The attack was, according to Mladic, not primarily designed to take
the entire enclave. That decision was made after a large number of
Muslim fighters decided to give up the Defence and to attempt an
extremely risky outbreak in the night of July 10 to Tuzla. "Muslims
fled in large numbers the night before the attack," said the Dutch
Army representative in Washington, Colonel G. van Oppen, in the
Fries Dagblad of 13 October 1995: "The question of why this
happened was never asked in the Netherlands." This is what I have always said and many others on FR never touched upon. They always discussed the fleeing of the Higher Officer Corps (down below)
But Michael Evans of The Times already knew this on July 13 when
he reported, referring to "Western intelligence sources," that Muslim
commanders had left the city after a provocation from their side, the
night before the first Serb tanks entered the scene. "Prior to the Serb
advance the Muslims had fired upon Serb units along the main road to
the South. (...) The apparent decision made by the Muslims to leave
the city gave the Serbs an unexpected opportunity to seize
Srebrenica." The Serb intention was to take the city as part of the agenda of wrapping up and ending the war before the 95-96 winter.
THE ORDER OF EVENTS brings to mind the situation of Gorazde in
April 1994. A study made by US Colonel John Sray, former head of
UNPROFOR?s intelligence service in Sarajevo, reveals what
happened:
"Two British observers were located at an observation post
behind Muslim lines. Various attacks by the Serbs were
effectively stopped and the position could be defended for a
long period. Then the Muslims realized that the British
observers were positioned right behind them. During the next
Serb attack the Muslims retreated unexpectedly and for no
reason. Their only objective was to expose the observers to an
attack of the confused Serbs. Serb bullets killed one British
soldier and wounded the other, but responsibility for this lies in
the hands of the Bosnian Muslims, who hoped to provoke a
revenge strike by NATO as a punishment for the killing of a
neutral observer." BINGO! This is exactly how it happened. Except the round was from an anti-aircraft converted weapon to "antipersonnel" weapon...:)
(John Sray in Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware)
The trap failed in Gorazde, but in Srebrenica no half-measures were
taken.
Apart from the flight of the Muslim troops in the night prior to the
attack, there are many more indications that the Muslim leadership
abandoned the enclave on purpose. The Defence was already
weakened because of the fact that best troops had been moved out to
Tuzla, Sarajevo and Mt. Treskavica, long before the month of July,
according to a commander of a Bosnian Serb special unit. Naser Oric
himself, who had sworn never to allow Srebrenica to become Serb as
long as he was in charge, was no longer present. "His whereabouts
during the months prior to the collapse of Srebrenica are quite a
mystery," according to Charles Lane in De Volkskrant of 12 August
1995. But Ivanisevic argues that Oric, together with 2500 of his best
troops, was called on duty in April and May of 1995 to an area south
of Sarajevo in order to take part in the planned Muslim offensive.
Estimates of the number of armed personnel that stayed behind
mention six to ten thousand, comprising 3000-4000 regular Army
recruits. The Serbs were able to counter this with 3,500 men, all from
this region, far better equipped but only accompanied by four outdated
tanks. Besides, not more than a few hundred men took part in the
attack on the city itself. The difference in capabilities of the two
sides seems to underline the opportunistic nature of the Serb offensive. It
is also important to take into consideration that the Muslims had
suffered heavy losses during supply runs between Srebrenica and
Zepa in April, May and June, which could have cast doubts on
chances to defend the city in the long run. The area hardly has any
natural resources, and is strategically of far less significance than
Gorazde, for example.
Eventually, while the "Dayton" agreement was in preparation, the
Bosnian government [Izetbegovic] accepted the concept of
exchanging territory: Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde for the Serb
Sarajevo. Bosnian Minister of foreign affairs Muhammad Sacirbey
had already informed Secretary of State Voorhoeve about this option
during talks held in May (see De Volkskrant of 1 November 1995).
The deal came as a blessing for the Americans, so close to the start of
an election campaign. The fiercely criticized UN peace force very
much wanted to abandon the "safe havens" as well. Srebrenica
became the turning point from a military, political and publicity
perspective. Only the retreat of the peacekeepers made it possible for
NATO to start with the air strikes in September. The wave of horror
stories about mass executions overshadowed the Croatian terror in
the Krajina and no word got out about the Muslim-Croatian crimes in
cities like Glamoc, Grahovo and Sanski Most... "
WHAT REMAINS unanswered is the amount of Muslim men
missing, who possibly died [in action] or were possibly killed.
According to Miroslav Deronjic, official of the new municipality
Srebrenica-Skelani, that number is two thousand; according to
Amnesty International ? four thousand; according to the International
Red Cross, between seven and eight thousand; and Muslim sources
state eight to twelve thousand. Each number represents an enormous
tragedy in itself, but the results are also the product of a
hypothetical
calculation method. The size of the population before the fall of
Srebrenica cannot be known beyond reasonable doubt.
Manipulation with numbers was turned into an art during the Bosnian
war, and it is fair to assume that this also happened in Srebrenica....
