Columbia Was Beyond Any Help, Officials Say

New York Times ^ | 2/03/03 | KENNETH CHANG

[TLBSHOW]

Crew Escape Module

A crew escape module was considered in the original design trades for the Shuttle. The original escape module would have weighed up to 10,000 pounds, depending on the number of crew required. Placing this much weight in the crew compartment of the Shuttle moves the center of gravity to a point so far forward that the aerodynamic control surfaces could not control it. In other words the vehicle was nose heavy and could not maintain stable flight. At this time the crew escape module was abandoned and the vehicle was flown with aircraft ejection seats for the two astronauts conducting the test flights. As the Shuttle flights proceeded, NASA made the erroneous assumption the vehicle redundant flight systems made it safe enough to remove the ejection seats.

After the Challenger accident crew modules were again studied. The results were the same; the escape module was just too heavy to be placed in the crew compartment area. The issue was again reviewed in 1994 for the Access to Space studies and with the same conclusion. In July of 2000, another crew escape module study group was formed to study the problem. They were told that the crew module could weigh no more than 5000 pounds, but the crew size could be reduced to six. Their study resulted in a module weighting 10,000 pounds. History does repeat especially when all the conditions are the same. The problem can be solved, but NASA management must be willing to change the conditions.

There are two options for solution to the problem. Both options require that Shuttle management give up its unjustified position requiring piloting for Shuttle flights. Removing the flight deck piloting function systems will allow that weight to be used for the escape module. This will include the weight of the commander and pilot, their seats, forward flight deck displays and controls systems, escape pole system, forward windows, and other non-required items. The first option places the crew escape module(s) in the payload bay nearer the vehicle center of gravity. This solution solves the aerodynamic stability problem. However, the volume of the escape module must be charged against the payload carrying capability.

The second option is to install the escape module (seats) on the flight deck. A seat ejection system would eject four crew members from seats on the flight deck. Two additional crew members could be ejected from the lower middeck on rails connected to the seat ejection rails on the flight decks. The weight of this ejection system is approximately 3700 pounds. Removing the piloting sub-systems (commander and pilot weight, their seats, forward flight deck display and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc.) would provide the weight saving to install the 3700 pound ejection crew escape system without violating the aerodynamic stability limit. This is the preferred option. The ejection seat concept was developed and flown on the Columbia OV-102 Shuttle. The ejection trajectory is shown in the following NASA image:





NASA management will not consider either option because both require that their irrational requirement for piloting be deleted. Piloting is a non-mandatory requirement. It is an emotional and political issue. Deleting piloting and automating flight control would show that it does not take a "marching army" government jobs’ program to fly Shuttle missions. It is not a technical issue because all phases of space flight have been successfully demonstrated with automated control systems. With all the technology advancements made in autonomous flight control, this has become a ridiculous requirement, a requirement that places the lives of Shuttle crews in great danger.

It is ironic, that NASA, a leader in advance technology is so opposed to accepting advance flight control technology for the Space Shuttle.

[woofie]

A picture of Susan McDougall popped into my head as soon as I read "jail".

Yep they are now using this is psych 101....

Say the next thing that comes into your mind
Susan Mc Dougal ....jail

Bill Clinton....
Hillary.....
OJ....
Gary Condit...

It really allows people to get in touch with themselves

[altair]

It is not a requirement to be a rocket scientist to ask questions and make suppositions about this horrible tragedy

While it is tragic, it is not a "horrible tragedy". It was an accident. Accidents happen. Sometimes people make mistakes. NASA has a very good safety record over the years. This is definitely a situation where we must move on.

[TLBSHOW]

[John Jamieson]

I understand. Thanks.

[Howlin]

[Chad Fairbanks]

It would be interesting to see if a crew ejection module would have worked at mach 18, at 200,000 feet... especialy when this tragedy took only mere moments to occur...

Be realistic...

[Diddle E. Squat]

Umm, that's pretty, but you forgot to factor in that they would be flung from a shuttle traveling 12,000mph.

