CHINESE AIR FORCE TOWARDS 2015

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli Research Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis

Paper presented at the National Seminar on “Air Power in Indian Security” Organized by Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis, At Gulmohar, Habitat Centre, New Delhi October 9-10, 2000

While China’s People’s Liberation Army Air force [PLAAF] did not possess among its ranks a person of the caliber of Admiral Liu Huaqing who was instrumental in steering the Chinese Navy in to a well articulated naval power projection scheme abroad till the period 2045 and beyond, concerted modernisation of the PLAAF in the last two decades have changed its profile gradually. Indications of the PLAAF acquiring a different image were given by no less than a figure than the then paramount Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Deng called the PLAAF to shed its defensive posture and launch itself in to a top-notch force with offensive capabilities. Much before the US Air Force exhibited its prowess in the Gulf War in 1991, Deng called upon the PLAAF to “obtain control of the skies.”[1] Soon, the PLAAF leadership undertook a massive reorganization of its strategic direction, revamped its force structures, command and control mechanisms, initiated several new aviation programmes and transformed its training methods and educational system. A beginning was made in this period to “gain theatre air superiority.”[2]

PLAAF Strategy The strategic principles of the PLAAF have undergone a massive transformation in its five decades of existence. There is hardly any resemblance of any of these significant phases of PLAAF’s transformation. According to the Chinese PLAAF Officers Manual, published in June 1991, the history of the PLAAF is divided into three broad phases:

Ø The first phase spanning from the establishment of the PLAAF in 1949 to mid 1960s when it was dependent on the Soviet assistance in air force strategic, tactical and technical principles;

Ø The second phase from the late 1960s to mid-1980s coinciding with rift with the Soviet Union and self-reliance policy;

Ø From the later part of the 1980s, the PLAAF entered its third phase of tremendous changes in strategic direction with modernisation as the “central” policy and fighting local wars as part of its research.[3]

In these fifty years and above, two significant phases are clearly visible in the PLAAF strategy, viz., under the overall rubric of the People’s War [renmin zhanzheng] in the first phase and, if we omit the intermediary phase of Peoples War under modern conditions, the third and the most recent phase of Local Wars under high-tech conditions [jubu zhanzheng zai gaojishu tiaojian xia].[4] While under the previous military doctrine, the PLAAF has been a subordinate armed force to the land-based forces, several reports indicate a changing perception in the PLAAF leadership for a more independent, strategic and power projection force abroad.[5]

Broadly the differences between the earlier phases of the PLAAF strategy and the latest phase are as follows. Developed against the backdrop of repeated Taiwanese air raids on major Chinese cities on the mainland, Korean War, deployment of the US Seventh Fleet and blockade of the mainland, the PLAAF strategy in this period stressed the principles of:

ü Air defence of cities with anti-aircraft batteries, surface-to-air missiles, etc;

ü Overcoming enemy’s air offensive campaigns by active defensive postures and engaging the enemy aircraft at the frontlines;

ü “Front light, rear heavy” principle with air bases 200 km from the border.

Given these principles and the low level of technology at the disposal of the PLAAF at this juncture it is not surprising that its main role remained that of a defensive force. However, in the recent period, specifically after evaluating losses during the war with Vietnam in 1979, the local war under high-tech conditions, there was a complete transformation of the strategic direction of the PLAAF. Following principles sum up these to a large extent the new strategic demands on the PLAAF:

· Punitive air strikes against the enemy’s strategic assets deep inside the enemy’s territory;

Evidently, these principles are borrowed from the Western air force manuals and after following the changes in the modern air battles, specifically after the effective role that the US Air Force played in the Vietnam War as compared with its other armed services, Gulf War of 1991 and the Kosovo bombings in 1999. Though air defence of strategic points in China still formed the lynchpin of the PLAAF strategy, and despite several reservations on the new strategic principles of the PLAAF, what emerges out of the last two decades of massive modernization programme is that China has set its Air Force on the high-tech road.

