War Diary: Wednesday, April 2, 2003

It is premature to declare the night of April 1-2 as decisive in the war, but it certainly holds open a great deal of promise in that direction. The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division penetrated the formations of the Iraqi Al Medina division, which had been bombed for several days before the attack, and encircled the town of Karbala. At the same time, U.S. Marines moved close to the town of Al Kut, according to some reports, entering it, in an area where two Republican Guard divisions were reported to be deployed.

There are two questions now. The first and most important, is how the Iraqis will react to this. There are three possible paths:

1. The Iraqis forces north of Karbala and around Al Kut could retreat to a line closer to Baghdad -- or in Baghdad -- in order to use the urban environment for defense.
2. The Iraqis could try to engage in high intensity combat, trying to inflict casualties and take advantage of the coalition's extended supply lines.
3. The Iraqis could simply stay where they are and slowly disintegrate under intense bombardment.

From a military standpoint, the logical choices for the Iraqis would be one and two, in that order. However, given the current air campaign and the almost certain loss of persistent contact with Baghdad, the more likely outcome is intermittent movement with paralysis. It is not clear why five key Iraqi divisions moved as far south as they did. The Iraqis may have mistaken their early ability to resist in some areas as a sign of U.S. weakness, and they began to develop a more ambitious plan than they originally had. However, it leaves the Iraqis extremely exposed and vulnerable.

The second question is: What will the United States do? Here too, there is a dilemma. Sound military doctrine holds that armies do not take territory; they destroy the enemy's ability to resist. That would argue that the 3rd Infantry Division should now engage the Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezer divisions. But in this case, the rules might be a different.

In order to destroy the Republican Guard around Karbala and Al Kut, keeping them outside of Baghdad obviously eases the problem. Baghdad is a force multiplier that will make their defeat that much more complicated. Moving U.S. forces between the Republican Guards and Baghdad achieves two things: first, it prevents them from moving into Baghdad; second, it cuts lines of supply flowing from Baghdad, degrading their combat capability over time. Isolated from Baghdad, these units could be attacked from the air over time and destroyed. Moreover, it would make it much easier for U.S. forces to enter Baghdad.

There is, of course, a risk here, which is that the 3rd Infantry Division could cut itself off if it left too many Republican Guard units in its wake. Alternatively, if elements were left behind to engage and contain the Republican Guards, the force arriving in Baghdad might turn out to be too weak to be effective. The key is whether the Iraqis are now both crippled and cut off from command, so that they can no longer carry out coordinated operations.

It is not clear just how far CENTCOM will push the 3rd Infantry Division toward Baghdad. It also is unclear what the Marines will do after they take Al Kut. Simply looking at a map, we get the feeling that the United States could use a couple of additional divisions on the ground to complete this operation. At the same time, looking at a map doesn't tell you very much about the condition of the Iraqi divisions. The air campaign may well have shattered their ability to maneuver to the point that they are no real threat to anyone.

What is clear is that a basic proof of concept has occurred. The 1991 doctrine of heavy air attacks against Iraqi units followed by slashing mechanized attacks still works. It is a formula that can be replicated. Therefore, regardless of time frame, the probability of a U.S. victory increased dramatically tonight. It should be remembered, however, that two issues remain unsettled. First, precisely how will Baghdad be engaged and how will it fall? Second, what will happen in the north? Still, with the bulk of the Republican Guard seemingly trapped south of Baghdad, it would seem that the job just got a lot easier.

It is not clear why five key Iraqi divisions moved as far south as they did. The Iraqis may have mistaken their early ability to resist in some areas as a sign of U.S. weakness, and they began to develop a more ambitious plan than they originally had. However, it leaves the Iraqis extremely exposed and vulnerable

It's clear to me why they moved so far South-because they were getting their tactical information from CNN.

What is not clear yet is whether we used the entirely predictable whining and undermining from Fedayeen Clinton in Doha and Atlanta as part of the plan.

If so, my God that was brilliant.

Hey Axion, could you at least watch/read the morning news before posting this drivel? Not only is the analysis vacuous and nonspecific, it's dated. Let's examine and destroy the Stratfor analysis "in detal", as General Franks would put it.

STRATFOR "There are two questions now. The first and most important, is how the Iraqis will react to this. There are three possible paths:"

A classic Jeane Dixon tactic, one of N number of things can happen. I could fry my eggs, scamble my eggs, or not eat any eggs. Stratfor's technique is the same used by those who claim to speak to the dead. If you say enough, one predition is bound to come true.

STRATFOR "It is not clear why five key Iraqi divisions moved as far south as they did."

To form an integrated line of defense that the US is now destroying in detail. They deployed to the point that they could retreat to Baghdad without having to cross either major river, knowing that the US would destroy any major bridges behind them if they went farther. They've never deployed in force across key bridges. They wanted to be able to fall back.

STRATFOR "The second question is: What will the United States do? Here too, there is a dilemma. Sound military doctrine holds that armies do not take territory; they destroy the enemy's ability to resist. That would argue that the 3rd Infantry Division should now engage the Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezer divisions. But in this case, the rules might be a different."

First, all of these words say nothing, except for mistating sound military doctrine. Armies are designed to destroy enemy forces and hold territory. If we just wanted to destroy their ability to resist, we could have an a war that lasted until every last vehicle and weapon system was destroyed. We are taking territory and the only way to do that is buy it or invade it.

STRATFOR "Simply looking at a map, we get the feeling that the United States could use a couple of additional divisions on the ground to complete this operation."

Simply looking at the map is all the forehead-slappers at Stratfor can do. They have no visibility into the theater, they have no concept of combined arms, 3-dimensional warfare to guide them, and they just keep pushing out this Pyschic Friends Network quality "analysis". We need more divisions? To do what? The prize is regime change, which lies in Baghdad. The Iraqi military has been hit with more than 5000 precision munitions from the air alone, not counting Apache attacks, A-10 minigun attacks, tank-on-tank and artillery actions. They had fewer than 5000 armored vehicles/tanks to start. It's likely that more than half of this weapons cadre is already destroyed.

Moveover, the divisions cannot retreat into Baghdad. Rest assured there is a wall of metal behind these idiots. Anything moving north is destroyed from the air. Vehicles, tanks and other weapons systems are by now seen as ticking bombs to the RG soldier. Remember in Afghanistan that the most disquieting element of the conflict to the Taliban fighters was the continued threat of a vehicle exploding unexectedly. Eventually the combatants in Afghanistan were afraid to approach, ride in, stand near or in any way associate with a vehicle. That's what's happening right now to the RG. Unnerved, they will abandon their remaining weapons and run for their lives.

STRATFOR "Therefore, regardless of time frame, the probability of a U.S. victory increased dramatically tonight."

What? Did it increase from 100% to 110%? What dope would print such a thing? Nothing says more about the stupidity of STRATFOR than this statement. Not even Saddam ever thought his chances of military victory was anything greater than ZERO. What a bunch of morons!

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