Very soon we will find out that Cuba has been producing chemical and biological weapons and it will become onother chapter in the last two democratic presidents legacy of failure
INTELLIGENCE STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH CARL W. FORD JR. BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
June 5, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my pleasure to come before the Subcommittee today to discuss the issue of what we in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research assess to be Cuba's efforts to date in the area of biological warfare. My remarks in this open forum will necessarily be limited owing to the need to protect sensitive intelligence information, but I would welcome the opportunity and am prepared to give classified remarks in a closed session.
On March 19, in my statement in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I stated INR's judgment that:
The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states.
That assessment and our concerns have not changed in the intervening 2 and half months.
Among the various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disciplines, biological warfare (BW) is perhaps the most difficult to clearly identify, absent unambiguous reliable intelligence information, owing to the dual-use nature of the technology and materials used to support a BW program. In today's world, many nations, including Cuba, have in place robust biotechnology infrastructures, as some of the world's best scientific talent has turned to this avenue of modern science to promote medical and agricultural advances in their countries. Distinguishing legitimate biotech work from work that is pursued to support either offensive or defensive BW efforts or programs continues to be a difficult intelligence challenge. In a nutshell, since basic BW production does not require large, sophisticated programs or facilities it makes the intelligence assessment function more complicated.
Cuba has several facilities involved in biological-related efforts in agriculture, medicine and veterinary science, which, as in any country, could be used for illicit purposes. This dual-use problem presents all who are committed to combating the BW threat with the dilemma of how best to assess the capabilities of any given facility against the intent to develop biological weapons.
What then can I say about the evidence for our assessment? The nature of biological weapons makes it difficult to procure clear, incontrovertible proof that a country is engaged in illicit biological weapons research, production, weaponization and stockpiling. Cuba's sophisticated denial and deception practices make our task even more difficult. That said we have a sound basis for our judgment that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research and development effort. I am prepared to discuss the evidence we do have in a closed session or leave behind a classified statement for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.