These strategic debates have had its impact on the PLAAF force structure, inventory and training programmes. The priority given to the production of the Jian (J) series of attack aircraft- termed as “shield[s] in a warrior’s hand”- in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to the building of threatening aircraft such as bombers.[6] Recent projects focus on enhancing the PLAAF capabilities in long-range aviation, in-flight refueling, rapid reaction, electronic warfare, and resistance to electronic jamming and for real time aerial combat.

The traditional organization of the PLAAF into five groups of aviation units, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), air defence units, surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, airborne units and supporting units underwent a change.[7] Whereas the earlier organization of the PLAAF was based on the Soviet experience, current efforts reflect several features of Western influences. In the recent period there has been a thrust in the development of the Airborne Corps as it is characterised by rapid mobility and can engage in three-dimensional and omni-directional combat.

The armed forces of the China have undergone repeated demobilizations in the last five decades. Along with the announcement in 1997 of demobilsing 500,000 troops, cumulatively, the number of such troop cuts amounted to about nine times. However, in the earlier demobilization programmes, several ground troops were sent to the more professional services like the Air Force, navy and the Artillery. Concerning the PLAAF, the number of its personnel increased by leaps and bounds from about the mid 1960s from about 100,000 in 1966 to 120,000 in 1968 to 180,000 next year. After the launching of the Four Modernisations programme in 1978, and coinciding with Deng’s call to revamp the PLAAF, there was a remarkable jump in this sector from its previous high of 220,000 to 490,000 in 1980. However, after the enlarged meeting of the all-powerful Central Military Commission in mid 1985, the PLAAF was subjected to a cut of about 20,000 troops in 1986. The next major cut comes in the wake of the 1997 announcement. In 1999 nearly 50,000 PLAAF troops were slashed. However, in all these demobilisations, the number of air defence troops either was increased, as in the earlier period in 1976 when they were increased from 85,000 troops to 120,000 and again in 1980 from 120,000 to 220,000 or this sector all-together escaped the attention of the demobilisation programme.[8] The importance attached to aspects of air defence is clearly visible in retaining as many as 220,000 troops that account for more than 54 percent of the total PLAAF strength. Graph 1 sharply brings about the changes in the PLAAF composition.

Reorganisation programme also affected the administrative and combat structures of the PLAAF.[9]While the PLAAF consisted of about 12 air corps headquarters in the pre-reform period, post 1980s saw a majority of these being either completely abolished or transferred to the Military Region Air Force Headquarters [MRAFs] or placed as strategic reserves at Beijing, Shenyang and Nanjing. Further revamping took place in the 1990s with a three-layered unified command structure at Beijing, MRAFs and Air Division levels. For furthering the quick response of the airborne troops, Rapid Reaction Forces were commissioned in the PLAAF.

Another measure in this direction is the reduction in the number of obsolete aircraft from the PLAAF inventory. Several versions of the Jian-derivates were taken off from active service and some were placed under the reserves category. These include J-5s, J-6s, J-7s fighters, Hong-series bombers and Yun-transports were retired from service in the last two decades.[10] Graph 2 indicates the extent of such reductions.

Coinciding with these activities at revamping the force structures of the PLAAF, China has also in the process of expanding the potential of its aviation industry. Selective, but crucial, imports or license-manufacturing agreements were signed with several countries, especially Russia, in order to build a powerful Air Force in to the 21-century. Today China is perhaps the only country in the world believed to be undertaking the development of six different types of aircraft. While reorganising the aviation industry to include “cooperative and competitive” enterprises and reducing the number of aviation factories from 250 to 100 with a simultaneous reduction in the number of the work force, China has also began an active R&D programme in high-tech areas. In this process, nearly 34,000 workers were removed in 1998 and about 14,000 transferred to non-aerospace activities.[11] In July 1999, in a further deepening of reform, the Aviation Industries Corporation was further bifurcated in to two organisations (I & II).

