The Terrible Logic of Nukes

The growing debate on invading Iraq hinges on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Opponents of invasion discount the existing threat by arguing that A) he is not crazy enough to use them against us, and B) if he doesn't use them, what threat are they?

The response to A is we do not know that Saddam is sane enough never to use them against us, and it is not a proposition that we should wish to test by giving him yet more time to acquire them. Saddam has acted with supreme irrationality in the past, from launching a catastrophic war against Iran in 1980 to forfeiting half a dozen opportunities offered to him in 1990 to extricate himself with advantage from Kuwait. In the annals of tyranny and on the scale of capricious savagery, he ranks somewhere between Caligula and Mao. There's not much percentage in counting on the rationality of such gentlemen.

Which brings us to objection B: What use are weapons of mass destruction anyway? Well, we had a quite extraordinary demonstration of their efficacy this summer. Just a few weeks ago, India and Pakistan appeared on the verge of war. It never happened. Not only did the feared war not go nuclear, but it did not even go conventional. Why? Many reasons, but perhaps the most important was, paradoxically, the nukes themselves. India made clear that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Pakistan, however, did not follow suit. "We ... do not subscribe to a no-first-use doctrine," declared Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S.

I can't agree with Krauthammer's evaluation of Saddam Hussein as "irrational." Evil, yes; but although he's a gambler, Hussein doesn't set out on irrational quests. He seeks to enhance his own wealth, power and status, and does only those things that he sees as good bets for those stakes.

For more thoughts, please see:

Raising A Clenched Fist

Freedom, Wealth, and Peace,
Francis W. Porretto
Visit The Palace Of Reason: http://palaceofreason.com

India and Pakistan... [did] not go nuclear... Why? Many reasons, but perhaps the most important was, paradoxically, the nukes themselves.

I read an article in my paper about this issue. The author's thesis was that multinational companies put the pressure on the Indian government to tone down the war of words. These companies have based a lot of their technical infrastructure in India, and communicated to the Indian government their desire for a stable business environment. The Indian government decided that they like the multinationals more than they hate the Pakistanis.

In reality, I think there are a good many reasons why the Indians and Pakistanis didn't go to war. Nukes, business, politics, and allies all figured in to the equation.

This is one reason why the primitive undeveloped nations of the Arab world are particularly dangerous -- the only significant economic tie the rest of the world has to them is oil, and the rest of the world can't choke that off without doing severe damage to itself.

Building more economic ties won't really be possible until the various medieval (e.g. Saudi) and totalitarian (e.g. Iraq and Iran, albeit of different strains) regimes are replaced by something civilized (at which point they won't really be a problem anymore anyway).

It's not just "What will Saddam do with the nukes?".

It's what will Saddam's offspring do with them? What if the next guy to be the leader of Iraq is even crazier? What if Saddam decides to sell these weapons to al Qaeda? Or to the Palestinians? There's lots more to this question than just is Saddam crazy enough to do it...

Perhaps one of the big reasons the multi-nationals decided to apply pressure to the Indian government was the desire of these companies to avoid losing their infra-structure investment in a mushroom shaped cloud.

Stay well - stay safe - Stay armed - yorktown

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