On July 14, the ICRC [Red Cross] counted 23,000 refugees who were
taken by bus to Tuzla, more than half of them children. This group was
later joined by thousands of Muslim men who arrived on foot. In total
the World Health Organization and the Bosnian government have
registered 35,632 refugees from Srebrenica up to this moment. An
unknown number of men have not had themselves registered and
have been absorbed, as announced by the Bosnian Army, in the 28th
division. Others (1,000? 2,000?) have fled to Zepa and Serbia.
MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND persons were registered as
missing. "Conclusions about the number of missing people based on
this figure has to be done with caution," UN inspector Tadeusz
Mazowiecki wrote, "because there may have been double counts in
the missing person notices and because resolved cases are not always
reported to the Red Cross." It is also possible that names have been
forged in an attempt to increase the number of missing people, or in
an attempt to escape prosecution for war crimes. Mazowiecki?s
successor, Elisabeth Rehn, came to the number of 8,000 people whose
fate was unknown: five thousand men of military age who left the
enclave before the fall, and three thousand men who were separated
from their families. Rehn agreed with Mazowiecki, who suspected on
the basis of "strong indications" that the missing Muslims had been
murdered. During her visit of locations near Srebrenica in January of
this year, she seemed to tone down her initial comments a little bit.
She was still looking for evidence.
{Editor's Note: The UN bureaucrat accuses the Serbian forces of
murder despite the denials of UN military officers on the scene during
the fighting. Having made the accusation, the accuser goes "looking
for evidence!}
Miroslav Deronjic also gave his version in a report about the events:
"According to intelligence of the Army of Republika Srpska, around
six thousand Muslim conscripts have not joined the convoys for
evacuation, but instead continued armed resistance, or tried to force
an outbreak through the Serb lines of Defence in the direction of
Srebrenica ? Kravica ? Konjevic Polje ? Cerska ? Crni Vrh ? Tuzla.
Skirmishes with this group (...) have continued for the next twenty
days in the district of Konjevic Polje ? Cerska ? Udrica. A large
number of Muslim fighters were killed during the attempt to break
through the lines of Defence of Bratunac and Zvornik, or during
clashes between their own competing factions. Part of the fighters
surrendered ? a small number, two hundred ? and they have been
transferred as prisoners of war to the military prison of Bjeljina. The
larger part, around four thousand, reached the territory of the
municipality of Tuzla. It is impossible to give exact estimates of the
number of Muslim soldiers that died, because the fighting took place
over a large area and in different directions."
That Muslims fought each other, as Deronjic argues, cannot be found
in the reports of Mazowiecki, Rehn and Human Rights Watch, but is
known from statements made by the Dutch UN military personnel.
{This is another indication of the anti-Serb bias of the UN
bureaucracy and Human Rights Watch, as opposed to the UN troops!}
At least on two occasions Muslims have clashed with each other.
According to general Couzy, the issue was a dispute about the
question if the enclave should be defended or abandoned. Yugoslav
agency Tanjug already reported in February last year about a "heavy
conflict and fighting" in the vicinity of the town called Slap, between
Muslims who wanted to leave to Macedonia via Serbia and Oric?s
men, who controlled the Drina crossings in the hamlet of Luka. Later,
unconfirmed reports mentioned a rivaling "modest" military unit
under command of Osman Suljic. In July, Muslims from Srebrenica
who wanted to surrender apparently received a harsh treatment by
hard-liners under command of Zulfo Tursun, Ejub Golic and Nezir
Mandzic. Such a fight, according to Deronjic, had taken place just
after the fall of the enclave at Bokcin Potok. A team of the Dutch
NOS-news discovered the corpses of tens of victims on 3 February.
NOW, CAN WE, looking at everything, say anything about the
number of missing people with certainty? The latest number of 7,000,
picked by the American State Department, seems to be far too high
for the time being, but that the fate of many Muslims who fled is
uncertain is a fact. Have they been killed on orders given from the
top, or in acts of individual revenge? Are hundreds, maybe thousands
of Muslims being held by the Bosnian Serbs and assigned to forced
labor, as some refugees in Tuzla assume or at least hope? It is about
time that an independent institution investigates suspected mass
graves, and interrogates witnesses who might have been accomplices
to mass murder (like the Bosnian Serb soldier Drazen Erdemovic,
arrested last week). Only then there will be clarity about the real
events and the actual magnitude of the tragedy in Srebrenica.
{Editor's note: even after all the evidence they have provided, the
authors still use language that assumes the credibility of the charges
against the Bosnian Serbs. Thus they speak of the need to look for
"suspected mass graves." In fact, as George Pumphrey shows in
Srebrenica: Three years later and still waiting , the NATO forces
have been looking for "suspected mass graves" since 1995 with no
result. Perhaps more damning, The US claimed to have satellite
photos of mass graves around Srebrenica, but the photos somehow
got lost.} This is the time when I mentioned there were 3 large graves. One of each for the Serb and Muslim military dead and the other was of civilians killed in the crossfire.
SerbianFire- eyes of serbia
Pedal in Peace 2003- Cycling Challenge for the Children of Serbia
