[ggekko]

"Therefore, it's not wrong to argue that slavery was far more important as a cause of the war than the tariff...."

You are making a very fine distinction that needs to be clarified. To say that the slavery issue was the proximate cause of the Civil War is, I think, inarguable. To have conceded that point is not the same, however, as saying that Lincoln led the Union into war in order in order to end slavery in the United Sates. It is manifestly obvious that this was not Lincoln's pimrary war aim.

It is my contention that slave-based, Agrarian export-led economies of most of the Confederate states come into intractable conflict with the Empire-minded mercantilist economic system (Clays's "American system") favored by Northern politicians including Lincoln. I don't think unfair to say that Lincoln became, after Clay, the primary exponent of American mercantilism. I would further contend that Lincoln only addressed slavery prior to the Civil War as an issue insofar as it effected the implementation of the American system (high tariffs to protect American manufacturers, government-funded infrastructure development, a National bank).

Across a broad range of issues these two economic systems came into conflict: tariffs on manufactured goods (the Confederates states bought finished good primarily from Europe), non-uniform taxation (many Confderate states paid a disproportionate amount of tariff income into the Treasury which funded infrastructure project sited almost exclusively in the North), the non-enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act by several Northern states, the establishment of a National Bank (Southern politicians almost universally opposed this measure), and the use of the Dred Scott decision to allow the partial counting of slaves for purposes of Congressional Representation. The extension of slavery into new states was merely a proxy for this broader conflict between incompatible systems.

I don't think that mainstream Lincoln historians have paid sufficient attention to the importance of the macroeconomic consequences of the enforcement of the Morill tariff would have had on Confderate state economies. In Lincoln's innaugural address he did not threaten to use force over the slavery issue but he did threaten to use it to enforce the Morill tariff. The de facto secession by South Carolina in 1828 when they refused to collect the so-called "Tariff of Abominations" was still fresh in Lincoln's mind.

Lincoln kept the abolitionists as part of his coalition and I am sure that he harbored abolitionist sentiments for the most part and particularly after Gettysburg embraced abolitionism more strongly. I believe, however, that Lincoln did guide his policy before the war with the aim of forcing the Confederate states to accept the "American System".

[Non-Sequitur]

Across a broad range of issues these two economic systems came into conflict: tariffs on manufactured goods (the Confederates states bought finished good primarily from Europe), non-uniform taxation (many Confderate states paid a disproportionate amount of tariff income into the Treasury which funded infrastructure project sited almost exclusively in the North)

But that is utter nonsense. The confederates didn't buy many finished goods to begin with from anyone, much less Europe. The minute amount of imports entering through southern ports is proof of that. And if the confederate states paid a disproportionate amount of the tariff income then it was a disproportionately small amount. About 95% of the tariff was collected in only three Northern ports.

[x]

I never said that "Lincoln led the Union into war in order in order to end slavery in the United States." But it does seem to me undeniable that the militants of the Deep South supported secession and war in order to defend slavery. That slavery benefited from neither secession nor war doesn't disprove that, though it does call into question the wisdom of Southern leadership.

In the 19th century context, Southern economic policies based on export of raw materials to British manufacturers were regarded by many as consigning America to a weak and subservient position with respect to the British empire. Looking at what happened to the Caribbean islands after the sugar boom went bust gives a clue as to how such policies would have served America. Things looked differently in the Deep South, but historically dependence on cotton proved to be very harmful for the South, once other countries got involved in cotton growing. Many a free-marketeer today would have supported Lincoln in furthering commerce and industry and overcoming neo-colonial agrarian, slave-based economics. I'm not saying that a high tariff policy would have been right, but one has to see it in the context of the options available at the times, and not just in a modern-day academic context.

A lot of exaggerated rhetoric surrounds the Morrill tariff. Everyone knew tariffs would be revised upwards. Even Buchanan supported tariff revision. That tariffs were increased so much later on was largely the result of the war. I would sympathize with Southern opposition to the tariff increase, but it wasn't at the top of their agenda. Had blocking it been so very important as you say, it would not have gone through. But Deep South militants split the party over slavery-related questions and spent time agitating for secession rather than organizing to block legislation. In the Upper South, tariffs were probably less important than the emotional pull of "Southerness" in sparking secession, and arguably less important than slavery.

Saying that Lincoln threatened to use force to enforce the Morrill tariff gives the wrong impression. He wanted to keep the federal machinery functioning throughout the country, and the primary ways that the federal governments touched the lives of people were the mails, forts, the courts, and the tariff. His words bear out that his purpose was simply to keep the machinery of government in operation and maintain the impression that the country had not been divided: "In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere."

I do not know what you mean by "the use of the Dred Scott decision to allow the partial counting of slaves for purposes of Congressional Representation," since this partial counting was already in place in the Constitution. The question of who paid how much in tariffs has been much discussed. I don't think what's at issue is how much was paid in, but rather the fact that, not having developed industries, the slave states didn't get as much back from protection as the free states did. Also, you left out efforts by Deep Southerners to acquire more slave territories in the Caribbean and to get the slave trade reopened in the 1850s. Adding them in to your list of reasons for conflict changes the picture somewhat.

It's clear that more was involved than slavery, but if you are looking both for short-term immediate reasons for the conflict and for longer-term explanations of why the nation looked ready to divide into two sections in 1860 slavery goes much further than other reasons. Middle Western agrarians made common cause with Eastern industrialists and merchants because the expansion of slavery outweighed agrarian or tariff questions.