"The privileges and benefit of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government, in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding months." - Proposal by Mr. Pickney, August 20.
The proposal, along with several others, was referred to committee for consideration without debate. It emerged in its proposed form eight days later when Gouverner Morris motioned to include the text "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."
The record again clearly indicates that the power of Article 1, Section 9 pertaining to habeas corpus was of the legislature.
The same is recognized in the debate papers during ratification where references to the clause identify it as a legislative power. Take the following excerpt from the anti-federalist papers:
"In the same section it is provided, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may require it." This clause limits the power of the legislature to deprive a citizen of the right of habeas corpus, to particular cases viz. those of rebellion and invasion; the reason is plain, because in no other cases can this power be exercised for the general good." - "Brutus" (Robert Yates) Number 9, The Anti-Federalist Papers
Also in the ratification debate, delegates to the Massachussetts ratification convention clearly identified the suspension power as one of the legislature. The following excerpt is from its record of debates on January 26, 1788. As one delegate observed:
"Supposing it had been, as in our constitution, "not exceeding twelve months," yet, as our legislature can, so might the Congress, continue the suspension of the writ [of Habeas Corpus] from time to time, or from year to year. The safest and best restriction, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in which Congress are authorized to exercise that power at all, namely, in those of rebellion or invasion."
Another delegate argued that "Congress have only power to suspend the privilege to persons committed by their authority," again clearly recognizing the suspension power was with the legislature.
Thomas Jefferson clearly saw it as a legislative power as well, writing so in his autobiography:
"Those respecting the press, religion, & juries, with several others, of great value, were accordingly made; but the Habeas corpus was left to the discretion of Congress, and the amendment against the reeligibility of the President was not proposed by that body." - Thomas Jefferson, autobiography, 1821.
Considering the volume of evidence for this view among the founding fathers and other participants in the Constitution's framing, it of little surprise that Marshall ruled the way he did in Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout in 1807:
"The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case. If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide." - John Marshall, Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout (1807)
The same view appears in the two most prominent legal commentaries on the Constitution from the early 19th century. William Rawle, in his "A View of the Constitution of the United States," defines the suspension power as legislative:
"It is at any rate certain, that congress, which has authorized the courts and judges of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases within their jurisdiction, can alone suspend their power"
Echoing this position, Justice Joseph Story makes it clear that suspension is a legislative right alone in his "Commentaries on the Constitution," perhaps the most celebrated early text on the document: "It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body."
That pretty much covers it, Walt - a comprehensive list of historical documents and figures from the time of the Constitution's drafting and the decades immediately after, ALL of whom clearly recognize that the Constitution specifically gives the suspension power for habeas corpus to the legislature. To date you've only provided two sources who assert otherwise by claiming the executive has the power:
1. Abe Lincoln, who claimed it as his own (1861)
2. William Rehnquist, at a speech to a law school (modern times)
Now Walt, compare that against my list of sources that say it's a legislative power:
1. Madison's records of the Constitutional Convention (1787)
2. The Massachussetts ratification debate records (1788)
3. The Anti-Federalist Papers (1789)
4. John Marshall, in Ex Parte Bollman & Swartwout (1807)
5. Thomas Jefferson, in his autobiography (1821)
6. William Rawle, in "A View of the Constitution" (1826)
7. Joseph Story, in "Commentaries on the Constitution" (1833)
8. Roger Taney, in Ex Parte Merryman (1861)
Now tell me, Walt. Exactly where did Lincoln come up with that nonsense about a presidential power to suspend habeas corpus, and how in the world can you defend it considering it directly contradicts the overwhelming ammount of historical evidence from the U.S. Constitution's drafting, ratification, and implementation before it?
The Constitution nowhere says what the president may do in regards to the Writ. It only says what Congress may or may not do.
As I have suggested before, the perception of the powers of the three branches was different in 1861 than it is now. The power of the Supreme Court extended only to - particular cases-. Had the issue come before the Supreme Court in the form of a -case-, which it never did, and Lincoln ignore -that- then you might have a beef with Lincoln.
You are making an historical judgment on an historical person.
I think we can pretty much say that the current Chief Justice is familiar with all your data and he said (as you know):
"Lincoln, with his usual incisiveness, put his finger on the debate that inevitably surrounds issues of civil liberties in wartime. If the country itself is in mortal danger, must we enforce every provision safeguarding individual liberties even though to do so will endanger the very government which is created by the Constitution? The question of whether only Congress may suspend it has never been authoritatively answered to this day, but the Lincoln administration proceeded to arrest and detain persons suspected of disloyal activities, including the mayor of Baltimore and the chief of police."
-- Chief Justice William Rhnhquist, November 17, 1999.
Walt