Chinese fixated on winning war against US via "assassin's mace."

U.S.-China Commission ^ | 7/15/2002 | Richard D'Amato

[sam_paine]

		Statement by Chairman Richard D’Amato U.S. Capitol, July 15, 2002 Thank you for coming this morning. I will make brief remarks, as will Vice Chairman Michael Ledeen, then answer your questions. This is the Commission’s first annual report to the Congress. Congress directed us to look at the wide scope of the U.S.-China bilateral economic and trade relationship, with a focus on its national security implications. We spent the last year holding hearings, engaging in original research and conducting meetings to serve as the eyes and ears of Congress. We have tried to augment Senators’ and members’ understanding of this complicated, big and growing relationship between the US and China, its dangers, trends, opportunities, and particularly its unknowns. This is a bipartisan product, the results of a broad agreement among nearly all of the Commissioners, a highly varied group of people who put fresh eyes on this subject, and approved the Report by a vote of 11-1. I want to commend Vice Chairman Ledeen for his work and support in this effort, and thank all Commissioners, most of whom are in this room, for their hard work and creative diligence. This is an educational report and an action document. Each chapter highlights findings and makes recommendations which flow from those findings. The Executive summary gives the key 21 recommendations, but you will find many others at the end of each chapter. We have copies available of our entire hearing record, and a two volume set of our documentary annex -- original research and original translations of Chinese materials. We also have released an original survey research study done at the University of Maryland, which documents Chinese media treatment of the U.S. from various perspectives. We found that U.S. policy toward China has been and is fragmented, lacking consistency and depth. It has often been driven solely by commercial interests, or by specific human rights issues, or by a particular military crisis – rather than by a comprehensive examination of all the issues which impact this relationship. Furthermore, over the last 30 years it has been dominated by strong Executive branch personalities and compulsive secrecy. We lack a sustainable consensus on the fundamental national interests of the U.S. among our elected leadership, particularly between the President and Congress. We think the nation is poorly served by this shortcoming, and it needs to be corrected, particularly as China grows in economic and military power, and the U.S. plays a substantial role in propelling that rise in power. We are also very concerned over the serious differences in the perceptions held by each country of the other, lacking agreed-upon goals, core values and shared agendas. The potential for miscommunications and serious misunderstandings is apparent. It is compounded by a dismal failure, despite long American efforts, to establish bilateral institutions for confidence building, threat reduction, and crisis management. Let me call your attention to several unique aspects of our report: Chapter 1 on conflicting national perspectives opens the report because we think it sets the framework which needs understanding and attention by the Congress. We think that Chinese strategic thinking that we have documented in this chapter is cause for concern. The Chinese leadership appears to be fixated on so-called asymmetrical warfare, or silver bullets, surprise weaponry and tactics they call assassin’s mace. We worry that they may be mesmerized by a self-deception that they can prevail in military scenarios with the U.S. on the cheap through such surprise strategies. These perceptions problems are accompanied, in our view, by the steadfast refusal of the Chinese leadership to engage us constructively on the matter of building effective bilateral confidence building institutions and procedures. We are encouraging the Administration to make renewed attempts to build such institutions. We go to some lengths to make numerous recommendations designed to enhance U.S. better understanding and knowledge of China and Chinese materials in the U.S. We recommend rebuilding the Library of Congress China collection, new national education language and area studies grants programs similar to the NDEA programs of the past, new efforts at open source collection by the intelligence community and an upgrading of the FBIS, Federal Broadcast Information Service. We know too little about China’s intentions, what they are communicating to their own people, and to us, and we need a far better level of effort. In Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 we document the growing, and very unbalanced economic relationship. We have a huge $80+ billion trade deficit, large flows of investment, R&D, private and public technology to China, as well as substantial funding from U.S. capital markets. U.S. exports of goods to China remain stagnant, while China’s exports to the U.S. are exploding. Our primary exports to China are our manufacturing capacity, R&D, and investment capital, not goods – and we differ in important ways with Europe in this area. The Chinese are dependent in substantial ways on U.S. economic flows. The impacts of this flow of resources on our national industrial base and national security is poorly documented. It needs careful monitoring. Our report calls for increased scrutiny of corporate activities in China, and a new corporate reporting system as to what investment, R&D and technology is being sent to China. We are also concerned over China’s impact on other Asian economies, particularly the Japanese, but also ASEAN and Taiwan, and call for fuller consultations between the U.S. and our Asian friends and allies on the consequences of this phenomenon for our mutual relations. Also there is a unique presentation in the Capital markets area (Chapter 6); a renewed call for more effective consultations and consensus building between the President and Congress on Taiwan policy (Chap 8). We are recommending refashioning the American toolbox of incentives and disincentives to enhance American leverage and encourage the Chinese to comply with their commitments -- in proliferation practices, prison labor agreement enforcement, IPR enforcement, and most importantly, with their far-reaching obligations under the WTO. We have proposed new American assistance programs to help China come into compliance in the WTO and build a working rule of law system in China – the success or failure of this I believe is the most important benchmark of progress as this commission’s work proceeds. The final chapter includes a series of recommendations for future Commission work, and those recommendations have now been incorporated in next years legislative appropriations bill. As you will see, they focus on proliferation, the full range and impacts of economic transfers to China, use of U.S. capital markets, corporate reporting, WTO compliance, and Asian regional impacts. A number of our recommendations have already been communicated to Congress, and several of them have already been acted upon or are being seriously considered as we speak. In concluding, one might ask our position on the policy we call "constructive engagement." My view is that if constructive engagement is to have any meaning or content beyond a superficial catchphrase, and be a sound basis for the refashioning of U.S. policy on a more coherent basis, it will have to become a real two-way street, not the sound of one hand clapping. In sum, we are looking for Chinese willingness to take steps to develop relations not susceptible to constant surprise, where the common ground is expanded and understood, open and transparent, and where cooperation and a positive atmosphere is nurtured. As yet, we do not see these things happening. Vice Chairman Ledeen.
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[kinghorse]

