Djindjic's killing creates power vacuum in Serbia

The assassination of Serbia's powerful Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic outside the main government building in Belgrade on Wednesday afternoon is an event of tectonic magnitude even in a country that has seen more than a fair share of crises, wars and violence over the past decade and a half. The sudden death of the politician who was indisputably the most powerful man in Serbia creates a power vacuum that is not likely to be resolved swiftly or smoothly.

Djindjic was known to his rivals as the "little Sloba"—an allusion to his political style, similar to that of the former, now disgraced Serbian leader. He recognized power as the only currency of politics. Nominally a "pro-Western reformist" and a "democrat," in pursuit of power he was prepared to disregard constitutional and legal niceties:

—He undermined the National Assembly by arranging the exclusion of deputies from the largest political party—the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led by Vojislav Kostunica—on a spurious pretext a year ago.

—He undermined the authority of the judiciary by refusing to obey the ruling by Serbia's constitutional court that ordered the return of those deputies to the chamber.

—He demoralized the Army by depriving it of funds—including those needed to buy basic foodstuffs for the recruits—and by delivering some of its most prominent officers to The Hague Tribunal on spurious charges, and by attacking its pivotal role in uncovering foreign spies in the highest echelons of his own government.

—He undermined the credibility of Serbia's new, democratic government and its self-proclaimed determination to deal with lawlessness by associating with known organized crime figures such as the notorious "Cane," the king of cigarette smuggling.

—He discredited the process of privatization of Serbia's moribund economy by arranging bogus tenders and selling off a host of profitable public companies to a select circle of cronies on whose loyalty he could depend as the result.

—He abrogated the rule of law by delivering indictees to The Hague without any due process, on at least one occasion literally by having the victim kidnapped from the street.

Djindjic's political credo was aptly summarized in his message to a long-time colleague and later foe, Dragoljub Micunovic, whom he replaced as the leader of the Democratic Party eight years ago: "If you want immortality' go to church, not into politics." His flamboyant style and his lack of scruples gave him the edge over his long-time rival and former federal president Vojislav Kostunica, whose meticulous legalism proved to be—for the time being anyway—his political undoing. Last month's transformation ofYugoslaviainto a loose union of its last two remaining republics,Serbia and Montenegro, was widely seen as Dindjic's victory because it led to Kostunica's removal from office.

Only months earlier, Serbia's failed presidential election was a boon to Djindjic: its clear winner was Kostunica, but fewer than 50 percent of voters went to the polls and the result was accordingly voided. Djindjic deliberately engineered the outcome by refusing to remove the 50 percent rule, inherited from Milosevic's times, from the statute book. The resulting constitutional imbroglio enabled Djindjic to install one of his nondescript allies, National Assembly speaker Natasa Micic, as the republic's acting president. The majority of deputies in the Assembly continued to be controlled by Djindjic and his allies from about a dozen microscopic parties belonging to the DOS coalition, whose continued political survival was contingent on Djindjic's ability to keep the old show on the road. The constitutional entanglement enabled Djindjic to continue running the government by default and to keep postponing the country's long-overdue general election.

By creating an inherently unstable situation in which he could run Serbia free from institutional checks and balances, Djindjic made the task of rebuilding stability in the aftermath of his sudden disappearance from the scene that much more difficult. The military, to take one example, is widely expected to play an important role following the proclamation of the state of emergency—especially since the record of the police in dealing with political murders is poor—but its top brass are demoralized and demotivated. Furthermore, it is commanded by the supreme defense council of Serbia and Montenegro, a body currently controlled by the Montenegrin separatists from Milo Djukanovic's Party of Democratic Socialists, which creates a potentially fatal disconnect between the Army's putative stabilizing role and its political masters who may have a very different agenda of their own.

The immediate question, who pulled the trigger and why, is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Belgrade has seen a host of political murders in recent years, including Milosevic's predecessor in the post of Serbian president, Ivan Stambolic, his federal defense minister Pavle Bulatovic, and his top policeman "Badza" Stojicic. In the distant past, Serbia's leaders who died a violent death included the legendary leader of its uprising against the Turks, "Black George" Petrovic (1817), Prince Michael Obrenovic (1867), King Alexander Obrenovic (1903), King Alexander Karadjordjevic (1934), and the aforementioned Mr. Stambolic. Some were luckier, but not much: Prince Milos Obrenovic was exiled in 1842, Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic was deposed and exiled in 1858, King Milan Obrenovic was deposed and exiled in 1889, and the last King, Peter II, died in exile during Tito's rule. Two of Serbia's recent presidents, Slobodan Milosevic and Milan Milutinovic, are incarcerated at The Hague. Whoever succeeds Djindjic is well advised to keep his or her life insurance policy well endowed and up to date.

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