Posted on 09/20/2002 6:31:53 AM PDT by The Unnamed Chick
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
Do you admit that the federal government has overstepped its authority in prohibiting certain substances?
DO you now admit that the federal government has overstepped its authority with its restrictions on firearms.
When have I ever expressed the contrary?
Perhaps I mistook you for someone else. If so, sorry, I was wrong.
Find one.
The 2nd Circuit had this to say:
The Supreme Court in Lopez further explained that it struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act because:Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (footnote omitted). The difference between this and the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances is striking. These activities are commercial by their very nature. Indeed, in upholding a different section of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 846), we recently noted that, in contrast to the statute invalidated in Lopez, "[t]he Controlled Substances Act concerns an obviously economic activity." Genao, 79 F.3d at 1337.
It is therefore not surprising that every court that has considered the question, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, has concluded that section 841(a)(1) represents a valid exercise of the commerce power. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 1996 WL 621913, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 29, 1996); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584-85 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 136 (1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1972); Lopez, 459 F.2d at 953.
Proyect attempts to distinguish this body of authority by arguing that, while growing marijuana for distribution has a significant impact on interstate commerce, growing marijuana only for personal consumption does not. Despite the fact that he was convicted of growing more than 100 marijuana plants, making it very unlikely that he personally intended to consume all of his crop, Proyect contends that no one may be convicted under a statute that fails to distinguish between the cultivation of marijuana for distribution and the cultivation of marijuana for personal consumption. This contention is without merit.
This moron needs to be whacked up'side the head with a club of common sense.
If true, your lack of even a basic understanding is an enigma.
Regardless of what the courts say, the intent of the Founders was not to provide a catchall phrase within the Constitution that a future Congress could use to prohibit whatever they damn well please, nor was it intended that the Commerce clause be applied to virtually anything and everything under the sun.
So, for instance, Quilici vs Morton Grove would only hold in the Seventh Circuit, in which it was adjudicated. Now another circuit might reference such a decision, or the Supreme Court itself, but until adjudicated in those courts, no presumption is made. Lockyer may be trying to set up a situation where the Ninth would have to rule, and he may be doing so now because he fears that the composition of the Ninth will change soon.
It should also be noted that Emerson, which concludes that there is an individual right, is only valid in the Fifth Circuit. But since it postdates the flawed, conclusionary logic of Quillici ("Shall not be infringed" only applies to Congress), and substitutes the obvious notion of a basic, incorporated right subject to restriction upon abrogation of duty as a citizen (i.e., for conviction of a crime), any Supreme Court decision would have to consider it, and I suspect would choose this interpretation in balance against Quillici.
As such, the same applies to any other Amendment within the Bill of Rights. And accordingly, the Supreme Court erred when it declared abortion a Constitutional Right.
Care to elaborate?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.