[Chad Fairbanks]

Man... what a ride THAT would have been... ejecting at Mach 18 woo-hoo! What a rush!

[Doohickey]

Funnier than the parrot, even...

[strela]

1 stone = 14 pounds

Empty weight of orbiter Atlantis (with SSMEs installed) = 171,000 pounds

12,214 stone ;)

[woofie]

How about a picture of a toaster?

[Chad Fairbanks]

Thanks! it's nice to have some info that is as relevent as what TLBShow is posting ;0)

[Southflanknorthpawsis]

I just caught a clip of one of the astronaut's parents on the news. They said all he ever wanted to be was an astronaut and had said when his time came, he hoped it was in a plane or spacecraft. Even in their sorrow and pain, they are proud and obviously supportive of NASA.

Yep.........heroes to the last man is right.

[strela]

While it is tragic, it is not a "horrible tragedy".

I disagree.

[TLBSHOW]

Countdown to Another Space Shuttle Disaster?

In 1992, the prediction for a Space Shuttle catastrophic failure was 1 in 72 flights. After seven years of safety upgrades the prediction decreased by only 1 in 423 flights. Even with these upgrades, the fleet was grounded for most of 1999. The Shuttle is still sending warnings that it is a very dangerous launch system. Considering the following:

May 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery had a launch delay caused by hail damage to the external fuel tank.
July 1999—Space Shuttle Columbia had a hydrogen gas leakage scare.
December 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery on a mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope had a record nine launch delays spread over two months. Delays were due to damaged wiring, a contaminated engine, a dented fuel line, concern over fuel line welds, a nicked cable, and paperwork errors.
January 2000—Space Shuttle Endeavor launch is delayed by computer trouble. Damaged wiring had already delayed its launch four months.
March 2000—Space Shuttle Atlantis must have one main engine replaced because of another paperwork snafu.
August 2000—Inspection of the 20 year old Space Shuttle Columbia revealed about 3,500 defects in wiring.25
October 2000—The 100th flight of the Space Shuttle was delayed twice because of safety concerns with the external tank and a misplaced safety pin.

Tick-tock . . . tick-tock . . . is time running out for another Shuttle crew?

http://www.nasaproblems.com/#Book

[strela]

LOL. (Do they weigh the Irish space shuttle in drams)?

[Howlin]

That looks like it would leave a mark.

[Light Speed]

Yes I agree on the physics.
In my earlier post this thread..other shuttles have suffered damage from debrie strike..cosmic..even one admitted by Nasa which had the rocket booster seperate and rake the underside....this STS returned safely..allthough Nasa moved the orbiter near a satillite which was assigned to image the damage.

as mention..and this has my focus,..Columbia had one mission since its re-fit with new electrical trunk to new monitors and a new computer suite.
On STS 109 prior to de-orbit test cycle..STS 109 had a thruster /yaw/pitch failure in the 4 port package.
1-1/2 years of re-fit...Columbia lands...then Nasa discovers cracks in Columbias flow system to engine.
They missed this over 1-1/2 years?...Columbia suffered Harmonic damage..energy distortion in one flight?.

As per the many posts where we are beginning to think outside the box as per tile reality..many here are forwarding excellent thinking for novices.

I work in the steel fab/oilfield sector..an American firm out of Houston in Canada.
Primary duty is operating a CNC Plasma..underwater cut...50 ton remote cranes..steel..biggy huge scale.
The Plasma is Cryogenic nitrogen..100,000 volts.
It screws up...German techs fly in when locals cannot fix computer problems.
After Helmut leaves..the machine fails again...because of human error.
Columbia has human error potential..**Note potential** written all over it.
Columbia has one flight after being gutted nearly 2 times in re-fit...im thinking something in the way of computer systems failure..or human.

[Jhoffa_]

Agreed, you have to go somehow.. Our heroes realized this and didn't care.

Mortality remains steady at 100%