In my best Carlito's Way voice

Que pas-o Vato! I wus wondering how muh homey pendejo hue was hanging. El culero pinche cabrone esta en la casa! Chingala hue, good to see you there homey?

Let's see if I remember any more border slang from muh days living in the El Paso badlands. I hope I didn't say anything bad. Frankly everything sounds bad when you give it the border bravado brah!

Me and my homeys are going over to Chicos Tacos in a little while to pick up some flautas, gorditos, cheese queso, green chile caudillo stew, some chalupas and chile verde burritos. Oh and everyone who knows better will tell you USA Coke nolo contendre with Coke hecho en Mexico. Take your la garrota and jam it up your bean hole compadre.

[Map Kernow]

Note that in each case that it's been tried, the Mexican elites have not taken them up on the offer. There are several reasons for this. The biggest one now is that grabing the Southwestern US gets all those folks they worked so hard to chase OUT of Mexico back IN.

I'll be brave and dare to disagree with you. In the case of the "Zimmermann telegram" during WW I, if you'll recall, Mexico was in the throes of a protracted "revolution," which is simply a euphemism for anarchy, and the Germans were foolish to think that the Mexicans could offer them any substantive help. Still, have you never read about Pancho Villa's murderous raids north at the same time into American territory, and Pershing's punitive expedition against him? Think that happened just because Villa goofed?

And I don't agree that just because Mexico might be glad right now to get rid of population it can't support and to get their remittances from the US to float its economy, it doesn't have restoration of the American Southwest to its national territory as its long-term goal. Too many prominent Mexicans have posited this as a national goal over the last 150 years, and even more importantly, the average Mexican views the Southwest as legitimately Mexican territory. Postulating that the Mexicans "need" us economically and would thus never do anything to spoil US-Mexican relations takes no account of the broader history of US-Mexican relations or the national feelings of the Mexican people (often considerably stronger than "one-worlder" American elite opinion), and it is self-deluded, short-sighted and dangerous to construct an immigration and national security policy around it.

