Replies

Of note vis a vis infeed of materials (especially oil). Firstly, Beijing's surge for the Strait of Malacca need not be purely naval. Overland also must be considered. Secondly, Beijing' surge for the Strait of Hormuz could embark from Gwadhar, at the mouth of Hormuz. The PRC - Pakistan axis has a number of strategic advantages for the PRC. And, lest we forget, although Musharraf has somewhat cooperated with efforts against terrorists, he's done nothing whatever to change the nature of relationships with the PRC (and, along these lines, Myanmar).

Of note vis a vis controlling the S. China and E. China seas, attacking US W. Pacific bases and attacking potential US forward deployment areas. The PLA have wisely invested in SRBMs and IRBMs, and, in their deployment in road mobile fashion. We in the West wonder why the PRC have not, up until now, made much investment into ICBMs. Simply put (and mentioned in a CIA report last year) SRBMs would have great utility as theatre mass destruction weapons. The PRC's nuclear doctrine is drastically different from ours and does appear to feature substantial theatre usage.

In other words, the ChiComs have adopted a nuclear use policy that is aimed at warfighting, but completely rules out damage limitation, preventing lateral escalation, and post-attack deterrence.

In this scenario, we would have every reason to destroy China as a geopolitical entity, every ability to do so without significant damage to the US homeland, and absolutely no reason to not do so. Hell, North Korea seems to have a more realistic nuclear warfighting strategy than the PRC does.