Aviation Industry Besides revamping the aviation industrial structures, China has commenced simultaneous design and development of advanced fighter aircraft. These reports emerge while several countries and regions like India (Light Combat Aircraft), Israel (cancelled Lavi Project), and Taiwan (recently inducted Indigenous Defence Fighters) are still struggling to produce advanced aircraft. Major innovations attempted in these programmes are related to multi-functional air superiority with advanced fire control systems, electronics, beyond-vision air-to-air missile systems, and air-to-ground assault systems. Other areas in which China has shown keen interest are AWACS, in-flight refueling, anti-missile defenses, ECMs, automatic command and control facilities. Keen interest in these aspects and effort in this direction indicate that the Chinese have been making a transition in the guiding principles of weapons development, as two senior PLA officers in their recently written book “Unrestricted Warfare” depicted. In the recent period, China has shown its preference to the second of the following two principles: “fight the fight that fit’s one’s weapons” [the mainstay of traditional warfare] and “build the weapons to fit the fight” [the mainstay of future warfare].[12] However, as China is still struggling to produce these, in the short run, a combination of latest aircraft with the older upgraded versions is discernable.

The six versions of fighter aircrafts/fighter-bombers include FC-1, F-10 (to be developed by 2001 with Israeli technology), F-11 (a version of the re-designated Su-27 fighter aircraft), FBC-1 (JH-7 twin-engine strike fighter for long-range air cover missions), XJ-1 and a stealth aircraft.[13]Most of these developments in the Chinese aviation programme are bound to influence the air power capabilities of the country in the first two decades and beyond of the 21st Century, though other varieties may also be developed. Hence a brief evaluation of these programmes is necessary.

Tipped to be the most modern aircraft to be developed by China, the Xinjian-1 (new fighter) would be in the same class as that of the US F-22 aircraft. According to the US Office of Naval Intelligence, the XJ-1 project would come to fruition in about 2015. The design indicates that this multi-role fighter would have twin-engines. According to some reports this aircraft would have stealth features.

Reportedly based on the cancelled Israeli Lavi Project, the J-10 is one of the highly secretive ventures undertaken by China. In October 1994, some US satellites reportedly pictured two prototypes of J-10. The first flight of this aircraft was conducted in 1998 and currently four prototypes were completed for testing purposes. Speculations vary on the likely entry of J-10 into the PLAAF battle order. Some sources put this at as early as 2005. Some estimates put the total production of this aircraft at about 300, with some as carrier-borne aircraft.[14]

J-10 is being manufactured at Chengdu Aircraft Industries Corporation in two version: a single-engined and a twin-engined with Al-31F and RD-93 turbofan engines respectively. Succumbing to the American pressures, Israel reportedly declined to provide avionics and other equipment for the aircraft. Hence, the PLAAF made an agreement with the Russian Phazotron Scientific and Production Company to manufacture about 200 Zhemchoug multifunction fire-control radars in China by 2015 for integration with the J-10. The Zhemchoug design has a detection range of between 80 km and 140 km and is capable of engaging up to two aerial or ground based targets simultaneously.[15] Powered by AL-31F turbofan afterburning engines, after replacing the Pratt & Whitney PW1120 engine under western pressure, the single-engine J-10s are rated at 122.6kN Saturn/Lyulka variety, with about 55,000lb thrust. About ten such engines were reportedly imported from Russia. However, so far there is no bilateral agreement on local manufacture of this engine.[16]

The Russian Sukhoi Su-27 export variants started trickling into the PLAAF inventory from 1992 period onwards with an order for about 24 Su-27s and 4 Su-27Bs. Gradually, China bought a further batch of upgraded versions. Later, with Sino-Russian agreement, these were license-manufactured at Shenyang. These have for the first time provided air superiority for the PLAAF operations, besides being a long-range escort, ground attack in depth, combat trainer, carrier-borne interceptor, theatre bomber, EW jamming facilities, multi-role functions, etc.

