More from the ruling:
"...The order arises in the context of foreign relations and national security, where a court's deference to the political branches of our national government is considerable. It is the President who wields "delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations -- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). And where as here the President does act with statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more reason for deference. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 & n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared responsibility for military affairs.
See U.S. Const. art. I, S 8; art. II, S 2. In accordance with this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981); Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20; United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63 (1897); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 506 (1870); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
This deference extends to military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle. The authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section 2. As far back as the Civil War, the Supreme Court deferred to the President's determination that those in rebellion had the status of belligerents. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. And in World War II, the Court stated in no uncertain terms that the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the courts. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). It was inattention to these cardinal principles of constitutional text and practice that led to the errors below....
the June 11 order apparently assumes (1) that Hamdi is not an enemy combatant or (2) even if he might be such a person, he is nonetheless entitled not only to counsel but to immediate and unmonitored access thereto. Either ruling has sweeping implications for the posture of the judicial branch during a time of international conflict, and neither may rest on a procedurally flawed foundation that denied both petitioners and the government a chance to properly present their arguments, or to lay even a modest foundation for meaningful appellate review. The district court's order must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings....
Any dismissal of the petition at this point would be as premature as the district court's June 11 order. In dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping proposition -- namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so. Given the interlocutory nature of this appeal, a remand rather than an outright dismissal is appropriate. "