Posted on 02/06/2003 9:45:33 AM PST by Zavien Doombringer
NASA investigators want to know if adjustments made to the position of the space shuttle Columbia during its last minutes by the vehicle's onboard control computers could have played a role in its breakup during re-entry Feb. 1. In a revised timeline of events released Feb. 3, Ron Dittemore, NASA's space shuttle program manager, said that at 8:59 a.m. EST, Columbia's five onboard computer systems began to detect a significant increase in drag on the vehicle's left wing and ordered two of the shuttle's four yaw jets to fire for 1.5 seconds to compensate for the change.
Investigators aren't sure yet whether the adjustments ordered by the computer played a role in the shuttle's breakup. "It was well within the flight control system's capability to handle the [maneuver]," said Dittemore. "But what is becoming interesting to us now is the rate of change."
While Dittemore acknowledged that NASA may never be able to determine the exact root cause of the crash, he said investigators are now studying all of the data from the launch process as well as the shuttle's flight control systems.
The focus on Columbia's flight control systems could be significant. On Feb. 3, Computerworld reported that Columbia and other space shuttles have a history of computer glitches that have been linked to control systems, including left-wing steering controls (see story).
Although officials said it's too early in the investigation to pin the blame for the crash on the control computers, William Readdy, deputy administrator of NASA, said officials are actively searching for any of the shuttle's five onboard computer systems. Although it's unlikely they survived the crash, he said, the computers have "memory resident in them" that could shed light on the status of the shuttle after communications were lost with ground control.
Each computer's memory stores "telemetry of thousands of parameters that affect the flight of the shuttle," Readdy said.
Columbia and other space shuttles have experienced a series of control computer failures during the past two decades, including one that had a direct link to the spacecraft's left-wing control systems. During a March 1996 return flight, NASA officials discovered a computer circuit problem that controlled steering hardware on Columbia's left wing. The computer circuit was responsible for controlling the spacecraft's left rudder, flaps and other critical landing functions.
Speaking at a news conference prior to Columbia's landing in March 1996, NASA spokesman Rob Navius downplayed the seriousness of the computer problem.
"There are three additional paths of data that are up and running in perfect shape, and there's multiple redundancy that would permit a safe landing," he said. Although Columbia landed without incident that time, NASA officials said the failure was significant enough that had it happened earlier in the flight, the agency would likely have ordered the shuttle home early.
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, has also criticized NASA in the past for relying on the same commercial contractors to develop, test and validate the space shuttle software (see story).
However, Donna Shirley, the former manager of NASA's Mars Exploration Program and the team that built the Sojourner Microrover, said there is no evidence yet that flaws in NASA's software-validation program had anything to do with the disaster.
The loss of those sensors points to some kind of symptom and if it was a common mode failure then that would be a big indicator of where the damage occurred. I imagine they are looking at wiring runs in the area of that wheel well. If something there took out the signal conditioner(s) or common cable run for the sensor leads to the trailing edge thermocouples and tire pressure sensors, then the same event could have popped open the wheel well cover. A lot of people will think tire explosion, but what caused that?
If it was a popped open wheel well then I wonder if there is telemetry indicating the state of the well door? Remember there are (or were, on early flights) pyrotechnics that would assure a positive opening of the gear bay doors on landing approach. Could one of those have gone off? Those are supposedly safed until the approach phase but who knows? Surely such an event would have been detected by the crew or shown on telemetry. I am reminded of the mystery hatch cover blast on Liberty Bell 7 after Grissom landed the capsule after his suborbital hop. Everyone said the explosives couldn't have gone off spontaneously but Grisson said they did.
Well, live and learn, OLA. Isn't that what life's all about? Meanwhile, don't take any wooden nickels.
I'm sorry if that's what I inadvertently implied,
That was not my intention.
I was just looking for a way to post a link to the article I had posted before this tragedy occurred.
In hindsight, I'm upset more than ever that someone in NASA would have wasted the astronauts' time with such frivolous and disgusting nonsense.
I've been a software developer for over 25 years, and I strongly disagree with you. Software does age. People put changes in it to deal with new situations, to deal with new equiptment, etc. A design that was initially "clean" will, over years and many patches, become more convoluted. Eventually in the life of a piece of software, after patch on top of patch, it becomes unmaintainable and is better off being rewritten.
I'd look first for some fatal mechanical failure as the root cause. It could be from an external event, human error or simply an age or stress related failure.
I agree. That was my first post on this thread, namely that some unanticipated mechanical failure caused the software to make a bad decision that resulted in an overcorrection and a cascade of further problems
One thing I've learned the hard way over the years: a simulator can only simulate the assumptions of its designers. The real world inevitably has surprises
Dittemore spoke of a possible strike of the tether strut port covering or door yesterday. I would think they had telemetry noting its closure ? It is covered with tile also.
I asked yesterday if the ET was recoverable and someone said it burns up on reentry ?
Willie, if you mean the "piss as art" project, then I couldn't agree with you more. For one thing, there's no way that I could imagine (at very least) how such a concept could be restated as any kind of a bona fide scientific experiment. Then -- prompted by you -- I get to wondering how long this particular "experimental design" might have been in the offing. And also why it hadn't been killed long before now, as the total waste of taxpayer expense that (arguably) it clearly is, in fact.
The ancient Chinese Curse has come true for us Americans: We do indeed live in interesting times.
Thanks, Willie. Great to hear from you.
(Potential for collision damage involves issues of size and shape and density and elasticity in addition to total mass and velocity.)
I have heard elsewhere on FR that NASA had previously done tests of foamed insulation hitting the shuttle at high speed and had concluded that it's not necessarily a problem. I haven't seen the data, one way or the other, but as a former engineer, I would urge FReepers to take a wait-and-see attitude.
At an altitude of approximately 30 miles, the orbiter makes a series of maneuvers and S-turns to slow its speed
Those "S-turns" are your "80 degree turns". Unless they meant and 80 degree angle of bank, I don't think it seems all that excessive.
Not when you're going on the order of Mach 18 or so, you get plenty of control force from the control surfaces. The fact that the RCS (thrusters) kicked in is what is unusual.
It usually burns up over the Pacific. There are, however, pictures of the ET after separation.
IIRC, there are three flight control computers. Each one gets a "vote" about what action to take. I assume they would not put a patch on all three at one time.
And before that the "Lead Sled", the F-105, demonstrated the same thing with a single J-75 26,500 lbs of thrust verses 17,000 for a single J-79 (in each case depending on the engine/aircraft varient)
I was thinking along the same lines. Although the first time I got there was thinking about deliberate "bug" in the code. I wonder if they did a new build of the code prior to this mission, or if conditions with the heavier bird, were just enough different to trigger the "bug"?
I am afraid you have posted to the wrong person, as I have never made any mention of a 80 degree S turn. I did not give any degree of turn since I do not have any idea at all what the turning degree is.
You must have seen second briefing, because that issue was covered. A reporter asked about the bank and Mr. D said the 80 degree bank was not excessive and within the upper range of nominal.(or something to that effect)
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