Several factors make this deal a potent aspect for the Su-27s to be the harbinger of PLAAF modernisation. It is the first such single massive programme in the history of the Sino-Soviet/Russian relations. Though the first batch of aircraft was bought at barter rates, the latest deals were in terms of hard currency. The first deal, mentioned by former Russian President Yeltsin, was put at $1.2 billion. The second deal in 1996 for license manufacture amounted to about $2 billion, though such agreement does not permit for re-export of the aircraft to other countries. However, the exact number to be license-manufactured is not known, though some point to this figure at 200. Technology transfers also include the manufacture of titanium structural elements that are essential for building the fourth-generation aircraft. Nevertheless, Russia has also agreed to transfer such aircraft in large numbers to several countries in the region including Vietnam, Ethiopia, India, while Japanese pilots reportedly paid about $300,000 for a 46-day training programme aboard these aircraft. Speculations also indicate South Korean, Yemen and Malaysian interest in this aircraft.

The first two locally assembled Su-27s made their first flights in December 1998. According to reports, the Shenyang Aircraft Industry Group will take at least two years before production reaches full-speed. To ensure quality control, there are 100 Russian engineers at the plant. About six or seven Su-27s are planned to be assembled annually between 1999 and 2001 and this may be increased to 15 per year from 2002. In addition to about 200 Su-27s, Chinese also plan to acquire 40-50 ground attack version of the Su-30 fighters. In June 1999 China and Russia signed an agreement for the delivery of about 50-70 Su-30MK aircraft from 2002. Speculations indicate local production of about 250 Su-30MKs in the future.

The AL-31 turbofan afterburning engine powers not only the Su-27s but also the locally being developed J-10 fighters.[17] These engines provide a thrust of about 55,000lbs. They provide a maximum speed of Mach 2.35 at height and Mach 1.1 at sea level. With a range of over 4,000 km and AA-10 Alamo air-to-air missiles, they can reach a target of over 70 km, thus fulfilling the over-the-horizon air battle missions of the PLAAF. The fire control radars are also some of the most modern to be installed on the PLAAF aircraft. The Phazotron NO-01 Slotback coherent pulse Doppler radar multiple target search at a range of 240 km, tracks at a range of 170 km. Avionic package include infrared search and track sensor with a range of 50km and a laser range finder with a range of about 8 km.[18]

Though the gradual induction of the Su-27s has visibly elevated the air prowess of China, training and maintenance of the aircraft still remains a problem. Despite the all-round training that the Chinese pilots have undergone in Russia, the PLAAF is still beset with problems in optimum utilization of these aircraft.[19] Nearly 17 Su-27 aircraft have been lost either due to crashes or by natural calamities like typhoons.

The single-seat FC-1 lightweight multi-purpose fighter plane is reportedly under development at Chengdu from 1991 with some design assistance from MiG-33 aircraft. This is a substitute for the Super-7 aircraft. The investments for these projects are to the tune of more than $ 500 million.[20] The unit cost of the FC-1 has gone up from the estimated $10 million apiece to about $15 million, though still at the latest price, the project seems to be viable. These FC-1s are to replace 120 Pakistan’s J7MP aircraft in the near future. An agreement for their transfer to Pakistan was signed in February 1998 and a joint development and production programme agreement was signed in June 1999.[21]

The Russian Klimov RD-93 engine is being adopted for the FC-1 fighter. Given its enhanced gas-dynamic resistance to outside perturbation and its fast draught growth for high-maneuverability frontline interdictor, the RD-93 is expected to increase the performance of the Chinese aircraft.[22]

