Lincoln’s 'Second American Revolution'

LewRockwell ^ | November 23, 2002 | Thomas J. DiLorenzo

[WhiskeyPapa]

After negotiations have failed and when the other side has already used it, force is not in itself a bad thing.

I think Uncle Billy Sherman said something very much like that.

Walt

[GOPcapitalist]

The seizure of federal post offices, arsenals, naval bases and forts was an act of theft.

They were no more theft than when the colonies took British installations in 1776.

The government was trustee of federal property until a constitutional separation could be effected.

The root problem with your position is that a constitutional separation beyond unilateral secession was simply not possible in the situation created by the northern radicals.

This just underlines the "nya-nya-nya" school yard character of these debates. If that's what they are, fine, but surely you can do better than that.

I would tend to think your original comment, to which I responded by pointing out its applicability to yourself, better personifies what you describe. If you wish to elevate the level of the debate you must act your part as well.

[GOPcapitalist]

My reference to constitutional action was to action to dissolve the union or "unadmit" states in Congress. That Southern extremists didn't take this course was a mistake. As was accepting the dubious theories of unilateral secession and absolute state sovereignty.

At the time I do not believe they were dubious at all. The issue was wholly unresolved and a reasonable case could be made for a right of secession and a union natured the way the confederates saw it. This case was argued heavily on the floor of Congress and among the southern leadership. As for votes of unadmission, I simply don't believe it was viable. As with everything else, all indications are that the northern radicals would have opposed it.

In reference to the compromise measures in Congress in 1860, Republicans were willing to guarantee the continued existence of slavery where it existed, but not to allow the expansion of slavery.

That has been said to be their position, or at least Lincoln's position. It appeared in the Corwin amendment at the last minute, but all prior to it had been obstructed by the northern radicals to much frustration of the moderate Republicans and the rest alike.

It reflected the sentiment of those who had elected them, and they were no more apt to surrender this than Southerners were willing to support an end to slavery where it was legal in 1860.

That is fine, and by the very act of secession itself, they were left in a position where they would not have had to surrender the position. The territories in question were retained in the union save New Mexico, which joined the confederacy by itself. Had they permitted the southern states to leave they would have gotten their wish of the territories for the exclusive use of, as Lincoln put it, "free white men." But that was not all of what they wanted so they acted to invade the confederacy and coerce its obediance.

Today we can sympathize with those who worked for compromise.

Agreed.

One can surely be critical of radical abolitionists or uncompromising free soilers

Not just them. Philosophical abolitionism in itself was not a bad thing at all and in many regards they were not the problem. The problem was with those who practiced abolitionism by engaging in acts of terror. Elsewhere the problem was with not the abolitionist radicals of literature and publication but the northern radicals within the political ranks - those who sought to obstruct anything and everything southern out of radical regional hatred. Sumner and others like him were known to even block defense appropriations and troops from unguarded frontiers if they were going to a southern state, such as Texas. When time came for compromise, they continued the act of bitter radical obstructionism to the point that even the most level headed of southerners concluded they were simply impossible to work with any further.

[Colt .45]

Why should I even try and answer your stupid allegations? Every time I have repudiated your assertions about what you say Lincoln did right, all you can do is try to misdirect with the crapola about "Jeff Davis did this, or he didn't do that." You never address the stuff about the tyrant so I have come to the conclusion that trying to reason with you is like trying to teach a pig to sing ... its a waste of time and annoys the pig.

FYI ... my screen name is after the M1911A1 Colt .45 Auto Pistol ... NOT THE BEER, nitwit. Come talk to me when you grow a brain.

[stainlessbanner]

Here's another one for your cut & paste records:

Notwithstanding this, he [G. Fox] actually reported a plan for the reinforcement of the garrison [Fort Sumter] by force, which was adopted. Major Anderson protested against it. I enclose with this a copy of papers, to be used under your wise discretion, which will place these facts beyond controversy.

-Journal of the Senate of South Carolina: Sessions of 1861

[GOPcapitalist]

No, but they wanted Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland and what they could grab.

Only so far that there were sentiments in those states agreeing with the southern position. You cannot deny that confederates made up a large segment of the populations in all three states and fought for the confederacy. Missouri's legislature sought secession itself while fleeing from the political oppression of The Lincoln. Kentucky sought it by way of a convention held in rump. The Lincoln arrested the secessionists in Maryland without cause before they could act.

