam.
Further complicating matters, Turkish troops might cross into northern Iraq to defend ethnic brethren and oil claims if Iraq's Kurds attempt to consolidate control over Kirkuk and Mosul. In addition, the demise of Saddam's security apparatus has sparked widespread banditry and looting, leading some areas to embrace radical religious leaders hostile to the U.S. occupation. Finally, the unexpectedly strong resistance of Saddam's militias during the war, the discovery of arms caches throughout the country and the influx of self-declared Arab holy warriors suggest that armed insurgency and suicide attacks could persist.
To quash all of this simmering civil violence, centralized policing of postwar Iraq would require an average troop level of about 20 per thousand residents. Given Iraq's population of about 24 million, that could mean 480,000 peacekeepers.
Two factors potentially could lessen the demand for U.S. troops. First, past cases indicate that if violence were lighter or regionally circumscribed, policing requirements might drop as low as 10 troops per thousand, or a total of 240,000. Second, our allies might contribute troops; the United States is making ''a very active effort'' in this regard, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Tuesday. However, given the original opposition of France, Germany and Russia to the U.S.-led invasion -- and the limited ability of these states to project force in any case -- these allies are unlikely to provide a large share of the troops. At least 200,000 peacekeepers probably would have to be Americans.
U.S. manpower requirements would climb even higher because of the demands of troop rotation. For every U.S. peacekeeper on duty in Iraq, another would be at home training to take his place, and yet another who had recently served would be recovering. Depending on the length of these training, deployment and recovery cycles, troop requirements could be multiplied by two to three times.
Given that the U.S. Army and Marines have combined active-duty forces of only about 700,000 men and women, this would leave very few for other missions -- either long-term commitments in Asia or the war on terror.
Thus, Bush will have to compromise at least one of his aspirations:
* He could sacrifice democracy in Iraq. This would ease U.S. troop requirements by delegating policing to regional warlords. Kurdish rebel groups could rule the north, the Shiites would try to rule the south, and some remnant of Saddam's Sunni regime would retain central Iraq.
The limits of this kind of ''peace-on-the-cheap'' solution have been revealed in Afghanistan, where a slim force of about 15,000 U.S. and international troops has delegated authority to local warlords, who continue to battle each other and to harbor remnants of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters that target U.S. forces.
Similar shortcuts in Iraq might be adequate to buy temporary order, but would have no hope of delivering Bush's promised democracy.
* Bush could sacrifice the war on terror, conceding that peacekeeping demands in Iraq do not leave sufficient forces to fight the remainder of al-Qaeda and the ''axis of evil.'' This seems the least likely sacrifice.
* To provide sufficient forces for both Iraq and the larger war on terror, he could either reinstitute the military draft or activate large numbers of military reserves for extended tours of active duty. Both options would be opposed by White House pollsters, but the president may well accept such political risk in the name of national security.
Obviously, the United States must concentrate first on finishing this war. But it is not too early for Congress and the American people to ask Bush how he plans to address the looming postwar crisis.
It's human nature not to want to be wrong, but the opponents of this war add to that a passionate dislike if not hatred of President Bush. The isolationist naysayers hoped Iraq would prove we must disengage from the Middle East. The liberal naysayers were convinced and indeed hopeful this would be a repeat of Vietnam, which formed their world view. That both have drawn the wrong lessons from Vietnam for 25 years would shatter their identity, therefore they must find some way to find fault with the military or the outcome. They are enraged and are determined to try to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
As far as taking any media reports as gospel, no one should do that. Well-informed people should read as many accounts as possible, weigh the reliability of each source and then form an opinion. I have a fairly hard core set of beliefs but I can be reasoned with and reasonable.
I know I'm as guilty as anyone of putting my 2 cents in using my preconceived biases before I am completely informed but that is why FR works so well. We get to vent.
True. I've been under no illusions about Saddam's regime, I know Baathism was modeled on a combination of Nazism and Stalinism. But the facts that are beginning to come out are even worse than I imagined. Prisons for kids? The Udai shredder story confirmed. Summary executions by conscription gangs. No wonder this regime fell with a thud.
Baathism was modeled on a combination of Nazism and Stalinism. But the facts that are beginning to come out are even worse than I imagined. Prisons for kids? The Udai shredder story confirmed. Summary executions by conscription gangs. No wonder this regime fell with a thud.
From General Shinsekis mouth to Kupermans pen.
There are currently 118,000 US troops in the Iraqi theatre.
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