The J8II aircraft, derivative of China’s earlier J-series aircraft, is considered to be an important component in the PLAAF modernization.[23] The upgrading of the J-8II Finback B fighter/ground attack project at Shenyang with the assistance of the Grumman of the US as a part of the "Peace Pearl" project in the field of avionics has been canceled in 1990 in the wake of June 1989 incident.[24] The improvements in the J-8II are its weapons and fire control systems, onboard electronic devices, power systems. The air intake ducts of the aircraft have been moved from the nose to the sides of the aircraft, thereby providing more room for the installation of new large-diameter radar and giving the plane greater interception capability. The replacement of the engines with 2 "WP-13A" with greater thrust also gives the plane greater mobility in middle and low altitudes. The plane can carry medium-range air-to-air missiles in its two additional underwings. It can carry out all-weather interceptions as well as ground attacks. This model has a maximum takeoff payload of 17,800 kg, a maximum level flight speed of Mach 2.2, and a maximum cruising range of 2,200 km. Its take off distance is 670 meters and landing distance is 1,000 m. It is considered to be superior to the MiG-23 in overall performance. [25] Another variant, the J-8IIM is being developed by China as an export version with two up gradations, including a digital fly-by-wire flight-control system and the addition of operational pods for targeting and electronic warfare.[26]

AWACS Besides these aircraft development programmes, China has shown keen interest in the development of the AWACS aircraft. The reasons for undertaking the project are obvious: With AWACS, the efficiency of the PLAAF combat operations would increase phenomenally from about 15-55 percent, interception rate from 35 to 150 percent and prevent the enemy’s deep strike sorties by 15-55 percent.[27] Though research in this field started as early as the 1960s, progress was made in this project only in the recent years thanks to technical inputs from UK Searchwater AEW system for the PLAAF Yun-8 transports; GEC Marconi’s deal in 1996; Israeli Phalcon systems for the Il-76.[28]

Air-refueling Another area of interest for the PLAAF is air refueling for long-range missions. Progress in securing Beech refueling pods and bolt-on probes from Iran, equipment from Bedek Aviation of Israel, conversion of its H-6 bombers into refueling tankers and adaptation to the J-8II aircraft as receivers have been advertised by China. PLAAF received a shot in the arm in 1999 when, during the October 1 National Day parade in Beijing, it displayed air-refueling tankers to the public for the first time. [29]

Assessment The PLAAF has made significant progress in the last two decades of modernisation in several fields like shaping an effective strategic formulation to counter future air warfare and secure national territorial goals of the country. The advancements made in the revamping of the air force structures, procurement of weapons from indigenous sources in the light of Western obstacles, and training the personnel towards these aims are noticeable. Long-range aviation, air refueling and aerial reconnaissance and other related aspects would boost the PLAAF beyond China’s territorial airspace and deeper into the enemy’s interior. The quantitative and qualitative improvements made in the PLAAF are the most noticeable in this regard. These are expected to change the regional strategic situation and air environment in East Asia and Southeast and South Asia in the next two decades. Quantitatively, by 2015, the PLAAF intends to enrich its battle order by modern aircraft. Given the preparations in this regard, this claim can be hardly be doubted. With over 300 Su-27s, about 100-150 Su-30 MKs, about 150-200 J-10s and about 100 FC-1s for the Naval Aviation, gradual trickling of XJ-1s, up gradation of large number of J-8IIs, transports, possible acquisition of 3-4 AWACS and air refueling capabilities, the PLAAF is clearly destined to surpass the air power strengths in the region. With over 6.5 metric tonne carrying capacity aircraft like the J-10 is a suitable answer to replace the functions of additional bombers in the PLAAF inventory. In qualitative terms also the PLAAF has been making a significant dent in the region. License manufacture of the advanced AA-12 (R-77) active radar guided BVR missiles for Su-27s/Su-30s and possibly for other aircraft underdevelopment, which has a clear edge over the Mirage 2000-5s MICA air-to-air missiles, is bound to enhance PLAAF’s offensive capabilities.[30] Similarly other air-to-air missiles from Russia, like AA-11 (R-73), AA-10 (R-27R) are also expected to boost beyond the vision combat capabilities of the PLAAF. Other indicators like the fire control systems, digital avionics are also being upgraded by China with the active assistance of Russia. Similarly, advanced precision-guided munitions may also be developed by this time. Development of modern aircraft engines for greater thrust is also being attempted. The transition from turbojet technology to turbofan afterburning engines is evidently visible in this effort. The $20 billion dollar deal with Russia in October 1999 spanning the next decade could definitely contribute to the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces, including the PLAAF. However, one significant aspect of most of the military deals with other countries, China has been insisting on the technology transfers and license or joint design production of the state-of-the-art aircraft within China. Chinese experience in the aircraft development in the 1960s with the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians, Western embargoes in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, cancellation of the mutually agreed deals like the AWACS deal with Israel under the American pressure and so on have made the Chinese leadership to realize that self-sufficiency, even if partly, is of paramount importance for a nation to survive and emerge as a big power.

