Not neccessarily so.
The corollary, from the first position, is, that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretense by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.
W. Rawle, A view of the Constitution, 125-56 (1829).
A mere 38 years after ratification of the Bill of Ritghts.
A little latter, in Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (1 Kel.) 243 (1846) :
the Georgia Supreme Court wrote:
I am aware that it has been decided, that this, like other amendments adopted at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the United States, and does not extend to the individual States. The court held otherwise, however, in the case of the People vs. Goodwin, (18 John. Rep. 200) and Chief Justice Spencer, who delivered its opinion, says: "The defendant's counsel rely principally on the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which contains this provision: 'Nor, shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' It has been urged by the prisoner's counsel, that this constitutional provision operates upon State courts--proprio vigore. This has been denied on the other side. I am inclined to the opinion, that the article in question does extend to all judicial tribunals, whether constituted by the Congress of the United States or the States individually. The provision is general in its nature and unrestricted in its terms; and the sixth article of the Constitution declares, that that Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding. These general and comprehensive expressions extend the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, to every article which is not confined by the subject matter to the national government, and is equally applicable to the States. Be this as it may, the principle is undeniable, that no person can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offence."
The language of the second amendment is broad enough to embrace both Federal and State governments--nor is there anything in its terms which restricts its meaning. The preamble which was prefixed to these amendments shows, that they originated in the fear that the powers of the general government were not sufficiently limited. Several of the States, in their act of ratification, recommended that further restrictive clauses should be added. And in the first session of the first Congress, ten of these amendments having been agreed to by that body, and afterwards sanctioned by three-fourths of the States, became a part of the Constitution. But admitting all this, does it follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? Is this a right reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an inalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is too dear to be confided to a republican legislature.
The preamble which was prefixed to these amendments shows, that they originated in the fear that the powers of the general government were not sufficiently limited. Several of the States, in their act of ratification, recommended that further restrictive clauses should be added. And in the first session of the first Congress, ten of these amendments having been agreed to by that body, and afterwards sanctioned by three-fourths of the States, became a part of the Constitution. But admitting all this, does it follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? Is this a right reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an inalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is too dear to be confided to a republican legislature.
So the court starts out here admitting that the intent behind the BOR was only to resrtict the federal government, and then proceeds along a very serious error of understanding: "We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures." Obviously, the BOR didn't confer anything at all upon the local legislatures. Their powers were conferred by their own state constitutions. The issue isn't whether the BOR conferred a power on state legislatures, but whether it actively restricted its powers. And as the court acknowledged here, there was no such intent to do so when the BOR was passed.