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Interesting post but I think this analysis might be a little dated.

The proposition of moving large numbers of troops and artillery over any stretch of ground without overwhelming air power is no longer a feasible approach. Defense in this day and time will be far less costly than offense in terms of resources and numbers. Unlike the last war in Korea, South Korean troops and a very large contingent of US troops are all ready present. Air power from within South Korea and externally in Japan and Okinawa is ready and mobile.

Without the heavy use of WMD's North Korea would stand no chance at all of success and the field of battle would be little more than a place to relive some of the population stress in North Korea.

If they use WMD's North Korea would be destroyed and China would turn her back completely. Pyongyang (sp?), Nampo, Sunchon, and Wonson and others in that region would be smoldering ruins in the first 48 hours we would begin to drive the peasants north and cut off what meager supplies there military has. Within three weeks there would be mass starvation in the southern part North Korea and the number of white flags will make you think we were fighting the French.

China will call for the peace treaty quickly due to an extreme refugee problem.

It’s not even our amazing technology that would bring it about, but darn near 50 years of planning, digging in learning the turf. Last time we didn’t know the terrain, we didn’t understand the tactics, we didn’t have time to prepare and we didn’t have the resources at hand. Last time we played games with who what and where we could attack, what hills we could hold etc… to appease the politicians of the day. A lot has changed in that time period. Still, lets hope it doesn’t come to it, many lives will be lost if it does - on both sides of the border.

Why is everyone thinking in terms of land surface warfare?

Phase I: Tunnel under the DMZ (done, done, and done.) Did we find all of the tunnels? Have we effectively neutralized this threat? It only takes one.

If there are enough existing and surviving routes for underground infiltration, move special forces units and weapons caches into place behind main defensive lines. Utilize a coordinated unconventional, but non-nuclear attack to disrupt command and communications, supply, and defensive troops from the rear, also hitting airfields and fire support units (especially ammo storage), in concert with or slightly preceeding a frontal assault on those sectors which show the greatest disarray. Pin defensive forces against their own wire, while attacking from the front in conventional fashion.

Alternate Phase I: If only a few tunnels survive, and these are insufficient to infiltrate conventional or special forces, emplace and detonate nuclear device(s) under the main forward defensive areas. Attack on the surface. Use airbursts (Nuclear, tactical yield) to create background ionization to neutralize aerial detection and warfighting capability and/or take out specific targets.

The rest is pursuit and mop-up. Unfortunately, we are still trapped in the conventional-warfare, Maginot line mentality we were left with in what was the second phase of the war when my Dad fought there.

If they haven't already done so, it is time to start drilling holes in the ground and filling them with water.

I have to wonder about how the DPRK's doctrine would fare in practice as well. North Korea is a totalitarian state, and more totalitarian than most. I'm sure that leadership/initiative is not highly prized, and those who show such traits are viewd with suspicion, if not eliminated outright. Therefore, I think we have reason to doubt the ability of the DPRK generals to conduct a successful campaign past the initial set-piece stage.

My very uneducated guess as to how this might go: The North Koreans achieve some early successes, but once the war starts deviating from the script, as it inevitably will, the DPRK offensive rapidly falls apart due to inability to adapt and improvise.

I think the remnansts of the North Korean military would probably do much better in a defensive fight on its own territory, making the regime change phase of a counteroffensive somewhat problematic. I can easily envision a replay of the WWII Pacific campaign, with fanatical North Korean defenders fighting from bunkers and caves long after any rational hope of victory is gone.