Though there still persist several problems related to training of the pilots on advanced aircraft, strategic airlift of troops, allocation of resources and focus to air defence measures in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991, the PLAAF poses a confidant image with its modernization programme, of which it pursues with a vengeance. Efforts towards air superiority, punitive first strikes deep inside the enemy territories and so on are unmistakable in the PLAAF operational programme in the decades to come.

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[1] Deng cited by Zhang Nongke and Weng Huainan, “A Leap Over The Past 50 Years-Viewing Development In the People’s Air Force From the Four Grand Military Parades” People’s Daily Overseas Edition November 11, 1999 p.3 in FBIS-CHI-99-1121 November 23, 1999. See also John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a Modern Air Force” International Security vol. 24 no. 1 Summer 1999 pp. 64-94 (pp.70 and 78) for Deng’s resolve to “ensure air domination [in a future war]” (ibid).

[2] See for details Zhang Jian, “Thoughts on Building China’s Naval and Air Forces” Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) August 25, 1999 p. C1 in FBIS-CHI-99-826 August 27, 1999

[3] Xin Ming (chief ed.) Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Hangkong fence [Chinese People’s Liberation Army Officers Manual: Air Force Part] (Qingdao: Qingdao Publications, 1991) [hereafter Zhonggu renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Hangkong fence] p. 163

[4] See for the changing PLAAF strategy, Liu Shunyao [chief ed.] Kongjun Da Cidian [Air Force Dictionary] (Shanghai: Cishu Publications, 1996) pp. 9-10. See for the missions of the PLAAF in the early years, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun shi [Contemporary Chinese Air Force History] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1989) p. 48; and Zong Baoquan, “Kongjun shengya 50 nian” [Air Force career in 50 years] Hangkong Zhishi [Aerospace Knowledge] (Beijing) Issue 274 January 1994 pp. 8-12

[5] See the articles written by PLAAF officers as reprinted in Michael Pillsbury ed. Chinese Views of Future Warfare (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 1997) pp. 285-310

[7] For the structure of the PLAAF see Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Hangkong fence n.3 pp. 98-100; Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995) (MR-580-AF) chapter 8 and Appendix A.

[8] These figures are based on the estimates of International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (various years) and Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (various years).

[9] One of the best such accounts is available in You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (London: IB Tauris, 1999) pp.119-24

[10] According to Lewis and Xue by 1988, 48.8 percent of aircraft, 53.9 percent of aircraft engines, 42 percent of radar systems, 50 percent of HQ-2 SAMs, and 42 percent of HQ-2 missile guidance sites were not operation in the PLAAF. See Lewis and Xue n.1 p. 74

[11] Estimates from Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2000-2001 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2000) p. 63

[12] See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publications, 1999) [FBIS translated version]

[13] As a quid pro quo for “operating” Yugoslavian electronic equipment from the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, it is speculated that the former has transferred parts of the downed US stealth fighter B-117 to the PRC for possible “reverse-engineering” process.