If there ever is a nuclear strike on the US, Mexico will probably have a really severe problem with illegal immigration from the US.

You think Mexico will have a problem absorbing US territory in the Southwest if we're prostrate from a nuclear attack??? Say good-night.

[Map Kernow]

Back to your leaden style of "humor" again, eh? Yeah well, what else can a guy like you manage? Say hello to los 'manos at Taco Bell for me.

[kinghorse]

Mapster,

If Tony Sanchez wins the Texas Governor's seat I'll be back to eat crow in prodigious quantities. If you doesn't, I'll yawn, turn up the bug zapper and roll over in my hammock.

[Poohbah]

You think Mexico will have a problem absorbing US territory in the Southwest if we're prostrate from a nuclear attack???

Yes, precisely BECAUSE we would be prostrate from a nuclear attack. Critical infrastructure in the region would be destroyed, as would the means of repairing same; the survivors would head for any place better than where they were.

As bad as Mexico is, it would be better than a Southwest where major urban areas and the transportation, electrical, and water networks had been destroyed by a large-scale nuclear strike. Many survivors would thus head south (and many of these survivors would actually be illegal immigrants coming back home).

In turn, Mexico would be forced to try and stem this flow, because that many people coming south all at once would overload THEIR infrastructure.

[Map Kernow]

In turn, Mexico would be forced to try and stem this flow, because that many people coming south all at once would overload THEIR infrastructure.

I'll be game and concede your point is plausible. However, it still doesn't mean Mexico would not absorb the US territory it lost 150 years ago---it just means it might restrict migration from its "restored" territories, by means of "internal passports," like in the Soviet Union and Communist China.

[Poohbah]

The question is whether a poor (and, without significant trade with the US, getting a LOT poorer by the minute) Mexico would be able to simultaneously do two tasks: PHYSICALLY assert its sovereignty over the Southwest (i.e., have boots on the ground occupying it) and maintain control of the old border region to keep the riff-raff out of Mexico proper.

The short answer is "no."

Every enemy of the US tries to court Mexico. They are unsuccessful Mexico understands the strategic realities far better than our enemies do. Our enemies merely wish for the US to leave what they perceive to be their sphere of influence (be it Europe, Southwest Asia, or wherever). At that, they will be very happy. They will also lack the ability to significantly project their power BEYOND their immediate region, even if they win.

In short, if Mexico joins in with an overseas foe to help accomplish the foe's strategic goals, and the foe is successful, the results of said endeavour will be as follows:

• The United States that has been ejected from an overseas region; while the deployed forces have been reduced in strength, it is unlikely that they have been destroyed in total.
• The United States, as a nation, is extremely angry.
• Mexico has, in collusion with the enemies of America, attempted to grab the Southwestern United States, in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase. They may have been successful in grabbing some territory.
• The United States is extremely PO'd at Mexico, and is right next door to Mexico.
• The United States, as a nation, is extremely angry.
• Mexico's overseas ally is, well, overseas. They are not going to be any help.
• Mexico is going to get stomped flatter than a beercan run over by a tank.

Mexico was wooed by the USSR throughout the Cold War. The Mexican government's reaction each time was, "Yo, Ivan, it's not that we overmuch LIKE the United States, it's that we have to live right next door to them, and would still have to do so even if you won."

[Map Kernow]

I don't wish Sanchez on you. And if you're going to close your eyes and go to sleep in your hammock, have your shotgun loaded and within reach at least.

