In the 19th century context, Southern economic policies based on export of raw materials to British manufacturers were regarded by many as consigning America to a weak and subservient position with respect to the British empire.
Such an economic view is antiquated and without merit, both today and in 1860. It is a mathematical fact, both then and now, that free trade production increases the wealth of a nation more than would be under the same situation with protective tariffs in place. One could theoretically argue that some then truly believed, just as some now truly believe, that protecting industry would "save" it from external competition. But on the whole, these "true believers" hold to that view for little reason other than that they have been duped into thinking it is so. The powers behind real advocates of protectionism - i.e. labor unions and industries such as steel - back it because they know it satisfies their economic well being to do so, albeit at the expense of the rest of us. The same can be reasonably said of the manufacturers of 1860. The debates over the Morrill bill thoroughly demonstrate this to be so. The southerners presented the statistical evidence and made the case against tariffs, while the northerners played semantics games, first to hide the fact that their protectionist tariff was for protection and not revenue, and then to hide the fact that protection hurt the economic well being of the nation as a whole.
Looking at what happened to the Caribbean islands after the sugar boom went bust gives a clue as to how such policies would have served America.
Nonsense. America was economically diverse and well endowed with regional advantages and comparative advantages over a great many ranges of production. By contrast, the caribbean islands were economically isolated, small, limited in resources, and historically dispositioned toward the positions you assert to have been fears of Americans. Accordingly, a comparison is not valid nor were the fears well founded.
Things looked differently in the Deep South, but historically dependence on cotton proved to be very harmful for the South, once other countries got involved in cotton growing.
Again that is simply not so. Southern cotton production in 1860 was one of its highest levels ever, and southern agriculture at the time created some 75% of the entire nation's exports. Cotton was thriving because southern geography and climate made it a comparatively advantageous market for production. As any capitalist would and should do, they produced the goods that they had an advantage at producing.
Many a free-marketeer today would have supported Lincoln in furthering commerce and industry
Not a true one. Lincoln's policies were oriented around economic intervention by the government. Further, his very concept of trying to "remold" the economy with government is command-oriented by nature, thus making it the exact opposite of non-interventionist capitalism.
A lot of exaggerated rhetoric surrounds the Morrill tariff. Everyone knew tariffs would be revised upwards.
Yes, but a raise from 18% to 20% is significantly different from a raise from 18% to 45%. By justifying the Morrill Act on the expenditure-induced desires for increased tax revenue, you commit an historical fraud not unlike that of the Pennsylvania protectionists who tried to hide the fact that they were radically realigning America's tariff policy by way of the Morrill bill.
Even Buchanan supported tariff revision.
Buchanan was a northerner from Pennsylvania - the state that pushed hardest for the Morrill bill. His support was of little surprise.
That tariffs were increased so much later on was largely the result of the war.
Again, that is simply not so. The Morrill act itself provided a radical realignment of union tariff policy from revenue to protection. They simply tinkered with it after that fact had been achieved. The Morrill act immediately doubled the average tariff rate and set raises into action that brought that rate over 40% in the next couple of years. Adjustments after it were comparatively minor, taking it from the mid 40's to the high 40's.
I would sympathize with Southern opposition to the tariff increase, but it wasn't at the top of their agenda. Had blocking it been so very important as you say, it would not have gone through.
To the contrary. The only body it did not yet have support from after Lincoln's election was the Senate. As is indicated by the secession era speeches from the southern delegation in the Senate, they knew perfectly clearly that they did not have enough votes to stop it. As I quoted above, Sen. Wigfall outlined the northern vote abilities on December 12th before any state had seceded and demonstrated with them the ultimate inability of the southerners to stop the new administration's policies. By next February when secession was occurring in many states, Lincoln was publicly pledging to make the bill a top priority and to force it through Congress. At the same time, southerners were opposing it in the Senate by making a strong and detailed case against protectionism. Sen. Hunter, while making this case, openly admitted that he could not stop the bill from passing yet felt obligated to make the case against it because doing so was the right thing for his constituents and for the country.
In the Upper South, tariffs were probably less important than the emotional pull of "Southerness" in sparking secession, and arguably less important than slavery.
The Senate leader of the opposition to the Morrill bill was Robert Hunter of Virginia, an "upper south" state. His colleague Sen. Mason and the senators from North Carolina were the main opponents of the bill in debate. Hunter outlined the issue with great precision when he said the bill would stand out as an example of what the North would do to the South when it completely controlled the government. If the acts of these senators are representative of their state's views on the tariff issue, they seem to indicate that the opposition to Morrill from the "upper south" was among the strongest.
Saying that Lincoln threatened to use force to enforce the Morrill tariff gives the wrong impression.
Not at all. A dominant theme of The Lincoln's speeches, personal correspondence, and legal justifications for his actions throughout the entire secession-to-fort-sumter period is the need to collect duties from the south.
I don't think what's at issue is how much was paid in, but rather the fact that, not having developed industries, the slave states didn't get as much back from protection as the free states did.
You touch upon the issue at hand, though with great imprecision. Protective tariffs, as a matter mathematical fact, cannot "give back" at a level equal to what they take away, much less one that surpasses it. They "take out" a portion of the nation's economy known as the consumer surplus and redistribute it elsewhere. Some of that consumer surplus goes back to the manufacturers by being transfered into the producer surplus. In that area, yes - the north got more back than the south. The remainder goes partially into the government as revenue, and is partially incurred as a dead weight loss on the economy as a whole. Under the economy of 1860, this essentially meant that the losses were harder felt on the south because it did not gain back from the tariff's redistributive properties to the producer surplus. That all went to the northern manufacturers in the protected industry. Exacerbating the problem in another way was the situation tariffs created internationally. As you no doubt know, trade operates in a circle (imports come in from Europe, exports go out to Europe, more imports come in from Europe etc.). When a barrier is placed in that circle, trade itself generally comes to a stop. This happened with Europe after the Morrill act - their trade with the US virtually ground to a stop because the tarrifs created a barrier to it. When trade ceases to occur, the persons hurt most are those who are economically involved in trading. As you know, the southern economy of 1860 was almost entirely export oriented and accounted for some 75% of the nation's exports. If trade dies off because of a barrier, so do economies that depend heavily upon trade occuring, and that meant the southern economy.