The British efforts to prevent Rhodesian independence under responsible government hinged on their claim that it was racially biased and the African majority would have no say in running the country. This was a false premise, as Smith explains:
Going back to the original Rhodesian constitution of 1923, there was no racial connotation to the franchise, and from that date there have been people of every race, colour and creed on the voters’ roll. The next step came forty years later with the 1961 constitution, and this embodied the addition of a ‘B’ roll with a debased franchise qualification especially designed to cater for our black people. The normal roll, or ‘A’ roll as it was now called, remained open to all irrespective of race, colour or creed. So this new constitution, far from trying to entrench our white people, did the reverse, and facilitated and encouraged the participation of our black people. The constitution was accepted by, and carries the signatures of, representatives of the British Government, the Rhodesian Government, and the black nationalist leaders. It enshrined the principle of ‘unimpeded progress to majority rule’ and the British representatives involved in drawing up the constitution estimated that it would culminate in a black majority government within ten to fifteen years. If this is the manner in which white Rhodesians attempted to perpetuate their rule of the country, their incompetence, not to say stupidity, was most remarkable. (p. 103)Despite last-minute pleas and even threats, the British and Rhodesian views were irreconcilable, and UDI was declared on 11 November, 1965. Smith and his government were to defy the British, the United Nations, and African extremists until 1979, keeping the Rhodesian economy functioning and even improving, despite a terrorist campaign and a UN embargo on trade.An interesting point throughout the period of UDI was the obvious contrast between the views of the British Government and the views of the British man-in-the-street. Although Wilson tried to project Rhodesia as a danger to world peace and a case for urgent UN action, the average Englishman was favourably inclined towards the simple, straight-talking style of Smith, especially when compared with the theatrical antics of those African leaders, such as Idi Amin, who demanded his removal. "Support Rhodesia" stickers proliferated in Britain and at political meetings the cry "Smith for PM in Britain" (only half in jest) could often be heard!
This attitude was particularly prevalent among the British armed forces. After UDI had been declared, Wilson sent RAF squadrons and troops to Zambia at Kaunda’s request as "protection" against the Rhodesians. The commanding officers and men made it clear to Wilson, however, that they would not comply with any order to attack the Rhodesians, their allies during the war. Instead they took every opportunity to cross the border and renew old friendships with the ‘enemy’, raising their glasses at New Year parties to toast "Smith and Rhodesia"! The RAF pilots, reluctant to depend on Zambian airfield facilities, were often guided in by the air traffic controllers in Rhodesia...
Discussions were held with Wilson on two occasions on board British warships, but without result. Here again the high regard in which the British armed forces held Ian Smith became apparent - he was invited to dine with the officers, Wilson was ignored.
Smith describes in full the numerous attempts to solve the impasse in the 1960s and 1970s, including the efforts of Henry Kissinger to mediate. For South African politicians such as Vorster he has little regard, pointing out repeatedly that they were more concerned with promoting their own detente policy than in solving the Rhodesian problem, although he had a good working relationship with the South African military, which was anxious to help as much as possible, sometimes even in defiance of their own politicians. The conference in Geneva, also unsuccessful, is described in some detail.
By the late 1970s the Rhodesians, tired of the fruitless efforts to achieve a solution in cooperation with the British, focussed their attention on obtaining an accord with some of the nationalist leaders who were prepared to renounce violence and work together with the whites in bringing about a democratic African majority government. Another reason was the fact that some whites in the security forces, although winning every battle they fought against the terrorists, were beginning to have doubts about the long-term future of the country. As Smith relates, it took a great deal of effort to get Bishop Muzorewa "into the starting stalls", but once he had been convinced to participate, he complimented Smith on his achievement in bringing together the various erstwhile enemies.
It appeared that the internal settlement was going to be accepted, with Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance visiting Rhodesia to discuss the situation, and reacting positively to what they saw and heard in the country. Later meetings with Vance, however, were less productive, as he was unable to make any decisions without first obtaining clearance from President Carter and the OAU (note that Carter went straight to the OAU for an Afrocentric communist determination -CO).
In April, 1979, Bishop Muzorewa was voted into power, and Smith, who had been preparing for retirement, changed his mind and decided to stay in politics and assist the new and inexperienced leaders. At first it seemed that the British Government, now led by Margaret Thatcher, would recognise the new government and lift sanctions. British observers had confirmed in their reports that the elections had been free and fair.
Then, in June, it was announced that the USA would not lift sanctions. Smith comments:
Carter’s hypocrisy and rank dishonesty was unbelievable and unforgivable. He advanced the reason that the removal of sanctions would be to the prejudice of our country... it was obvious to any thinking person that he had only one objective in mind: winning himself black votes in the coming presidential election. (p 306)In August Margaret Thatcher was forced to abandon her promise to lift sanctions by Nigeria and Australia at the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka. The fact that the terrorist war had not ended, but was in fact escalating, was also having an effect on the debate over whether or not to recognise Muzorewa. He had promised that the war would end, but had failed to deliver. The British pressed strongly for a new conference to discuss the situation, feeling that with the redoubtable Ian Smith out of the way, they could manipulate Muzorewa into accepting another election, this time with the participation of Nkomo and Mugabe.