Columbia Was Beyond Any Help, Officials Say

New York Times ^ | 2/03/03 | KENNETH CHANG

[kattracks]

OUSTON, Feb. 3 — Even if flight controllers had known for certain that protective heat tiles on the underside of the space shuttle had sustained severe damage at launching, little or nothing could have been done to address the problem, NASA officials say.

Virtually since the hour Columbia went down, the space agency has been peppered with possible options for repairing the damage or getting the crew down safely. But in each case, officials here and at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida say, the proposed solution would not have worked.

The simplest would have been to abort the mission the moment the damage was discovered. In case of an engine malfunction or other serious problem at launching, a space shuttle can jettison its solid rocket boosters and the external fuel tank, shut down its own engines and glide back down, either returning to the Kennedy Space Center or an emergency landing site in Spain or Morocco.

But no one even knew that a piece of insulation from the external tank had hit the orbiter until a frame-by-frame review of videotape of the launching was undertaken the next day. By then, Columbia was already in orbit, and re-entry would have posed the same danger that it did 16 days later.

Four other possibilities have been discussed at briefings or in interviews since the loss of Columbia, and rejected one by one by NASA officials.

First, repairing the damaged tiles. The crew had no tools for such a repair. At a news conference on Sunday, Ron D. Dittemore, the shuttle program manager, said that early in the shuttle program, NASA considered developing a tile repair kit, but that "we just didn't believe it was feasible at the time." He added that a crew member climbing along the underside of the shuttle could cause even more damage to the tiles.

Another idea, widely circulated on the Internet in the last few days, was that the shuttle could have docked with the International Space Station once the damage was discovered. But without the external fuel tank, dropped as usual after launching, Columbia had no fuel for its main engines and thus no way it could propel itself to the station, which circles the earth on a different orbit at a higher altitude.

"We have nowhere near the fuel needed to get there," said Bruce Buckingham, a spokesman at the Kennedy Space Center.

Another shuttle, Atlantis, was scheduled for launching on March 1 to carry supplies and a new crew to the space station, and it is possible to imagine a Hollywood-type series of events in which NASA rushed Atlantis to the launching pad, sent it up with a minimal crew of two, had it rendezvous with Columbia in space and brought everyone down safely.

But Atlantis is still in its hangar, and to rush it to launching would have required NASA to circumvent most of its safety measures. "It takes about three weeks, at our best effort, to prepare the shuttle for launch once we're at the pad," Mr. Buckingham said, "and we're not even at the pad." Further, Columbia had enough oxygen, supplies and fuel (for its thrusters only) to remain in orbit for only five more days, said Patrick Ryan, a spokesman at the Johnson Space Center here.

Finally, there is the notion that Columbia's re-entry might have been altered in some way to protect its damaged area. But Mr. Dittemore said the shuttle's descent path was already designed to keep temperatures as low as possible. "Because I'm reusing this vehicle over and over again, so I'm trying to send it through an environment that minimizes the wear and tear on the structure and the tile," he said at his news conference on Sunday.

Today he added that he did not know of a way for the shuttle to re-enter so that most of the heat would be absorbed by tiles that were not damaged, on its right wing. "I'm not aware of any other scenarios, any other techniques, that would have allowed me to favor one wing over the other," he said.

Even if that had been possible, it would probably have damaged the shuttle beyond repair and made it impossible to land, requiring the crew to parachute out at high speed and at high altitude. He said there was no way managers could have gotten information about the damaged tiles that would have warranted so drastic a move.

Gene Kranz, the flight director who orchestrated the rescue of astronauts aboard the crippled Apollo 13 in 1970, said that from what he knew about the suspected tile damage, there was probably nothing that could have been done to save the flight. "The options," he said in a telephone interview, "were just nonexistent."

[woofie]

Im sorry you lost me ,the last time I looked you were holding Republicans feet to the fire...

[Chad Fairbanks]

Blarney Stones... ;0)

[Chad Fairbanks]

That looks like it would leave a mark.