Just who are these "yankees"? You admit that Seward and others were for compromise.

The reference is to the northern radicals of the Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner camps.

I would also point out the role of Southern representatives in defeating the Crittenden Compromise.

Many knew it would not fly politically with the yankees and gave up trying. Even then the southern role was far less than the northern role in defeating it. The southerners had almost all left by the time elements of it came before the full chambers for a vote.

Your hero Wigfall, was he working towards compromise?

Actually he voiced an interest in some propositions to better the situation at times. He concluded early on though what most southerners came to conclude during the session - that it was simply impossible to get anywhere with the obstructionist radicals in the north. Based on that conclusion he advocated secession. He remained in DC holding his seat until his own state seceded even though he personally wanted that day to come faster. Even then and long after he had become an advocate of secession, he rose in the Senate to denounce the yankee radicals for the very core of incivility that permeated throughout their obstructionism. To Wigfall, secession was made necessary by the complete inability of northern radicals to engage in governance with everyone around them.

Your assertion that most Northerners weren't abolitionists belies your view of the conflict. If Sumner and other abolitionists were such a minority

Ah, but Sumner was not an abolitionist of the same mold traditionally affiliated with that name. He was a political free soiler with some abolitionist tendencies, but above all else, a northern radical. He was out of touch with many of the northern people, but as always many politicians are.

how did they come to hold so much power over the political process?

You tell me. How did the outright socialist Democratic Party get such a large number of their own in the congress of today? Surely you don't think its because the majority of the people they represent are card carrying socialists. If you do you would be in error as poll after poll after poll demonstrates that modern Democrats are severely out of touch on the issues with the majority of Americans.

Surely Northerners and Southerners devoted to Union and peace could have outvoted this faction.

In the Corwin amendment they did, but only after two months straight of bitter fighting against Tom Daschle style obstructionism at every term by the likes of Sumner.

[GOPcapitalist]

I think Uncle Billy Sherman said something very much like that.

The problem though is that he employed that force in such an immoral and abusive way to render the entire exercise of it a wrong.

[stainlessbanner]

You minimalist view of the Ft. Sumter do not include the events leading up to 12 April.

No, South Carolina was not concerned about 62 men (actually it was closer to 80) short on rations, penned up in a fort; they were concened about the coming attack from the US army.

How could Lincoln have known about Fort Sumter during his Campaign? This sounds like another red herring. Consider Lincoln's Inaugural Speech:

The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts.

Obviously he knew about the impending threat of secession. Perhaps he did not know it would be Sumter specifically (many thought it would be Pickens), but he was preparing.

[x]

Wigfall certainly did a lot of denouncing in that last session, but he seems to have had trouble distinguishing between "yankee radicals" and Northerners and Republicans in general. He may have "voiced an interest in some propositions to better the situation at times" but once he had set his mind on secession, his contribution was as negative and as counterproductive as anything he might have denounced. Even those on his side didn't find him conciliatory, compromise-ready or civil, sometimes not even sane.

You want to blame Republican "radicals" for the failure of compromise. I think one could blame secessionist radicals and fire-eaters with at least as much justice.

First, many compromise proposals were one-sided "compromises." Republicans were asked to give up the oldest, most important and most popular planks of their platform for nothing more than an assertion that there would be no secession at the time. In the "Crittenden compromise" virtually all the concessions were to be made by the free states. It was not likely or conscionable that representatives would repudiate the platform that they had been elected on in return for no real concessions from the other side.

Secondly, once it was clear that some states would announce their secession, the wind went out of such compromise plans. Congress had to do something -- hence the Corwin Amendment -- but compromise became a much less compelling idea. There was sentiment for keeping the union whole that dissipated once it appeared that a schism had occured. Southern commitment to union would have found a strong echo in the North.

Compromise could have helped keep the Border and Upper South states in the Union, but "could" is the operative word. Confederate commissioners were hard at work whipping up secessionist sentiment in other states, and in such an uncertain climate, Republicans and other Northerners didn't want to give up all that they thought valuable and end up with nothing to show for it. Davis's apparent willingness to risk war to provoke secession in the Upper South shows that Republican reluctance to make massive concessions was well-founded.

Third, one can't neglect the role of Davis and Toombs in killing the Crittenden compromise. If all the concessions were being made by the free states and the result wasn't enough for the Deep South slave states, some would conclude that the effort wasn't worth making. Davis also doomed the Committe of 13 by insisting on rules that would have made the Compromises of 1820 and 1850 impossible.