[14] See Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001 According to another estimate about 1,000 J-10s could join the inventory by 2010. See Prasun K. Sengupta, “China’s new-generation combat aircraft designs mature” Asian Defence Journal August 2000 p. 42

[15] See Zhang Yihong “Russian radar first for China” Jane’s Defence Weekly August 4, 1999 p.12

[17] See, for details, “China-assembled Su-27s make their first flights” Jane’s Defence Weekly February 24, 1999 p.16

[19] See Li Xi, “Chinese pilots in Russia” Bingqi Zhishi (Beijing) Issue 108 October 1996 pp. 24-27

[20]. See Hsiao Yu-sheng, " China's new general main military aircraft" Kuang-Chiao Ching [Wide Angle] in SWB FE/2522 G/8-10 January 30, 1996

[22] The RD-93 is a modified version of the RD-33 engine. It weighs about 1,055 kg and develops a draught of 5,040 kgf (unforced mode) and 8,300 kgf at full force. This is based on “Russia develops new engine for fighter planes” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Moscow) report of April 19, 2000 in SWB FE/3821 G/9 April 21, 2000

[23] Lu Mingdong, “Guochan Jian8IIM duoyong tu zhantouji” [China’s J8IIM Multi-role fighter] Bingqi Zhishi Issue 109 November 1996 pp. 6-7

[24]. See David A Fulghum, "New Chinese fighter nears prototyping" Aviation Week & Space Technology Vol 142 No 11 (March 13, 1995) p 27.

[25] See, for details, Ling Yu "New Developments of CPC's Air Force" Kuang Chiao Ching No 264 September 16, 1994 in FBIS-CHI-94-195 October 7, 1994 pp 35-40 ( p 36).

[26] The fly-by-wire system consists of a flight-control computer, cockpit interface, accelerometers, rate gyros and trim interface. The operational pods include: the forward-looking infrared/laser targeting pod developed by No.613 Institute; the KG300G airborne self-protection jammer pod developed by the Southwest China Research Institute of Electronic Equipment; and the Blue-Sky low-altitude navigation pod developed by No.607 Institute. These are designed to enhance the capabilities of the J-8IIM in the air-to-ground mode. For details, see Andrei Pinkov, “China plans to upgrade J-8IIM to boost exports” Jane’s Defence Weekly January 20, 1999 p.16

[29] See for details, Jane’s Defence Weekly October 13, 1999 pp.4-5; and “Veteran missile expert says Chinese are capable of developing missiles of advanced international standard” Xinhua October 1, 1999 in SWB FE/3656 G/4-5 October 4, 1999.

[30] For a comparison between the relative performances of such missiles, see Bingqi Zhishi Issue 114 April 1997 p.31

According to the Chinese PLAAF Officers Manual, published in June 1991, the history of the PLAAF is divided into three broad phases:

The first phase spanning from the establishment of the PLAAF in 1949 to mid 1960s when it was dependent on the Soviet assistance in air force strategic, tactical and technical principles;
The second phase from the late 1960s to mid-1980s coinciding with rift with the Soviet Union and self-reliance policy;
From the later part of the 1980s, the PLAAF entered its third phase of tremendous changes in strategic direction with modernisation as the “central” policy and fighting local wars as part of its research.
I have a revised 3-stage plan of the PLAAF:

During the first phase, from 1949 through the early '60s, the PLAAF relied completely on the Soviet Union.
The second phase, from the early '60s through the mid '80s, were the "dark ages", with old Soviet designs soldiering on.
The third phase, which began in the mid '80s, saw renewed use of modern Soviet/Russian designs with an eye of overwhelming Taiwan, the Philipines and everyone else with an interest in the South China Sea oil.

Do you know what is funny! I do not think that the Chinese stole military secrets (such as nuclear warhead miniturization tech and advanced targeting) from the US alone. There is a lot of factual evidence they must have done the same from the European nations (especially the UK or Germany) and from Israel. For example look at the following pictures. The first is of the Chinese J-10 jet fighter (a new Chinese 'design' supposed to be their first line fighter) and the second is the EuroFighter.

