Posted on 12/30/2002 6:59:48 PM PST by paltz
Colonel David H Hackworth, America's most decorated soldier, does not mince his words. "I would be reluctant to jump into a battle zone with any conventional American unit. I would hate to take them into battle - they ain't ready, they are not 'good to go'."
With British and American ground troops poised to take the war against the Taliban into a new, perilous phase, Hackworth's appraisal of the army he once served will do little to calm nerves in the corridors of power. And his verdict on "crack" American troops such as those likely to be deployed in Afghanistan, is scarcely more complimentary. The soldiers of the vaunted 82nd Airborne are only "a little better" than ordinary infantry. And of the supposedly fearsome 10th Mountain Division, he says, "I hear a lot of rhetoric about the famous 10th Mountain Division. In World War II it was unquestionably America's finest unit - trained for three years, made up with men from Colorado, Montana, Idaho, really tough men, experts in mountain fighting. What we have now in the 10th Mountain Division is a bunch of kids that are better qualified to play computer games than they are to fight in that kind of terrain."
Confronted by the sudden prospect of putting their training to the test in Afghanistan, more than a handful of American soldiers show signs of agreeing with Hackworth's dismal assessment. "A large number of them have been submitting release from active duty requests, feigning that they're conscientious objectors, which is exactly what we went through in Vietnam," he says.
It is difficult to envisage anyone now emulating Hackworth's record even if they took on the Taliban during an extended campaign. After lying about his age, he managed to enlist, aged 15, in the second world war, "winding up on the Morgan Line around Trieste, trying to keep the Yugoslavs and the Italians from wasting each other".
Thereafter, in Korea and Vietnam, he was awarded a brace of Distinguished Service Crosses, 10 Silver Stars, four Legions of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross and a remarkable eight Purple Hearts - meaning that he was wounded, on average, in each of the (almost) eight years that he was in combat.
Commissioned in the field in Korea, he became the army's youngest captain; less than 20 years later, as its youngest colonel, he condemned America's involvement in Vietnam. It was, he said, "a bad war... it can't be won. We need to get out." He also predicted that the North Vietnamese flag would fly over Saigon within four years - a prediction made no more palatable to his superiors by being right.
Hackworth's critics might like to dismiss him as a battlefield dinosaur; most are wise enough not to try. After his public denunciation of the Vietnam war, he left the army and headed to Australia, where he gave his medals away to a class of 12-year-olds, burned his uniform, lived under the stars and smoked - and inhaled - a little dope. Nearly 20 years later, after making himself a fistful of money by selling a Brisbane restaurant and starting Australia's first Peking Duck farm, he returned to the US.
During his years of self-imposed exile, he had become an anti-nuclear campaigner but that proved no bar to re-establishing contacts with friends in the army, who were invaluable allies in his next career as a war reporter.
He discovered that - with some admirable exceptions - most of his new colleagues "wouldn't know a tank from a Range Rover or a B-52 bomber from a Valujet". During the Gulf war, he sensed that it was "almost as if frightened reporters who knew nothing about military realities wanted to inflate the war to inflate themselves". He decided on a new mission: to educate and inform his countrymen about those "military realities". Several years before he had co-authored the Vietnam Primer, which became a classic. On his return from Australia, he wrote About Face, a chronicle of his war experiences. It became a best-seller, as did three further books, the profits from the last two of which have been ploughed into Soldiers For The Truth, Hackworth's non-profit foundation dedicated to military reform.
But that reform, he says, will only come after America has suffered "a terrible performance in battle. Then we'll see maximum attention to re-establishing discipline and getting standards up". This, though, will come too late to make a difference in Afghanistan. Hackworth recently watched three weeks of basic training at Fort Jackson and left "appalled at the lack of discipline, the lack of hard training". The American military, he argues, is undermined by twin evils - a culture of grotesquely profligate, misdirected expenditure and by a toadying, self-serving caste of senior officers interested only in securing their own advancement.
But most corrosive of all, he says, has been the almost comic absurdity of making the forces politically correct. "There is now something called 'Consideration for Others' training," says Hackworth. "That's where Joe and Jane will get along and live in harmony. One, Joe and Jane shouldn't be in the foxhole together; two, harmony is not the name of the game; the name of the game is killing your enemy." (He is kinder about their British counterparts. "The Brits that I have found - the units that I've seen as a reporter in ex-Yugoslavia and so on - are not suffering as badly as the Americans from political correctness. It seems that your standards haven't been so lowered.")
Such idiocies, argues Hackworth, could have been prevented "if the top brass had opposed the politically correct leadership which was engendered and supported by Bill Clinton". "Do you think Clinton would have appointed any leader that would say, 'We've lowered the standard, we're not training our people hard enough or fierce enough'? No: the guys who get promoted are the guys who go along to get along. They are the Perfumed Princes."
But the "perfumed princes" are in for an unsettling ride, he says. "We are in round one - which is not even over - in a 30-round fight. I think my grandkids, who are five and eight, will be in college before we're in round 30. It's going to be a very long war, not like a war we've fought before. We will win, as long as everybody realises that it is not going to be a Desert Storm, wham-bam, thank you mam."
Last August, Hackworth made another prediction. Outlining three scenarios of future terror, he described a terrorist gas attack at the Indianapolis sports arena, killing 4,000. Hackworth set the date at June 4 2005; the terrorist responsible? Osama bin Laden. He concluded: "The chances are eight out of 10 that we will see a devastating terrorist attack from abroad within the next 10 years. Up to now we've been relatively lucky. But this kind of luck can't last... This dude [Bin Laden] ain't gonna give up. Neither will a thousand fanatics like him. It's a mistake to believe you can stop a terrorist movement by taking out its leader. You can cut off the head, but the body will still live on."