[Map Kernow]

I'll be game once more and concede that you've made valid points. However, we're talking about a long-term strategy here, one that is brought closer to reality day by day by uncontrolled illegal immigration from Mexico into the US. That's what makes our current and developing situation with Mexico different from the past: an American Southwest with a substantial, plurality, or in some regions of the Southwest, majority Mexican population (with Mexican citizenship or dual Mexican-US citizenship) will be very hard to retain as part of the US, even under international law, no matter how powerful the US stays, or how angry the American people get. You can't assume that Mexicans in the Southwest who quietly and meekly go about their work right now will not lift a finger against US interests if they conflict with Mexico's, and believe me, our interests have already come into conflict with Mexico's on the issue of immigration over the last two decades, and it seems to me that it's always Mexico that has had its interests accommodated rather than us. For goodness sakes, haven't you heard about the Mexican Army incursions the past few years over the border?? What's been done about that except to hush it up on our side???

I believe the time may eventually be right, and sooner than we think, for Mexico to cast in its lot with an enemy of ours like the Chinese, but I'm going to knock you over, Poohbah, and say that I hope that you're right this time. I'm just not willing to bet money on it, that's all.

[avenir]

"It's probably too late. We can't fight a sustained war because alot of our weaponry parts are made overseas. Greed has done us in."

And China's godless communism has exalted them? Please, none of that false "American" guilt. We have a better way here IN SPITE OF our various faults.

[chilepepper]

My gut feel is that "assassin's mace" is some weapon for taking out our carriers, probably by firing a ballistic missiles at them, or perhaps some strategy of sending a swarm of KH-31's or "sunburn" type supersonic cruise missiles at them...

a good test of ABM technology of all types. too bad for China we have ballistic missiles too, so they'll get to try out their ABM technology ;)

[DoctorMichael]

Screw the Fascist Chinese Hegemonists.

[RinaseaofDs]

Either the Kaiser or Hitler tried it. Wasn't it called the Zimmerman Communique, and was intercepted before it got to Mexico?

Not sure on this.

[Rebelbase]

"Luckily most Chinese pilots do not seem to be very good pilots and thus have been crashing this very capable jet quite often (LOL) but should they learn how to use it as the Russians do"

I bet there are a lot of qualified Ex Soviet/Russian fighter pilots who are already mercenaries for the Chicoms.

[RightWhale]

They will lose.

Yes. Unfortunately, destruction will be massive everywhere.

[Tench_Coxe]

"If lower prices were not passed on to US consumers, Wal-Mart would never have become so popular."

Strawman. I know first hand that margins are increased on the products, and the savings are not passed on to the consumer.
I won't get into details, but if you are a stockholder in a consumer oriented industry, start digging into how goods are priced and where the company is having them manufactured ( and don't stop at a distribution point in the US that is termed 'a manufacturing center', but dig to find out where the actual product is being built. ). I think you'll be surprised.
That's all I'll say.

[Hollywoodghost]

You are wrong! We are not the same Americans as the ones in 1941. If Pearl Harbor comes today it will be in a different form. Like 9-11, it will come without a national flag to target. I don't think Americans will fight with the same feavor we had before--we can't. The Chinese make all of our stuff--I believe even the uniforms our troops wear are Chinese made. If they time it just right, while we are distracted by some internal problem they just might do it--seize all of Asia, from Japan to Viet Nam into a new Han Empire. And all we will do is run to the UN and apply meaningless sanctions. I could see a president Kerry doing this, can't you? Why risk losing American cities to Chinese ICBMs for some people in Asia? No, we have lost the will to fight a real war--all we can do is pick on 3rd world nations who lack Atomic weapons.

[SauronOfMordor]

I like the summary. I am afraid that all of the FedGov's eyes are on the Muslims, and the China represents a greater medium-term threat. And may be allied with some of our enemies in the Muslim world, on the sly (Iraqi weapons transfers, etc.)

I would not be surprised to learn that al Queda has been getting financial and logistical support from the Chinese, in order to provide the Chinese with a plausibly-deniable way to strike at the US

[SauronOfMordor]

Mexico was wooed by the USSR throughout the Cold War. The Mexican government's reaction each time was, "Yo, Ivan, it's not that we overmuch LIKE the United States, it's that we have to live right next door to them, and would still have to do so even if you won."

The private gun owners of the American Southwest could probably conquer Mexico without help from the US army. And Mexico knows it.