The failure of compromise, though, does indicate that Northerners were adapting to the idea of division. Before Sumter there was some sentiment on behalf of just letting the rebel states fall away. Had it not been for Davis's foolish assault on Sumter perhaps the country would have been peacefully divided -- with all the evils that that would bring. It would have taken some patience and self-restraint on the part of the secessionist, though, and that was something in short supply. The insistence on radical ideas of sovereignty led the South astray, but this was of a piece with the extremism that had been growing in the South for a decade.

Those who condemn Lincoln for not being wholly committed to abolition or racial equality, though, ought to feel some respect for Sumner and Stevens for sticking to their guns and not compromising with slavery. If they were not wholly in consonance with the thinking of our time, yet they ran risks and paid the consequences for progress towards the present-day consensus.

[GOPcapitalist]

Wigfall certainly did a lot of denouncing in that last session, but he seems to have had trouble distinguishing between "yankee radicals" and Northerners and Republicans in general.

I'm not so sure about that. Now, he didn't go out and sing the praises of all pro-compromise northerners like Seward, but his speeches seem to direct their expressions of frustration against those within the Sumner faction. If I remember correctly, one of his main speeches names the culprits by name and they are all from the extremist crowd.

You want to blame Republican "radicals" for the failure of compromise. I think one could blame secessionist radicals and fire-eaters with at least as much justice.

No, not really and for three reasons. First, the secessionist radicals were at very minimum willing to look at and propose compromises in name. The northern radicals would have none of it. Second, the secessionists were not there for the last part of the session when all the key compromises were being voted on, and obstructed by the northerners. Third, the secessionists, even in all their provocative and sometimes inflamatory speeches, as a whole did not approach the level of vitriolic personal incivility against their opponents that was practiced daily by the northern radicals.

Secondly, once it was clear that some states would announce their secession, the wind went out of such compromise plans. Congress had to do something -- hence the Corwin Amendment -- but compromise became a much less compelling idea.

That does not seem to be the case among those who forwarded the Corwin amendment and other compromises during the late days of the session. The compromiser's speeches indicate a seeming belief that by acting they would genuinely save the union. Others believed they would be able to take the wind out of the sails of secession and make it a minimal conflict of a few weeks at most. Seward for example expressed this second belief in February 1861.

Compromise could have helped keep the Border and Upper South states in the Union, but "could" is the operative word.

Actually that was one of the hopes. In the end though, Lincoln's use of the military and arrests went much further than any compromise to achieving this end.

Third, one can't neglect the role of Davis and Toombs in killing the Crittenden compromise.

Davis and Toombs acted in committee to delay them then left before the Crittenden proposals ever came before Congress as a whole. Their actions did not kill the compromise as its planks were pushed on the senate floor after both men departed. In all cases of the Crittenden plan, it was either voted down or obstructed by the Sumner faction.

The failure of compromise, though, does indicate that Northerners were adapting to the idea of division. Before Sumter there was some sentiment on behalf of just letting the rebel states fall away. Had it not been for Davis's foolish assault on Sumter perhaps the country would have been peacefully divided

I don't believe so as The Lincoln wanted a war and was willing to provoke it, be it at Sumter in early April or elsewhere. From December to April his letters and correspondences are filled with messages to his military commanders directing them to draw up plans and preparations to take back all the forts in the south. He was already planning for military action to retake the abandoned Fort Moultrie back in December. By the time Sumter came about, The Lincoln had dispatched a naval fleet of warships to fight its way into the fort if the confederates would not let them in the harbor. That he would have simply sat there had Sumter not been fired on is highly unlikely.

Those who condemn Lincoln for not being wholly committed to abolition or racial equality

I do not condemn him per se for those views other than their separated moral error - only those who portray him as something he was not.

though, ought to feel some respect for Sumner and Stevens for sticking to their guns and not compromising with slavery.

No, as in "sticking to their guns" on the issue of one sin, they perpetrated a countless number of other sins seen directly in the brutality of the type of warfare they delivered as direct accomplices. They were hate filled and bitter men on whose hands the blood of thousands is stained.

[WhiskeyPapa]

Walt, you don't even know what you cut and paste.

Welles (Secretary of the Navy) later wrote that until the afternoon of April 6, 1861, both he and the President understood only that the policy of the Buchanan administration was to "do-nothing," in return for which the secessionists would permit his administration "to expire without being molested."