Consequently, Hackworth does not get overly excited by Bin Laden's fate. "He's got many, many fall-back positions, but he's a hard guy to hide. He's going to come in, in his Mercedes or his four-wheel drive; if people in the local village know he's there, the word is going to go out. He's got 30m bucks on his head; if you're an Afghan or Yemeni and you're making a dollar a week, $30m is a hell of an enticement. I wouldn't want to be in his sandals. But he's more the figurehead than the principal military planner; it's like getting rid of Saddam Hussein - there are other rattlesnakes that are even worse."
Hackworth has yet to get to Afghanistan to see the situation for himself; in the meantime, he is urging people to read a paper written by Richard Kidd, a West Point graduate who spent two years in Afghanistan working in the UN's mine clearance programme. Kidd argues in favour of giving the Northern Alliance "a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust. Third, I would support the Northern Alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy."
Hackworth urges people to "burn [Kidd's] words and advice into your brain". He believes that they have been heeded in the White House, which he praises for its handling of the campaign so far. Hackworth says Washington should leave the fighting to groups like the Northern Alliance, confining British and American troops to an advisory role. As for the tens of thousands of American troops wondering if they could soon find themselves face to face with the Taliban, Hackworth suggests they should not expect to experience real combat any time soon. "I see them only in a defensive, perimeter role, because that's what they've got experience doing in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo: standing behind a wall of sandbags and peering out into the darkness. That's what they're very good at."
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It isn't over yet. It's barely even started.
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Desert Storm was an ideal war for bush-button gadgets on a terrain ideal for kids trained to operate push-button gadgets on 7-11 computer games. It wasn't military combat.
Right you are! The Reserves and Guard were deployed to the Gulf as support troops (and mostly did a fine job), but not one Guard or reserve combat unit was sent. It was GEN Schwartzkopf who refused to allow them. There simply wasn't enough time to get them properly trained up.
The US has changed it's war fighting tactics and in the last 20 years it has served us well. The future will include unmanned aircraft and robots with anti missle lazers so is this bad? No, but it will never take the place of hard combat experience no matter how much Hack bitches about it !
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I don't believe it.
I bet those "kids", as you call them, were damn glad to have whiz bang gadgets with which to quickly dispatch Iraqi soldiers to their maker. Just because it's one sided doesn't mean it's not military combat. I'm sure there are plenty of Desert Storm combat veterans who would disagree with your assessment that they were not involved in military combat. Would it have been better if 10,000 or so of our soldiers had been killed in heroic bayonet charges?
But...IF I had to go to war again...(albeit a lot older and grayer than last time)...I would PREFER someone like Col. Hackworth in charge.
He has his priorities right....
redrock
I will never demean any of those that served in Desert Storm, whether they were in the Regular Army or part of the NG or Reserve. All performed admiralby. They made America proud!
I was a grunt in Vietnam and the diference between the two wars was unreal to me. 1 yr = 90%+ casualties for my company. Desert Storm = 180 KIA out of 500,000 in 2 months.
Bottom line is... I have complete confidense in our active and reserve military people.
Does that come with an English translation?
RLK was saying that fighting with modern weaponry designed to minimize our casualties isn't real combat. Did you not understand my point? Warfare is warfare no matter the weaponry because you can be killed in either case. Just because you aren't sticking a bayonet in his ribs and looking into his eyes as he slowly dies doesn't mean it isn't combat.
And no, I am not in the military, nor have I ever been. Does that mean what I say is not the truth?
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That isn't what I said, but it's close enough.
During the Gulf War nearly our entire list of casualties was the result of a misaimed missile hitting a barracks full of sleeping men many miles away from the front. The fact is, you were in more danger crossing a street in New York than you were on the front lines during that war. It was not what I call combat or even close to it.
During the crisis with Serbia I heard retired General Schwartzkopf asked what he thought of a ground war in Serbia. With characteristic understatement he said, "Well, the terrain is different there."
In that terrain tanks would have been useless. Helicopters would have been wiped out by crossfire between opposite high mountains. Air attack effectiveness would have been about 2% as effective as it was in the Gulf. The Serbs were dug in and nearly every one was a well-trained sniper with any kind of weapon. When they shoot, they don't miss, from hundred of yards. The Serbs had supplies stored to last months or years. There was heavy cover and concealment. Had we gone in there with ground forces we would have lost 20,000 men very easily. THAT is combat. Forget about pushbuttons. The U. S. military currently does not have significant numbers of people to fight that kind of engagement. We aren't even equipped with the correct type of rifles and other equipment for that kind of action.
If we get into engagements in certain areas of the world, we don't have the equipment, numbers, or training to survive it.
Yes, I can see that, as you stated elsewhere on this thread, you have no military experience. Unfortunately, neither have most of the members of our unisex armed forces. Most of our senior officers are too young to remember Viet Nam.
When I was in the army, which was probably before you were born, most of the NCOs and officers had experience in WW II and Korea. My platoon sergeant wound up wounded and hanging by his parachute of the end of a Japanese barracks with the nips running around 12 feet below him looking for people to shoot. There is almost no combat experience in today's military. We are likely to find that out the hard way.
Marcinko is a FNG when it comes to comparing military records with Hack. He isn't even close ... Hackworth is the most decorated military veteran alive today in the United States. Marcinko, on the other hand, and I speak from some inside knowledge on this, is considered a BS artist supreme by many who served with him ...
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