If that is the case, he is supposed to turn his firearms in to the local police dept., when the order expires he gets them back. That part is spelled out in the order. The articles I have read state that he purchased the gun after the order was issued but I won't argue that point.
He couldn't even do that - it would have required driving them on public roads, which are the articles of "interstate commerce" from which the ATF manages to get its jurisdiction. This aspect of his case is also spelled out in the brief filed by Emerson's attorney's to SCOTUS.
Text taken from the briefs:
In this case before the Court, Petitioner was unaware of any prohibition against his possession of firearms after the entry of the September 14, 1998 order. Neither the order nor the judge who entered it admonished Dr. Emerson as to its collateral effects. Furthermore, Dr. Emerson’s continuing possession of his firearms was a passive activity; that is, his possession of firearms continued in the same manner in which it had existed before the entry of the September 14, 1998 order, and it was the actions of a state district judge, not Dr. Emerson, which rendered Dr. Emerson’s possession of firearms illegal.[6] Firearms ownership, as noted by the Court of Appeals and by the district court, is a legal activity that has no attachment of opprobrium. In fact, "there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1799, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). The entry of a restraining order, unlike a felony conviction (or even a criminal conviction in general) does not effect a change in legal status that would put one on notice that one’s prior, legal possession of firearms may no longer be so. The entry of a restraining order does not even effect a change in legal status akin to being under indictment, yet it is perfectly acceptable for one under indictment to continue to possess arms owned lawfully prior to the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Finally, there was no indication to Dr. Emerson that would have prompted his inquiry into whether his continuing possession of firearms might not be legal. The September 14, 1998 order made no mention of Dr. Emerson’s possession of firearms and, in fact, specifically restrained Dr. Emerson from divesting or otherwise disposing of any property of the marital estate. As such, Dr. Emerson was perfectly justified in believing that his continued possession of firearms was not only legal, but required by the restraining order of September 14, 1998. This Court’s Lambert criteria are therefore satisfied by the facts of this case, and this Petition should therefore be granted to review the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals.B. The No-Win Scenario
Once the state district judge entered the order of September 14, 1998, Dr. Emerson was placed in a position where his conduct could not be reconciled with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). On the one hand, Dr. Emerson’s continued possession of firearms, in light of Scarborough, supra, constituted a criminal offense under that statute. On the other hand, if Dr. Emerson had attempted to divest himself of his firearms, he would similarly be guilty of an offense under the same statute by shipping or transporting his firearms in interstate commerce, as Dr. Emerson would have had to transport the firearms using public roadways (channels of interstate commerce) in order to effect the divestiture. As shipment or transportation in interstate commerce is also punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), that statute’s provisions create a situation in which it is facially impossible for a citizen who lawfully possesses firearms and subsequently becomes subject to a qualifying restraining order to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Additionally, as applied to the facts of this case, Dr. Emerson would have been subject to the additional penalties of criminal contempt in the state district court for violating the terms of the September 14, 1998 order restraining him from divesting or disposing of any property of the marital estate.[7] Under such circumstances, the fundamental notions of justice embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause mandate that the statute cannot stand, either facially or as applied to Dr. Emerson. For the Court of Appeals to hold otherwise is to so far depart from the normal course of judicial proceedings as to warrant this Court’s intervention, and this Petition should therefore be granted.