You're wrong as usual. I am sure I've posted this to you before. Yes, I had it saved as a file.

You will tell any kind of lie.

"The still unsettled question of Buchanan's reyly to the South Carolina commissioners now provoked a final Cabinet crisis. On Saturday night [Dec 30, 1860] the body met again. The President showed his six remaining ministers a draft answer. The paper has disappeared from his records. That it conceded much more than was proper is evident from the debate which it provoked. The flaccid Toucey approved it. Thompson and Thomas opposed it only because it did not yield South Carolina an instant removal of all bayonets. Black, Stanton, and Holt however, condemned it as excessively complaisant, and Black and Stanton at least were wrought up to a high pitch of indignation.

"These gentlemen," exclaimed Stanton, "claim to be ambassadors, It is preposterous! They cannot be ambassadors, they are lawbreakers, traitors. They should be arrested. You cannot negotiate with them, and yet it seems by this paper that you have been led into doing that very thing. With all respect to you Mr. President, I must say that the Attorney-General, under his oath of office dares not be cognizant of the pending proceedings. Your reply to these so-called ambassadors must not be transmitted as the reply of the President. It is wholly unlawful and improper; its language is unguarded and to send it as an official document will bring the President to the verge of usurpation."

Once more the heat of the exchanges produced much plain speaking. When the President reserved the subject for further consideration, Black went home to spend a sleepless night. He knew to what a degree the President was still under the influence of Davis, Mason, and other Southern leaders. He was told by both Stanton and Ben Butler, two men as clearheaded as they were aggressive, that any President who negotiated with Southern conspirators upon the segregation of govemment property and the alienation of American territory would be open to impeachment. He held this view himself. Before dawn on the thirtieth he had reached a determination.

...At no fewer than seven points did Black and Stanton traverse Buchanan's letter. They objected to his implied acknowledgment of the right of South Carolina to send diplomatic officers to treat with the United States. They objected to his expression of regret that the commissioners were unwilling to go on with the negotiation; there could be no negotiation, willing or unwilling. They objected above all to his intimated readiness to make some arrangement regarding the national forts; they were not subject to any arrangement whatever. They objected to his statement of belief that the government had no right to coerce a State to stay in the Union; the government certainly had a right to coerce those who attacked national property. They objected to his implied assent to the commissioner's statement that he had made an agreement on the forts; instead, he should make a flat denial of any bargain, pledge, or agreement. They objected to phrases casting doubt upon the propriety of Major Andersen's behavior. They objected to Buchanan's tolerance of the idea that the removal from Moultrie to Sumter did possible wrong to South Carolina. If these radical amendments were adopted, wrote Black and Stanton, the whole paper would have to be recast.”

The two heads concluded with some positive words upon the need for forceful action at Charleston. The warships Brooklyn and Macedonian should be ordered thither without delay. A messenger should be hurried to Anderson with word that the government would not desert him. Troops from New York or Old Point Comfort should immediately follow. "If this be done at once all may yet . . . be comparatively safe. If not, I can see nothing before us hut disaster and ruin to the country." And the memorandum contained a stinging sentence upon "the fatal error which the Administration have committed in not sending down troops enough to hold all the [Charleston] forts."

Thus was finis written to appeasement. With Cobb and Floyd gone, with Thompson helpless, and with Black, Stanton, and Holt enforcing their views on the irresolute President by their readiness to resign if he retreated, the revolotion in the executive branch was completed.

As for ten years past, the United States had no President in the full sense of the word. A directory stood in the place of a single clear-sighted, strong-willed Chief Magistrate. But that directory was now made up of granite-constant Union men, aware of what the crisis demanded. Henceforth, Buchanan largely adopted the ideas of his stern-fronted fellow Pennsylvanians, Black and Stanton.

This was manifest in his courteous but firm reply to the commissioners, delivered December 30, essentially following Black's suggestions. He restated his desire to have Congress deal with the situation in such fashion as to avoid war over the Charleston forts. He explained away his alleged pledge to preserve the status of the forts. When he had learned of Anderson's transfer, he stated, his impulse had been to order him back to Moultrie; but the South Carolinians had immediately seized Moultrie, Pinckney, and other national property, radically altering the state of affairs. Now he was asked, under penalty of a possible attack on Sumter, to remove all the country's forces from the harbor, "This I cannot do; this I will not do," he wrote, in language at last befitting a successor of Washington and Jackson.

