(7) On June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel.
(8) On October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation determined that Lieutenant General Short had not been kept `fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war'; detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in `abundance' but were not shared with the General Short's Hawaii command; and General Short was not provided `on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this'.
(16) On July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson (United States Navy, retired) responded to the Dorn Report with his own study which confirmed findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation and established, among other facts, that the war effort in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence distribution policy, and the degree to which the commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short.
FDR knew. Pearl Harbor was the first in the chain of events. Had Pearl Harbor been averted, everything after Pearl Harbor becomes hypothesis because they could very well have been averted too. Proper warning for Pearl would have changed much! Sorry you can't see that. Dec 7's a day of infamy all right, but not quite for the reason FDR thought.... people are waking up and the truth is coming out.
Again, the portions you bolded do NOT prove your claim. They are part and parcel of the Stark/Turner/Wegener problem at OPNAV Headquarters.
The information may have been collected in Washington, but the intelligence cycle doesn't begin and end with collection. It has to be analyzed (and analyzed without the benefit of the 20/20 hindsight that Admiral Hart had) and distributed to the end users. Turner's actions at War Plans, and the Wegener brothers' activities in Navy Communications, choked off the intelligence cycle as a byproduct of their political infighting and empire-building.