The J-10

The EuroFighter Typhoon

Do they not look the same? I think so!

And if you are wondering 'bout the innards of the plane this is how the J-10 was developed. Part of the J-10 (Jiang-10) frontline Chinese jet fighter was based on the Lavi fighter that the US and Israel were working on in the 80s, and when the Lavi was cancelled in '87 some (probably corrupt ...must be) Israeli guy decided to sell China one of the prototypes (together with the Israeli made ELM-2021 system for the J-10s radar and fire control). This, coupled with additional aviational expertise garnered from a single F-16 Pakistan (sold?) to China, plus a Russian AL31F (which by the way performed better than the American PW1120 originally slated for the 'original' Lavi) comprised the Chinese J-10.

In essence the Chinese must have been working overtime to get all that input ...from Russian engines and weapon systems (the missiles for the J-10 are top line Russian and Israeli missiles), Israeli tech (especially from the Lavi, plus the radar system and fire control), F-16 avionics (courtesy of Pakistan's F-16s that were bought from the US), and the exterior that seems to be a clone of the Eurofighter Typhoon (apart from the fact there is a very slight difference in the air inlets).

This makes me ask what the heck is going on.

Also how darn efficient is the Chinese spying agency! It must be either super efficient or US, Israeli and European agencies are corrupt or inept! Otherwise how can China acquire such esoteric tech ranging from the best US nuke tech to stealth tech that is supposed to be employed in their upcoming J-12 .....not to be confused with the above J-10 ....that is supposed to be fielded around 2007? Do you know what would be a shocker! What if the J-12 turned out to look like our US made F-22 Raptor! Obviously the Raptor would be better, but the J-12 would be the most lethal enemy we have (for example the J-10 may not be as good as the EuroFighter, but it is good enough to ensure the Brits do not fly Eurofighters against China with impunity. Luckily the F-22 can be able to kill botht he Eurofighter and J-10 easily, but the J-12 would be a good match for the F-22. The F-22 would still be able to defeat it but it would be a good match, and that is not nice. Unfair fights with the US in the advantage is the best thing for the US).

Anyways this should prove to be interesting. And what is even more interesting is i saw this analysis that said the best time for China to attack Taiwan would be around 2007 (that is when the Chinese military will have sufficient assymetrical warfare capabilities to viably engage the US military and keep it off the Taiwan strait. Note this does not mean China plans to win against the US ...it cannot. The game plan is to ensure that it threatens us with sufficient casualties that we stay away from aiding Taiwan. Imagine if a next generation SunBurn missile took out a US aircraft carrier? Politicians ..read Democrats ...and the families of the slain would demand why the heck we are helping Taiwan and bringing back US soldiers in bodybags ...and what would happen is that a 'Vietnam Effect' would occur where the impetus for war is stiffled). And all this will be conventional warfare since there is nothing China can do to negate the amazing ability of US nuclear weapons. Hence China would ensure that it makes the altercation strictly conventional, and by doing that it could (theoretically) manage to keep the US out of aiding Taiwan.

Anyways tis buildup by Taiwan should be quite interesting to watch.

Have a look at the other jet fighter the chinese have acquired: Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'

Again the Sukhoi is no match for a F-22 or a F-35 (JSF). Also with it may have certain abilities that beat out a USAF F-15C ...but note US pilots are some of the best trained in the globe and coupled with US detection capability (eg AWACS) a US F-15C can be able to beat a Chinese flown SU-30! After all just having a better gun does not mean you will win a gun fight. In a air battle i would put my money on a US F-15C flown by a US pilot if it is facing a Chinese flown SU-30 (after all Chinese pilots are not as well trained as the Russians plus the Chinese do not ahve our type of detection techonology i.e the AWACS). However yet again the key factor for China is not to win against the US but to ensure they can keep us out of the fray and take over Taiwan.

I wonder whwta will happen.

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