Would it be so hard for you to articulate what you're trying to say? Is it that you like to make us guess at what you really mean?
If you're trying to say that the 13th Amendment wasn't necessary but they passed it anyways, you're wrong. The Emancipation Proclamation came from the Executive branch of the government, which does not and cannot enact legislation. It required an AMENDMENT to the Constitution to SUPERCEDE state laws concerning slavery, as Congress saw it had no authority to pass a law that would have superceded state law otherwise.
That is ALSO why they passed the 18th Amendment concerning PROHIBITION. Thus, using the Commerce clause as a means to pass legislation that PROHIBITS a substance is blatently unconstitutional, as it is NOT an enumerated power within the Constitution.
Source?
Thus, using the Commerce clause as a means to pass legislation that PROHIBITS a substance is blatently unconstitutional, as it is NOT an enumerated power within the Constitution.
Nonsense.
Proyect attempts to distinguish this body of authority by arguing that, while growing marijuana for distribution has a significant impact on interstate commerce, growing marijuana only for personal consumption does not. Despite the fact that he was convicted of growing more than 100 marijuana plants, making it very unlikely that he personally intended to consume all of his crop, Proyect contends that no one may be convicted under a statute that fails to distinguish between the cultivation of marijuana for distribution and the cultivation of marijuana for personal consumption. This contention is without merit.Lopez did not purport to undermine the long-standing doctrine that "Congress may regulate activity that occurs wholly within a particular state if the activity has a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce." Genao, 79 F.3d at 1335. The nexus to interstate commerce, moreover, is determined by the class of activities regulated by the statute as a whole, not by the simple act for which an individual defendant is convicted. Thus, Congress unquestionably has the power to declare that an entire class of activities affects commerce. The only question for the courts is then whether the class is within the reach of the federal power. The contention that in Commerce Clause cases the courts have the power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 253 August Term, 1996