Posted on 12/28/2002 9:48:30 AM PST by knighthawk
Put Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein in a room with his North Korean counterpart and the two would have a lot to talk about. Like Saddam, Kim Jong-Il runs a brutal, Stalinist dictatorship; supports terrorism; and spends his country's meager resources on weapons of mass destruction. Yet the United States is preparing for war against Iraq, while the campaign against Pyongyang remains strictly diplomatic. Even as the North Koreans are moving to extract plutonium from their "research" reactor at Yongbyon, U.S. President George W. Bush has explicitly reassured Kim he has no plans for an Asian invasion.
Bush's critics call this a double standard, and insist it betrays a "secret" agenda in the Middle East -- seizing oil, protecting Israel, avenging Bush Sr., etc. But the truth has more to do with banal cost-benefit analysis. Simply put, a war against Iraq can be managed humanely, while a war against North Korea cannot.
When U.S. troops invade Iraq, Saddam will probably respond by firing missiles at neighbouring countries -- as he did a decade ago. But Iraq has only about two dozen Scuds. And so unless Saddam takes the unlikely (and suicidal) step of arming them with chemical or biological warheads, few innocents will die. The death toll will also be low among Iraqi troops. Saddam's soldiers know they are facing overwhelming force -- they've been through this drill before. And most units will likely flee, or surrender after token engagements -- again, as they did in 1991.
A war in North Korea would be more deadly. Pyongyang's hungry soldiers have no other news source than their government's comically triumphalist propaganda, and many would fight to the last. Seoul, home to more than 10,000,000 people, is just 50-65 kilometres from the North Korean border. Tens of thousands of civilians would likely die from rocket and artillery attacks in the first day of war alone. U.S. soldiers -- there are 37,000 stationed in South Korea, and more may be deployed if tensions escalate -- would also come under attack. Kim, unlike Saddam, is already thought to have several atomic bombs, and might use them if his situation looked unsalvageable.
And while the human cost of war would be greater in North Korea than in Iraq, the benefit of victory would arguably be smaller. In its rhetoric and military posturing, North Korea is a warmonger. Yet, naval skirmishes and commando infiltrations aside, the country has not actually invaded a neighbour since the Korean war ended five decades ago: Kim's quest for nukes seems driven mostly by paranoia at U.S. motives and a desire to extort economic assistance. Saddam, on the other hand, has invaded both Kuwait and Iran -- and attacked other countries with missiles. He clearly sees WMDs as a means toward regional hegemony. That is why confronting Iraq is the more urgent task.
That said, North Korea is still a grave threat. On Friday it ordered United Nations nuclear inspectors out of the country and said it would reopen facilities capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The risk might be relatively low that North Korea delivers an unprovoked attack against South Korea, Japan or the United States. But it is possible Kim would try to sell his nukes to another rogue state -- Libya, for instance -- or even to a well-funded terrorist group. North Korea is desperate for cash. (This is a country, remember, where people consider grass an entrée.) And we already know Pyongyang has sold its missile technology to such clients as Yemen and Pakistan.
Washington has several options. The first is to get tough. While the threat of a full invasion would not be credible, Washington might consider a blockade -- to keep oil imports out and weapons in. At the same time, the United States could ring the country with anti-missile destroyers, and seek a tough new package of sanctions at the United Nations.
Such an approach would quiet talk of an Iraqi/North Korean "double standard." But the end game could produce an embarrassing retreat for the United States -- or even, to quote North Korea's recent warning, "an uncontrollable catastrophe" if Pyongyang construes U.S. actions as an act of war. Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea's dovish, newly elected President, would probably panic and undermine Washington at the first opportunity. Most South Koreans have a benign view of North Korea's intentions and are rightly scared of its military. Moreover, they are furious over a recent incident in which a U.S. military vehicle crushed to death two local girls. In the current climate, any deal arranged between the two Koreas would result in diminished U.S. influence, and perhaps the wholesale expulsion of American troops.
A second option, advocated by William Safire in a Boxing Day New York Times op-ed, is to put the problem at Beijing's doorstep -- under the theory that North Korea is "China's child." That would be a great idea if Chinese officials play ball -- and is no doubt an avenue the White House is pursuing. But pronouncements in the Chinese press this week suggest Beijing may take North Korea's side, not Washington's.
A third approach -- less satisfying morally, but probably the most realistic, is to follow the precedent created in 1994, when then-U.S. president Bill Clinton induced North Korea to suspend its nuclear program with the promise of free oil. That deal, the Geneva Agreed Framework, survived until last October, when North Korea admitted it was violating the deal by conducting a secret uranium enrichment program. As things stand, the White House says it will not negotiate a new deal until North Korea suspends its nuclear program.
In its public statements, North Korea has hinted it would back off from its Yongbyon project if the United States returns to the Geneva Agreed Framework (or some variation on it) and signs a "non-aggression" treaty. Neither of these demands would seem entirely unrealistic. When Mr. Bush's administration inherited the Agreed Framework from Mr. Clinton in 2001, he continued the oil shipments negotiated by his predecessor. Indeed, the shipments continued even after October's bombshell disclosure. (They ended this month.) A "non-aggression" treaty would hand Pyongyang a propaganda victory of sorts. But then, Mr. Bush has already delivered a non-aggression promise in informal terms anyway. Assuming Washington can extract meaningful assurances from Pyongyang that it will make good on its obligation to suspend nuclear arms-building -- naturally, a thorough monitoring regime will be required -- a diplomatic solution should be attainable.
If Mr. Bush does reach a deal, hawks will accuse him of giving in to North Korean extortion. There is some validity to the charge. But then again, there is some validity to the North Korean threat. You cannot wish away Pyongyang's arsenal with a display of principle -- nor can you protect Seoul's 10,000,000 residents with sheer bravado. Eventually, North Korea's disastrous economic system and despotic political structure will cause its communist regime to collapse from within. But until this happens, Western nations must take seriously the military threat the country poses to its neighbours.
Is this a new anti-missile system or wishful thinking?
Taking out Iraq is. It'll tidy up the neighborhood, and leave us with more time to deal with the tough nutcases like the North Koreans.
We know what ships go in and out of their ports. It's not very many. We can very easily set up a weapons embargo and make sure that no ballistic missiles come out. We can also threaten sanctions on anyone who cares to do business with them. The next 'Yemeni' ship we stop, when we have the right sanctions in place, will be seized and impounded, with the U.N.'s blessing.
North Korea is going to set new records for unpopularity. Unable to sell WMD or ballistic missiles, they'll be isolated and helpless.
Triple Scrabble score bump.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.