I'm a bit over my head int the computer science end of this discussion, but I think Chomsky proved that any language comprised of tokens and syntax is equivalent to any other such language.
But applying this to human language requires omitting much of what language is about.
What Skinner tried to do (and apparently failed) is describe how meaning is tokenized. Rather than start with syntax, he tried to describe the function of language, or why it is we talk.
The minimal condition the language condition must meet is what we can call the ‘interface condition’. The information it presents must be accessible to the external system. The question is: Is that also a maximal condition? That is, is the language faculty optimally constructed to satisfy that minimal condition? When you pursue this question, you’re pursuing the minimalist programme.A few years ago it seemed hopelessly crazy, but now there’s already been enough work to indicate to a rather surprising extent that it may be correct that the language faculty is an optimal solution to the minimal conditions. It’s as if an engineer inserted a language faculty into a brain that didn’t have one and did it in an optimal way so that it would be accessible to the other systems.
And here:
Chomsky and Fodor's overt appeals to unlearnability should set off alarm bells for anyone who believes that human cognitive capabilities arose through evolution. If knowledge of sentence structure cannot develop in human beings, how could supposedly innate knowledge of Universal Grammar have come about through evolution? Chomsky openly doubts that it could have:"It is sometimes argued that though knowledge might in principle be innate, it must nonetheless be grounded in experience through evolutionary history… there is no reason to require...that evolutionary adaptation play some special role. There is no reason to demand and little reason to suppose that genetically-determined properties result from specific selection—consider the case of the capacity to deal with properties of the number system...If there is, as I believe, good reason to construct [a theory of knowledge and belief] in terms of mentally represented cognitive structures...then it becomes a question of fact, not doctrine, to determine the character and origin of these structures. It is an open question what if any role experience or phylogenetic development may play." (Chomsky, 1980, pp. 99-100)