Posted on 03/22/2003 8:44:36 PM PST by Axion
War Diary: Sunday, March 23, 2003 The night of March 22-23 saw the continuation of processes that were put in motion at the beginning of the war. Forces that had moved north continued to mop up in the vicinity of Basra, without directly occupying the city. While the systematic consolidation of the coalition position around Basra continued, U.S. Marine units pushed north of the Tigris River across a bridge seized during the day. Whether this will develop into another thrust toward Baghdad is not clear at this point. The Marines are much lighter on armor than the Army forces operating around the Euphrates, making a thrust toward Baghdad somewhat more risky. Moreover, there is a question of whether CENCOM's logistics would support enough forces along the Tigris route to make the diversion of resources from the Euphrates force worthwhile.
Mar 23, 2003
The Euphrates force -- consisting of the 3rd Infantry Division followed by the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division -- continued its aggressive advance along the Euphrates. After halting at An Nasiriyah, the United States apparently deployed forces on the eastern bank of the Euphrates and continued movements along the western bank as night fell. By dawn, the column moving along the western bank had reached the town of Qaryat al Gharab. This town is 45 miles southeast of an Najaf, just more than 30 miles northwest of As Samawa. Some advanced reconnaissance units appear to have approached an Najaf.
The advance along the Euphrates has been an impressive feat of mobility and logistics. However, the area was lightly covered by a regular Iraqi army division that was not expected to pose a serious challenge. The U.S. Army, on encountering this force, systematically dealt with it while seizing the bridge at an Nasiriyah. The United States appears to have captured all three of the bridges in the as Samawa-an Nasiriyah area. The Iraqis should have destroyed these bridges. They didn't. Even if they were ceding this region to U.S. forces, leaving those bridges intact generated more immediate problems for Iraq than should have been necessary.
The United States appears to have developed a pattern of operations in which their forces move and fight by night and halt during the day. This makes sense, given the U.S. preference for night fighting, and given weather conditions and the need to keep troops in chemical defense suits -- extremely uncomfortable under the best of circumstances. Resting and resupplying during the day is logical, particularly against an enemy force that is committed to the defensive and unlikely to launch counterattacks.
If the United States runs true to course, then operations on Sunday night raise the highest likelihood of the first encounter between Iraqi Republican Guard divisions and coalition troops. The most likely encounter would take place with the force that is now east of the Euphrates. We do not know its size or composition, and its movements likely will be slower than those of the force on the western bank, because of terrain and population density; but if this U.S. force moves forward aggressively, it is likely to encounter the first line of resistance tomorrow night. Alternately, given the relative speeds of the two thrusts -- plus the possibility that a Marine drive is developing along the Tigris, the entire process might slow in order to synchronize what are now at least two or possibly three axes of attack.
The critical question is not only where the Republican Guards are, but also whether they will fight. If we begin seeing large-scale capitulations of Republican Guard forces in the next 24-48 hours, then the chances of a short war are enormously enhanced. On the other hand, if the United States begins seeing stiff resistance from Iraqi forces, a very different war is going to emerge. We continue to regard the first encounter between large U.S. and Republican Guard formations as the critical moment of this war.
The attack by a U.S. soldier on the command tent of a brigade of the 101st Division raises questions about the ability of this brigade to undertake operations if its staff has indeed been lost. The loss of a brigade commander's staff is not a trivial problem. There is also the question of what will be done with both the 101st and those elements of the 82nd Airborne that clearly are being held in theater reserve. At some point those forces will be thrown into the battle. How and when are not at all clear.
The answer might come as the U.S. Army approaches the Iraqi line of resistance. Airmobile operations might take place in conjunction with massive air strikes in the true "shock and awe" phase of the war. However, it must be remembered that an entire theater of operations in northern Iraq has not yet been addressed. It is possible that it will not be addressed until after Baghdad falls -- if it does. Alternatively, a northern front might open up only if there is stiff resistance around Baghdad and southern operations might halt while the insertion of airborne forces to the north opens a second front.
In other words, the U.S. may not have the answer to the northern front problem until it has the answer to the fundamental question of the war: will the Republican Guards capitulate or will they fight. The last three nights have been preface to answering this question. The way it is answered will shape the rest of the war.
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