Major Anderson would be left where he was; his act [moving from Moultrie to Sumter] would not be disowned "against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come."

The remodeled executive department quickly showed its spirit in other ways. When the commissioners sent an insolent response to the president's letter, accusing him of breaking his pledge and choosing the path to war, it was returned with a brief endorsement that he refused to receive it. Jefferson Davis printed the response in the Congressional Globe with a cutting attack of his own on Buchanan, which several fellow-senators echoed. The moment he saw the commissioners' insulting note, Buchanan's hesitations over sthrengthening of Anderson vanished. He exclaime, "It is now all over and reinforcements must be sent." On December 31, he instructed the War and Navy departments to take steps, under which orders were issued that day to send the sloop-of-war Brooklyn to Charleston with troops, ammunition, and stores."

"A new page had been turned. The third phase in Buchanan's policy, the phase in which he asserted the right to maintain possession of the forts and other property of the govrnment even if this meant open war, and in which he turned a severe face on secessionists, had been entered upon; and it was to contnue until Lincoln came into power with a policy essential identical."

Emergence of Lincoln pp.376-79 by Allan Nevins

That's what I said yesterday, remember? This has been posted to you before -- but you'll tell any kind of lie.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

Lincoln disregarded Buchanan's agreement with Pickens and Sumter. Scott informed his commander of the agreement, but Lincoln disregarded, did not care, or decided against it.

Wrong.

Bruce Catton makes plain in "The Coming Fury" that Buchanan's policy and Lincoln's were seamless from after Floyd and the other traitors were ejected right around the new year, 1861.

I was wrong. It was "Emergence of Lincoln" by Nevins not "The Coming Fury" by Catton that relates -- there was not a nickel's worth of difference between the way the Buchanan acted after New Year's 1861 and the way Lincoln acted.

The neo-rebs will throw up the sesession traitors as perfect Christian gentlemen and then tell any kind of lie themselves.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

I think Uncle Billy Sherman said something very much like that.

The problem though is that he employed that force in such an immoral and abusive way to render the entire exercise of it a wrong.

Nah.

Walt

[Non-Sequitur]

FYI ... my screen name is after the M1911A1 Colt .45 Auto Pistol ... NOT THE BEER, nitwit.

What can I say? I based the assumption of your screen name on the quality of your responses. How anyone can be sober and say some of the things you do is beyond comprehension. And don't feel embarassed about you continued refusal to even discuss Jefferson Davis, much less try and support him. It is beyond my understanding how anyone in their right mind could ever try and justify JD's crimes. I understand completely.

[Non-Sequitur]

Look at the date on that, Stainless. December 21, 1860. At that time not a single southern state had rebelled and although South Carolina had adopted their articles of secession the day before Lincoln would have had no way of knowing that. Not a single federal facility had been siezed, Major Anderson was still in Fort Moultrie, and all was was calm. How could Lincoln have been talking about keeping or retaking Sumter and Moultrie before any threat to them had materialized?

[WhiskeyPapa]

Welles (Secretary of the Navy) later wrote that until the afternoon of April 6, 1861, both he and the President understood only that the policy of the Buchanan administration was to "do-nothing," in return for which the secessionists would permit his administration "to expire without being molested."

This wouldn't explain why The Star of the West was dispatched in January with 250 troops on board, would it?

As I said in my previous note, there is no difference between Bucnanan's policy after New Years' 1861 and Lincoln's policy. They were seamless.

This has all been discussed before.

But you'll tell any kind of lie.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

FYI ... my screen name is after the M1911A1 Colt .45 Auto Pistol ... NOT THE BEER, nitwit.

The M1911A1 .45 was a semi-automatic pistol. There was a colt .45 revolver also. So your screen name is poorly chosen.

Nitwit.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

How could Lincoln have been talking about keeping or retaking Sumter and Moultrie before any threat to them had materialized?

Now, be nice. Stainless might be the victim of generic meds.

Walt

[Non-Sequitur]

Oh you be nice, Walt, it's the holiday season. Stainless is just a victim of southron propaganda and nothing else. Keep up the attacks and pretty soon you'll be dropping your use of capital letters, calling it an Indian thing. I've seen it happen before.

[WhiskeyPapa]

Oh you be nice, Walt, it's the holiday season.

Well, you should drop him off a butterball or somrthing.

Walt