[annalex]

I don't think it would be possible for an outsider to tell who is a "NASA engineer" and who is a "NASA bean counter", as in most high tech outfits engineers move up to management and learn to think about the bottom line. But it is possible to detect the overall culture, common to technically-, economically- or manegerially-minded people. I would read the Major General's statement as saying that NASA as a whole ignored the safety risks inherent in the dislodged foam.

the political will of the public that the current rate of accidents is within acceptable limits

This is the first accident the public knows about since the Challenger, right? The rate of accidents is simply not something the public can form an attitude about.

[SteveH]

The culture is set from the top, not the bottom. Anyway, safety is not really a "culture" thing to begin with.

Quick, is ensuring safety a management issue, or an engineering issue?

I mean: safety *engineering* is relatively cut and dried. With the result now in, the conclusion is obvious: not enough safety engineering was applied-- a prioritization problem. Management sets the priorities. It appears that the priority that they set is about the same as in 1986: an engineer who worries unduly about safety risks his career.

The Major General's remark is the problem. Engineers are assigned to specific tasks, such as safety or maintenance. There should always be a safety engineer or a safety engineering department involved in all aspects of the shuttle operations (including maintenance). The Major General's remark strongly implies that this was not the case. The "spin" of the remark is away from management and towards someone in the trenches. Whatever-- the guys in the trenches don't have the authority to make cross-disciplinary calls.

This direction is towards another whitewash.