I'm guessing a long red one...

[TLBSHOW]

PAGING MR. NELSON

Bill O'Reilly would love to talk to you if no one else will.

[Howlin]

Has anybody besides me here read James Thurber's My Life and Hard Times.......and does the Get Ready Man come to mind?

[Howlin]

Well, O'Reilly should give him a call.

[Chad Fairbanks]

[justshe]

2nd Request

1. What proof do you have that the issues raised in the memo are accurate?

2. What proof do you have that the memo wasn't 'looked into' and found to be deficient and hence, dismissed?

3. Why, after pinging Gracey to your post on another thread, to confirm the accuracy of the memo, and seeing her dismiss Nelson's assertions, do you not accept her opinion?

4. Why do you not accept Don Nelson's own words that nothing in the memo would have prevented the tragedy that occured with Columbia?

5. Are you as sure of all of your facts as you were that Bill O'Reilly called Don Nelson's home?

6. Did this memo get leaked in order to help Don Nelson sell his book?

135 posted on 02/03/2003 11:05 PM PST by justshe

[Cold Heat]

I just don't understand how people can claim that something relevant is being withheld. There is absolutely no evidence of that. In fact, I firmly believe that some people should not be given information at all. They just can't handle it.

[woofie]

Im a Thurber fan...but will have to refresh my memory, its been a while

[Tall_Texan]

What do you suppose the backup plan was?

Dunno. I keep picturing in my mind extremely long ropes.

But, as my point mentioned before, the moon missions and spacewalks were a different matter because they were pushing the envelope and trying to accomplish things that had never been done. This business of sending up shuttles to see how moths copulate in zero gravity and such is a little different - they had opened the door to civilians, not just trained military pilots. They had geezers like John Glenn going up there. That, if nothing else, sent the signal that these missions were no longer considered very risky.

I realize that planes, trains and automobiles crash too and that there are no guarantees. That's not the issue. The issue is that a craft in orbit might be disabled for a whole host of possible reasons and what I'm hearing is that NASA had no plan to even try to safely get them down. That's acceptable when you are dealing with risky new territory. It's not acceptable with something expected to go up hundreds of times.

[TLBSHOW]

NASA must change its operating philosophy or that light at the end of the tunnel will be an approaching freight train!

Don A. Nelson is an aerospace writer. He retired from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He has participated in every shuttle upgrade effort until his retirement.

Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.

Mr. Nelson is the author of, "NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions."

e-mail: nasaproblems@yahoo.com

6 – Human Exploration of Mars—Still A NASA Management Fantasy

To strive for mankind to walk on the surface of Mars is a noble goal . . . but

Many factors must be resolved before human Mars exploration can be considered as a feasible and realistic endeavor. First, there must be a worthwhile reason for having human activity on Mars.

[Chad Fairbanks]

In fact, I firmly believe that some people should not be given information at all. They just can't handle it.

and, there would be no noticable difference in this thread, either, because many are not even bothering with the information that is available when it comes time to formulate an opinion... ;0)

[Howlin]

Remember he thought the world was coming to an end and carried around that sign that said "GET READY," and they just called him "The Get Ready Man."

[justshe]

Don Nelson
(TLB)

[Chad Fairbanks]

Ready to address post #135 and #168 yet???????

[Fitzcarraldo]

Here is a good post explaining the events from first cause to catastrophe: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/834556/posts?page=258#258

The question I have is once the drag on the left wing started to cause the yaw thrusters to fire at alarming rates, why couldn't the control surface on the right wing be used to create a counterbalancing drag?

[Chad Fairbanks]

You seem constipated... here you go....

[Howlin]

Well, I certainly wouldn't even attempt to answer that technical question. You'll have to see if Jim knows the answer.

[Chad Fairbanks]

Based on my (admittedly limited) knowledge, I'd have to say that there reaches apoint where no amount of correction can stop a catastrophe from occurring....</p>